

Origen, Greek Philosophy, and the Birth of the Trinitarian Meaning of *Hypostasis**

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■ Origen's Technical Meaning of ὑπόστασις

Origen, far from being a precursor of “Arianism,” as he was depicted during the Origenist controversy and is often still misrepresented today, was the main inspirer of the Nicene-Cappadocian line.¹ The Trinitarian formulation of this line, which was represented above all by Gregory of Nyssa, is that God is one and the same nature or essence (μία οὐσία) in three individual substances (τρεις ὑποστάσεις), and that the Son is ὁμοούσιος to the Father. Indeed, the three members of the Trinity share in the same οὐσία.² This formulation was followed by Basil in his last phase; Didymus, Gregory of Nazianzus from 362 onwards; Evagrius; and numerous later authors.³ Origen himself had already maintained both things: that the Father, the Son, and the Spirit have the same οὐσία but are three different ὑποστάσεις, and

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¹ I have argued this in “Origen’s Anti-Subordinationism and its Heritage in the Nicene and Cappadocian Line,” *VC* 65 (2011) 21–49.

² When Origen says that the Son differs from the Father in οὐσία and ὑποκείμενον (*Or.* 15.1), he is speaking of the Son’s humanity. [The Greek throughout this article is rendered in Times font.]

³ This formula was a response to the question, “Is God one or more than one?” recently investigated by James Ernest, “Patristic Exegesis and the Arithmetic of the Divine,” in *God in Early Christian Thought: Essays in Memory of Lloyd G. Patterson* (eds. Andrew B. McGowan, Brian E. Daley, and Timothy J. Gaden; Leiden: Brill, 2009) 123–50.

Gregory of Nyssa closely followed him.⁴ As I set out to argue, Origen's thought represented a novel and fundamental theorization with respect to the communality of οὐσία and the individuality of ὑποστάσεις, conceived as individual substances, in the Trinity. He influenced not only subsequent Trinitarian theology, but perhaps even "pagan" Neoplatonism. (Likewise, on the christological side, Anniewies van den Hoek⁵ has insightfully demonstrated the importance of Origen in asking—and endeavoring to answer—the question of the unification of humanity and divinity in Christ, and Origen's influence on later formulations.)

Of course, Origen did not use ὑπόστασις only in a technical Trinitarian meaning; for instance, he also used it in the sense of "foundation";⁶ of material or incorporeal "substance";⁷ of "existence";⁸ "constitution," or "coming into existence";⁹ and of "reality" as opposed to "appearance"; "conceptuality" or "insubstantiality."¹⁰ *Comm.*

⁴ For Gregory of Nyssa's conception see, e.g., Lucian Turcescu, *Gregory of Nyssa and the Concept of Divine Persons* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Johannes Zachhuber, "Once again: Gregory of Nyssa on Universals," *JTS* 56 (2005) 75–98; Christopher Stead, "Individual Personality in Origen and the Cappadocian Fathers," in idem, *Substance and Illusion in the Christian Fathers* (London: Variorum Reprints, 1985) 170–91; idem, *Divine Substances* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977).

⁵ "Origen's Role in Formulating Later Christological Language," in *Origeniana Septima* (ed. Wolfgang A. Beienert and Uwe Kühneweg; Leuven: Peeters, 1999) 39–50. A book on this problem is forthcoming by Christopher Beeley, in which a chapter is devoted to Origen's christological doctrine. I am grateful to the author for having me read it in advance for comments.

⁶ E.g., *Comm. Jo.* 2.24.156: True life (τὴν ἀληθῶς ζωὴν) becomes the *foundation* of knowledge (φωτὸς γνώσεως ὑπόστασις γίνεται).

⁷ *Dial.* 16: What is in the image of God is immaterial and "better than every corporeal substance" (καεῖτον πάσης σωματικῆς ὑποστάσεως); *Cels.* 6.71: The incorporeal substance (ἀσώματον οὐσίαν) of the human soul, or of angels (τὴν ἀγγέλων . . . ὑπόστασιν), is imperishable and impossible to consume and annihilate. Likewise in *Or.* 27.8 "essence proper" (ἡ κυρίως οὐσία) refers to "the substance of incorporeal realities" (τῶν ἀσωμάτων ὑπόστασιν), which "possess the being stably" (τὰ ἀσώματα τὸ εἶναι βεβαίως ἔχοντα); *Philoc.* 1.28: God's gifts are immensely better than "mortal substance or existence" (τῆς θνητῆς ὑποστάσεως). [All translations and italics in this essay are mine.]

⁸ *Cels.* 6.73: A sense-perceptible body does not explain "the modality of its existence" (τὸν τρόπον τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτοῦ). But we perceive the splendor and the existence (τῆς ὑποστάσεως) of heavenly bodies by looking at them.

⁹ E.g., in *Cels.* 6.65: The principle "of the constitution of all realities" (τῆς τῶν πάντων ὑποστάσεως); *Comm. Gen.* PG 12.48.27: "The substance that formed the substratum" (τῆς ὑποκειμένης οὐσίας; i.e., the preexisting matter) should have been immense in order to be enough "for the constitution of such a big cosmos" (τῆ τηλικούτου κόσμου ὑποστάσει); *Comm. Jo.* 20.22.182: "The first and principal constitution" (ἡ προηγούμενη ὑπόστασις) of the human being is in the image of God.

¹⁰ In *Cels.* 3.23 the term refers to the (denied) real existence of pagan deities: εἰ δύνανται ὑπόστασιν ἔχειν. Likewise in *Cels.* 8.67, in reference to Athena: Let someone prove "her existence" and describe "her substance" (τὴν ὑπόστασιν καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν), "as though she had an ontological subsistence" (ὡς ὑφεστηκίαις). In *Comm. Matt.* 10.14 we find the opposition between "in fact" and "conceptually": "Kingdom of heaven" and "Kingdom of God" are equivalent "in fact" (ὑποστάσει) if not also "conceptually" (ἐπινοίᾳ); likewise in *Fr. Lam.* 16 the question is of enemies that are such "conceptually" (τῆ ἐπινοίᾳ) or also "in fact" (καὶ τῆ ὑποστάσει); see also *Fr. Jo.* 36: ἐπινοίας μόνης ἀλλ' οὐχ ὑποστάσεως; 121 bis: ἐπινοία μόνη καὶ οὐχ ὑποστάσει. A similar contrast between

Jo. 10.37.246 shows the last meaning, reality vs. appearance or mere conceptuality, in the Trinitarian context: here Origen criticizes those who differentiate the Father and the Son conceptually (κατά τινας ἐπινοίας) but not in their substance (οὐ κατὰ ὑπόστασιν).

Origen, on the contrary, maintains that the Father is endowed with his own hypostasis or individual substance and the Son with his own, different from the Father's. This is a conceptual and linguistic novelty that Origen introduced into the Christian theological field, I shall argue. That Father and Son each are made up of two distinct individual substances is repeated in *Cels.* 8.12, in which Origen opposes those who deny that they are "two different hypostases" (δύο εἶναι ὑποστάσεις). This attestation is all the more important in that it is preserved in the original Greek and is not a fragment, nor does it come from a work of uncertain attribution. The same polemic against those who denied that the Father and the Son have two different individual substances is reflected in another important passage by Origen that is preserved in Greek: *Comm. Matt.* 17.14.¹¹ Here Origen maintains that the Father and the Son are distinct both conceptually and in their individual substance. Of equal importance, both for its sure authenticity and for being preserved in Greek, is *Comm. Jo.* 2.10.75, in which Origen asserts that not only the Father and the Son, but also the Spirit are three different *individual substances*.¹² In *Fr. in Io.* 37 Origen insists that the Spirit is a hypostasis, an individual substance, and not simply an activity of God. This also confirms *Schol. Matt.* PG 17.309.47, which is of uncertain attribution, and moreover introduces the concept of the identity of nature/essence between the Persons of the Trinity: the Father, the Son, and the Spirit "are one not for the confusion of the three, but because they have one and the same nature; their individual substances are three, perfect in all of them."¹³ In *Comm. Jo.* 2.23.149, indeed, Origen explains that the Father and the Son are the same in their essence or οὐσία¹⁴ (τῆ οὐσία μὴ διεστηκέναι), but at the same time they are "not the same thing" (οὐ ταυτόν), evidently in that they are two different individuals, having different individual substances or ὑποστάσεις.

In another authentic passage preserved in Greek, *Comm. Jo.* 1.24.151, Origen criticizes adversaries who do not conceive of the Son as having an individual substance of his own, distinct from that of the Father, and who do not clarify what his essence is (his οὐσία, which Origen deems divine and common to the whole Trinity);¹⁵ these theologians rather consider the Son to be a sort of emanation from the Father, consisting

"nominally" and "in substance" is found idem 16.6: "It has two meanings indicated by the two names, but the two are one in fact [τῆ ὑποστάσει]."

¹¹ Συγγχέοντες πατρός και υιού ἔνοιαν και τῆ ὑποστάσει ἕνα διδόντες εἶναι.

¹² Ἡμεῖς τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις πειθόμενοι τυγχάνειν, τὸν πατέρα και τὸν υἱὸν και τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα.

¹³ Εἷς ἐστὶν οὐ συναλοιφή τῶν τριῶν, ἀλλ' οὐσία μᾶ τρεῖς δὲ ὑποστάσεις τέλειαι ἐν πάσι.

¹⁴ Christoph Marksches studies Origen's concept of οὐσία (*Origenes und sein Erbe* [Berlin: de Gruyter, 2009] 174–87).

¹⁵ Ὑπόστασιν αὐτῷ . . . οὐ διδόσιν οὐδὲ οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ σαφηνίζουσιν.

only in an empty name (“in syllables”)¹⁶ and not in a personal, real, and individual substance (ὑπόστασις). Origen here may be attacking Valentinian conceptions. The same is stressed in *Comm. Jo.* 1.34.243: the Son, the Wisdom of God, is not a mere representation (έν ψιλᾶς φαντασίαις), but “has a real substance of his own, an incorporeal and, so to say, living substance” (τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔχει . . . ἀσώματον ὑπόστασιν . . . ζῶσαν καὶ οἰονεὶ ἔμψυχον). It is notable that in the immediately subsequent chapter (1.35.253) Origen expressly criticizes “heretics” who, from their writings, seem to be again Valentinians. Origen further explores the individual substance of the Son in *Comm. Jo.* 1.39.292: Christ-Logos has its substance in the Wisdom of God, which is the principle of all.¹⁷ The closeness to *Sel. Ps.* PG 12.1125.2 is manifest: here the individual substance of God’s Logos, that is, its very hypostasis, includes its being Wisdom.¹⁸ In *Comm. Jo.* 2.35.215, the testimony of the Baptist concerning Christ is said to reveal Christ’s “preeminent hypostasis or individual substance” (τὴν προηγούμενην αὐτοῦ ὑπόστασιν), in that, qua Logos, Christ permeates the world, being in all rational souls. In *Comm. Jo.* 32.16.192–193, the divine hypostasis of the Son (τὴν ὑπόστασιν τοῦ μονογενοῦς) is said to be separated by some from Christ’s human aspects. In *Comm. ser. Matt.* 146.5, virtues are declared to be attached to Christ’s individual substance,¹⁹ and in *Princ.* fr. 33, a reliable Greek fragment quoted by Athanasius in *Decr.* 27.1–2, to which I shall return, Origen affirms that Christ-Logos is the image, not of the nature of God generically, but “of the Father’s own ineffable and unspeakable individual substance.”²⁰

There are several other references to Christ’s hypostasis in Greek passages from works of less certain authenticity or that have survived only in translation, but those I have adduced so far would suffice even in absence of the following. However, the correspondence between the former and the latter in the Trinitarian conception of ὑπόστασις, especially in reference to the Son, seems to confirm the value of the following attestations. In *Sel. Gen.* PG 12.109.46 Origen is criticizing those who do not admit that the Son has a substance of his own, ὑπόστασιν ἰδίαν. These adversaries base their argument on Jesus’s words, “The Father and I are one and the same thing,” which in Origen’s view does not imply that the Son has no individual substance of his own, distinct from that of the Father. In order to make it clear that with ὑπόστασις he means “individual substance,” in this case that of the Son, Origen adds ἰδία; as I shall show, the expression ἰδία ὑπόστασις was common in the philosophy of his day and was used to specify that a substance was not to be taken generally, but was proper to some particular being. The dignity of the hypostasis of the Son is referred to in *Sel. Ps.* PG 12.1581.32: κατ’ ἄξιαν τῆς ὑποστάσεως Πρωτοτόκου πάσης κτίσεως. At the same time, the Son is said to be God by essence (κατ’ οὐσίαν) in *Fr. Jo.* 1. In *Comm.*

¹⁶ Προφορὰν πατρικὴν οἰονεὶ ἐν συλλαβαῖς κειμένην.

¹⁷ Λόγος . . . ὁ Χριστός . . . ἐν ἀρχῇ, τῇ Σοφίᾳ, τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔχων.

¹⁸ Ἡ Σοφία . . . ὑπάρχει τῷ Λόγῳ τοῦ Θεοῦ κατὰ τὴν ὑπόστασιν.

¹⁹ Ἀντανακολουθοῦσα ὡς αἱ ἀρεταὶ τῇ ὑποστάσει τοῦ Χριστοῦ.

²⁰ Τῆς ἀρρήτου καὶ ἀφθέγκτου ὑποστάσεως τοῦ Πατρὸς.

Rom. 7.12.146–147 Origen criticizes *haeretici* who deny that the Father and the Son have the same essence or nature (οὐσία, φύσις), but are different in their *proprietas*: “male separant Filium a Patre ut alterius naturae Patrem alterius Filium dicant.” Origen opposes to this what he regards as the correct view: the “properties” of each Person of the Trinity should be considered to belong to each Person’s individual substance or ὑπόστασις, while the essence or nature is common to both (“*proprietas quidem Patri et Filio et Spiritui Sancto suas cuique dabit, nihil autem diuersitatis esse confitebitur in substantia uel natura*”). “*Substantia uel natura*” renders οὐσία. Rufinus in *Adult. lib. Orig.* 1 explicitly states that Origen applied ὁμοούσιος to the Father-Son relationship: *Patrem et Filium unius substantiae, quod graece homoousion dicitur, designavit.* In *Fr. Jo.* 123 the individual substance that is referred to is that of the Spirit, and here again the addition of ἰδία is found, to emphasize that it is the substance proper to the Spirit alone, as distinct from God the Father; the polemic is against those who deem the Spirit simply “God’s energy or activity, without a substantial existence of its own” (ἐνέργειαν θεοῦ, μὴ ἔχον ἰδίαν ὑπόστασιν).

The *Dialogue with Heraclides*, discovered on a Toura papyrus from the end of the sixth century and unknown from any other source before this find,²¹ offers a stenographic record of a public discussion, part of which is highly relevant to the present investigation in that it is devoted to an assessment of the Father-Son relationship. First in a series of questions to Heraclides, and then in his own exposition, Origen clarifies how it is that the Father and the Son are two and distinct from one another, but at the same time they are one God. Although the key term ὑπόστασις does not pop up here—probably for the sake of simplicity and the lack of a philosophical context—Origen’s conception of two distinct hypostases in one and the same divine nature is clear and extensively illustrated. In 2.18 and 21–22 the Son is presented as distinct, ἕτερος, from the Father,²² and this distinction resides in the difference ὑποστάσεις of the two. At the same time, both the Son and the Father are God, and yet they are not two Gods.²³ Origen, who posited two hypostases, or better three if we take into consideration the Spirit as well, had to be careful not to give the impression of positing two or three Gods. Thus, in 2.30–31 he sets out to explain “in which respect the Father and the Son are two, and in which these two are one and the same God.” And in 3.20–4.9 his explanation makes it clear that his conception of two hypostases but one divine nature or essence countered both a kind of pre-“Arianism” or “adoptionism,” which denied the divinity of the Son, and what Origen himself calls μοναρχία, which postulated only one divine

²¹ *Entretien d’Origène avec Héraclide* (ed. Jean Scherer; SC 67; Paris: de Cerf, 1960). In English: *Dialogue of Origen with Heraclides and His Fellow Bishops on the Father, the Son, and the Soul* (trans. Robert J. Daly; New York: Paulist, 1992).

²² Ἐτερος ὢν τοῦ Πατρὸς ὁ Υἱὸς καὶ αὐτὸς ἐστὶν Θεός.

²³ 2.24 and 26: γίνονται ἐν δύο Θεοί; ... ὁμολογοῦμεν δύο Θεούς.

hypostasis, that of the Father.²⁴ The term μοναρχία appears only here among all extant works of Origen. It does not mean one single power or authority, but rather one single principle, one single ἀρχή. This “heresy,” indeed, denied the *hypostatic* distinction between the Father and the Son, whereas Origen maintained *three distinct hypostases* in the Trinity, coinciding with the three ἀρχαί of all. His very Περὶ Ἀρχῶν, which opens with a treatment of the Father, the Son, and the Spirit, and resumes this same treatment in Book 4 as a conclusion to the whole investigation, probably refers in its title to these three ἀρχαί.²⁵ The three principles for Origen coincide with the three hypostases of the Trinity, but God is one, and the distinct hypostases share the same divine οὐσία.

In a fragment preserved by Pamphilus, *Apol.* 50, from Origen’s lost commentary on 1 Timothy, Origen criticizes those Christians who consider the Father and the Son to be one and the same hypostasis in an effort to avoid the accusation of ditheism:

utī ne uideantur duos deos dicere neque rursum negare Saluatoris deitatem, unam eandemque subsistentiam Patris et Filii adseuerant, id est duo quidem nomina secundum diuersitatem causarum recipientem, unam tamen ὑπόστασιν subsistere (id est unam personam duobus nominibus subiacentem, qui latine patripassiani appellantur).

What I have put in parentheses is a gloss by Rufinus, who first chose to translate ὑπόστασις with *subsistentia*, which is typical of him and already of Victorinus,²⁶ and then to leave the very Greek term; finally, in his own gloss he translated ὑπόστασις with the Latin *persona*. Thus, Origen in this passage reaffirms that the Father and the Son are two different hypostases.

Also, ὑπόστασις is used by Origen to refer to the substance of each soul, for example in *Cels.* 6.26.²⁷ Especially from *Princ.* 3.1.22 it is clear that for Origen,

²⁴ Ὁ Σωτὴρ ἡμῶν . . . πρὸς τὸν Πατέρα καὶ Θεὸν τῶν ὅλων ἐστίν . . . εἰς Θεός . . . τηροῦντες τὴν δυάδα . . . ἐμποιοῦντας [*sic*] τὴν ἐνάδα . . . οὐδὲ εἰς τὴν γνώμην τῶν ἀποσχισθέντων ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκκλησίας εἰς φαντασίαν μοναρχίας ἐμπίπομεν, ἀναιροῦντων Υἱὸν ἀπὸ Πατρὸς καὶ δυνάμει ἀναιροῦντων καὶ τὸν Πατέρα. Οὐτε εἰς ἄλλην ἀσεβῆ διδασκαλίαν ἐμπίπομεν, τὴν ἀρνουμένην τὴν θεότητα τοῦ Χριστοῦ.

²⁵ Clement called God “first principle/cause” (*Strom.* 4.162.5: ἀναρχος ἀρχὴ τῶν ὅλων; 5.71.5: πρῶτον αἴτιον; 5.81.4: πρῶτη καὶ πρεσβυτάτη ἀρχή); he was referring to the Father proper, whom he identified with the One and the Good; as for the Son/Logos, he called him “second cause” (δεύτερον αἴτιον, *Strom.* 7.16.5).

²⁶ Victorinus used it in *Adv. Arianos* 2.4 to indicate each hypostasis of the Trinity. See Werner Beierwaltes, “*Substantia* und *subsistentia* bei Marius Victorinus,” in *Hypostasis e Hyarxis nel Neoplatonismo* (eds. Francesco Romano and Daniela Taormina; Florence: Olschki, 2004) 43–58. And Rufinus used *subsistentia* to indicate an individual substance, precisely in the sense that Origen defined with ὑπόστασις, as opposed to the more general *substantia* which corresponds to οὐσία (see, e.g., his *Hist.* 1.26 and 10.30). On the use of *substantia* and *subsistentia* in Rufinus see also *Traité des Principes* (eds. and trans. Henri Crouzel and Manlio Simonetti; 5 vols.; SC 252–253, 268–269, 312; Paris: Cerf, 1978) 2(SC 253) 23, 34, 46.

²⁷ Κολάσεις χωνευομένων, τῶν ἀναλαβόντων εἰς τὴν ἑαυτῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ὑπόστασιν τὰ ἀπὸ κακίας.

exactly as with the Trinity, rational creatures share in one and the same nature, but each of them has its own *individual* substance or hypostasis.²⁸ Rational creatures' individual substances are all distinct from one another, but they all share in the same nature. This parallel between humanity (or all rational creatures) and the Trinity on this score—i.e., each individual of each of these two natures has its own hypostasis or individual substance, but all individuals within the same nature share in one and the same essence—is the basis of Gregory of Nyssa's so-called social analogy, which I deem inspired by Origen's present conception.²⁹ This is hardly surprising if Gregory drew inspiration from Origen for his core Trinitarian conception of μία οὐσία, τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις. The individuality of the substance of each rational creature and, in the specific case of human beings, of each soul, is emphasized in *Sel. Ezech.* PG 13.817.21: "Each soul has its own individual substance, which consists in its own rationale, and not a different one."³⁰ For Origen, this is true both of each soul and of each Person of the Trinity.

Origen's idea that all human beings, and even all rational creatures, each one having its own ὑπόστασις, nevertheless share in one and the same nature or essence (οὐσία), was arguably formed and strengthened against the backdrop of his anti-Valentinian polemic. Whereas the Valentinians divided humanity into three different natures (οὐσίαι, φύσεις)—i.e., material, animal, and spiritual, which also implied different behaviors and different eschatological destinies—Origen insisted that all humans and all rational creatures have the same οὐσία, and that their behaviors and eschatological destinies depend on each one's free will. Both the Valentinian division of humanity into different οὐσίαι and Origen's treatment of οὐσία against this conception are evident in Heracleon's fragments and Origen's criticism of his work.³¹ The same οὐσία and φύσις for all the souls is also asserted in a fragment preserved by Pamphilus (*Apol.* 33, from Origen's lost commentary on 1 Timothy),

²⁸ Μιάς φύσεως πάσης ψυχῆς . . . ἐνὸς φυράματος ὄντος τῶν λογικῶν ὑποστάσεων (= *Philoc.* 21.21).

²⁹ On the so-called "social analogy" between humanity and the Trinity, see Giulio Maspero, *Trinity and Man: Gregory of Nyssa's Ad Ablabium* (Leiden: Brill, 2007); I fully agree with him and with Sarah Coakley that the "social analogy" of the Trinity (which implies the application of the technical notions of οὐσία and ὑπόστασις both to the Trinity and to humanity) should not give rise to psychologizing readings of the intra-Trinitarian relationships, and at the same time with Maspero that the social analogy should not be interpreted as one among the many analogies used by Gregory as a metaphor and mere rhetorical device.

³⁰ Ἐκάστη ψυχὴ ἰδίαν ὑπόστασιν ἔχει, ἐν τῷ ἰδίῳ λόγῳ ἰσταμένη, καὶ οὐκ ἐν ἄλλῳ.

³¹ In fr. 24, from Origen, *Comm. Jo.* 13.25, Heracleon asserts that the "pneumatics" have the same nature as God the Father and the Spirit and are ὁμοούσιοι τῷ ἀγεννήτῳ φύσει καὶ παμμακαρίᾳ. Origen replies that, if the "pneumatic" nature is ὁμοούσιος with God and yet commits adultery (since the Samaritan woman is an adulteress but is taken by Heracleon as a representative of the "pneumatic" nature), then the nature of God can commit adultery, which is blasphemous. For Origen, only the Persons of God are ὁμοούσιοι with one another, and likewise all human beings are ὁμοούσιοι with one another. This is why in fr. 44, from *Comm. Jo.* 20.18, Origen corrects Heracleon in quoting Jesus's words: not "you belong to the nature [τῆς οὐσίας] of the devil," but "your father [τοῦ πατρὸς] is the devil." Immediately afterwards, Origen refuses to define some human beings ὁμοούσιοι with the devil, endowed with a different οὐσία than that of the "psychics" and the "pneumatics."

in the framework of an anti-Valentinian argument, which, as usual, shows Origen's concern for theodicy: "non omnes humanas animas unius eiusdemque dicunt esse substantiae sed diuersas naturas animarum, inter eas haereses numerandi sunt quae iniquitatem in Excelso loquuntur ac iniustitiam inaequalitatemque eius accusant."

Thus, Origen's distinct conception of ὑπόστασις, as opposed to οὐσία, emerges manifestly both in his Trinitarian discourse and in his discourse on the rational beings, or *logika*: both the divine nature and the rational nature are divided into a multiplicity (respectively three or many) of individual substances or ὑποστάσεις.

■ The Lack of a Technical Theological Meaning for ὑπόστασις in the Writings of Theologians Prior to Origen (and Gregory of Nyssa)

Origen, as I have just shown, distinguished οὐσία and ὑπόστασις clearly when speaking of the Trinity, thereby creating a technical terminology. In this, as I am going to argue next, he differs from earlier theologians—and from Athanasius and even the Fathers who issued the Nicene canons, who used the two terms rather interchangeably; this interchangeable use went on as far as the Cappadocians' mature thought. An eloquent example of such interchangeability from Clement is *Strom.* 5.1.3.2; another from Irenaeus is *Haer.* 1.8.16.³² In Irenaeus ὑπόστασις usually means substance in general, that of a whole category.³³ Unlike Origen, Irenaeus never uses ὑπόστασις in the sense of "individual substance." In Athenagoras a combined expression, τῆ τῆς οὐσίας ὑποστάσει, is even found (*Leg.* 24.5). Neither does Tatian seem to have any distinctive usage of ὑπόστασις as "individual substance." He employs this term in the sense of "substance"³⁴ or "foundation." God is the foundation and principle of all that came into existence (*Or.* 5.1);³⁵ in *Or.* 6.2 Tatian is speaking of the resurrection, when the body's substance (ὑπόστασιν), visible only to God after one's physical death, will be restored to its original state. In 15.3 ὑπόστασις seems to designate the category of the demons.³⁶

But even after Origen, and before Gregory of Nyssa and the late phase of the Cappadocians, the technical distinction between οὐσία and ὑπόστασις in the Trinitarian field failed to be perceived by many. Athanasius provides an interesting example in a remarkable quotation from Origen in *Decr.* 27.1–2. While Origen's own text in this quotation displays the above-mentioned distinction, Athanasius's words,

³² Clement: ὑπάρχειν αὐτήν . . . οὐσίαν . . . καὶ φύσιν καὶ ὑπόστασιν; Irenaeus: τὴν τούτου οὐσίαν καὶ τὴν ὑπόστασιν.

³³ *Haer.* 1.1.10: τὴν λοιπὴν πᾶσαν ψυχικὴν ὑπόστασιν, ὡς ψυχὰς ἀλόγων ζώων, καὶ θηρίων, καὶ ἀνθρώπων; *ibidem*: τοὺς ἀγγέλους, καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν πνευματικὴν τῆς πονηρίας ὑπόστασιν; 1.1.11: τὴν πνευματικὴν ὑπόστασιν; see also 1.5.1; 1.8.3.

³⁴ See, e.g., *Or. ad Gr.* 6.2: ἐν ὑποστάσει τῆς σαρκικῆς ὕλης ὑπῆρχον.

³⁵ Αὐτὸς ὑπάρχων τοῦ παντὸς ἢ ὑπόστασις κατὰ μὲν τὴν μηδέπω γεγενημένην ποίησιν μόνος ἦν.

³⁶ Ἡ τῶν δαιμόνων ὑπόστασις οὐκ ἔχει μετανοίας τόπον.

which paraphrase Origen's text, entirely overlooks that distinction, since ὑπόστασις is employed by him in the sense of οὐσία:

Regarding the eternal coexistence of the Logos with the Father and its not having a different essence or substance [μὴ ἐτέρας οὐσίας ἢ ὑποστάσεως], but its being the Father's own offspring . . . you can hear again also from Origen the hardworker: "If he is the image of the invisible God, he is an invisible image. I would even dare add that, being also similar to the Father, there is no time when he did not exist. For, when is it that God did not have the effulgence of his own glory, so that someone would dare posit a beginning of the Son, while he did not exist before? When is it that the image and impression of the ineffable and inexpressible *substance* [ὑποστάσεως] of the Father, the Logos who knows the Father, did not exist? The person who dares say, 'There was a time when the Son did not exist,' should consider that she or he will also affirm: 'Once upon a time Wisdom did not exist, the Logos did not exist, Life did not exist.'"

Athanasius quotes Origen verbatim, and in Origen's own words (τῆς . . . ὑποστάσεως τοῦ Πατρὸς εἰκόν) ὑπόστασις means "individual substance;" for it is only the Father who is ineffable and impossible to name, not the Son, who reveals the Father. On the contrary, when in the introduction Athanasius says, in his own words, οὐσίας ἢ ὑποστάσεως, he uses ὑπόστασις in the sense of "substance," but not of "individual substance," which Origen distinguished for the three Persons of the Trinity. In Athanasius's own words, οὐσία and ὑπόστασις are synonyms. Indeed, he means that the Father and the Son have the same substance, and not the same individual substance. Athanasius uses the two terms interchangeably in his *Tomus ad Antiochenos* as well.³⁷ The same indistinctive use of οὐσία and ὑπόστασις, different from Origen's technical distinction, is found in the earliest Nicene document, Eusebius's *Letter to his own Church*, preserved by Socrates *Hist. Eccl.* 1.8 and quoted by Athanasius himself (*Decr.* 33).³⁸ In § 4 Eusebius quotes the first credal formula proposed by the bishops. Then, he explains, Constantine introduced "ὁμοούσιος" (§ 7). Thus, Eusebius quotes the second Creed issued by the bishops and the emperor, which, in the passage concerning the Son, explains that he was generated from the very essence or nature of the Father, and is of the same nature as the Father.³⁹ Then, anathemas are appended against those who claimed that "there was a time when the Son did not exist," that "before being begotten, the Son did not exist," that he "came into being from non-being" as a creature (ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων), and, most interestingly for the present argument, that the Son is "of a different *hypostasis* or *ousia*" from the Father (ἐξ ἐτέρας ὑποστάσεως ἢ οὐσίας). Here ὑπόστασις does not indicate the individuality of the Father or the Son, but the "substance" or "essence" of all the Trinity—the meaning being that the Father and the Son have the very same substance—and is a synonym of οὐσία. Thus here, just

³⁷ This is rightly noted by Thomas Karmann, *Meletius von Antiochien. Studien zur Geschichte des Trinitätstheologischen Streits in den Jahren 360–364 n.Chr.* (Frankfurt a.M.: Lang, 2009).

³⁸ Athanasius *Decr.* 33; Socrates *Hist. Eccl.* 1.8; Theodoret *Hist. Eccl.* 1.12; Opitz 22.42.

³⁹ Ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ Πατρὸς . . . γεννηθέντα οὐ ποιηθέντα, ὁμοούσιον τῷ Πατρὶ.

as in Athanasius's words and in Basil's earlier usage,⁴⁰ οὐσία and ὑπόστασις are treated as synonyms, differently from what happens in Origen's works.

■ Lack of Acknowledgment of Origen's Innovation and of Investigation into Its Source(s)

Against the backdrop of the analysis conducted so far, the terminological and conceptual specificity of Origen stands out all the more clearly. This specificity and its import are due to the fact that Origen first introduced the use of ὑπόστασις as "individual substance" into Christian Trinitarian terminology. This is a remarkable innovation that laid the foundations of a consistent Trinitarian doctrine, and indeed proves fundamental in light of its *Wirkungsgeschichte* (reception history), especially in that it was inherited by Gregory of Nyssa and the orthodox Constantinopolitan formulation. But scholars have often failed to realize this innovation and, what is more, have left its intellectual background and roots in darkness. Even Jürgen Hammerstaedt's foundational study does not pay to Origen and his sources of inspiration the attention they deserve.⁴¹ Nor do many scholars who have studied the development of the hypostasis doctrine in later Christianity acknowledge the writings of Origen and his sources of inspiration—either in the past century⁴² or in

⁴⁰ See Stephen Hildebrand, *The Trinitarian Theology of Basil of Caesarea* (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 2007). The first phase of Basil's Trinitarian theology (360–365) is analyzed in ch. 2: Father and Son are ὁμοιοούσιοι, not ὁμοούσιοι, and ὑπόστασις is still used as a synonym of οὐσία. Toward the end of the 360s (ch. 3) Basil used ὁμοούσιος and distinguished ὑπόστασις and οὐσία. See also Stead, *Divine Substance*; Heinrich Dörrie, "Hypostasis. Wort- und Bedeutungsgeschichte," *NAWG* 3 (1955) 35–92, idem, *Platonica Minora* (Munich: Fink, 1976) 12–69; Reinhard Hübner, "Basilius von Caesarea und das Homoiousios," in *Christian Faith and Greek Philosophy in Late Antiquity. Essays in Tribute to George Christopher Stead* (ed. Lionel Wickham and Caroline Bammel; Leiden: Brill, 1993) 70–91, 663–71; Volker H. Drecoll, *Die Entwicklung der Trinitätslehre des Basilius von Cäsarea* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1996); Lucian Turcescu, "Prosopon and Hypostasis in Basil of Caesarea's *Against Eunomius* and the Epistles," *VC* 51 (1997) 374–95; Joseph T. Lienhard, "Ousia and Hypostasis: The Cappadocian Settlement and the Theology of 'One Hypostasis,'" in *The Trinity* (ed. Stephen Davis, Daniel Kendall and Gerald O'Collins; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 99–121; Lewis Ayres, *Nicaea and Its Legacy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) 187–221 on the development of Basil's Trinitarian theology and terminology. On the homoiousian doctrine I limit myself to referring to Winrich Löhner, *Die Entstehung der homöischen und homöusianischen Kirchenparteien* (Bonn: Wehle, 1986); idem, "A Sense of Tradition: The Homoiousian Church Party," in *Arianism after Arius* (ed. Michael Barnes and Daniel Williams; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1993) 81–100.

⁴¹ Jürgen Hammerstaedt, "Hypostase," *RAC* 16:986–1035; see also Rex Witt, "Hypostasis," in *Amicitiae Corolla* (ed. H. G. Wood; London: University of London Press, 1933) 319–43.

⁴² See Franz Erdin, *Das Wort Hypostasis. Seine bedeutungsgeschichtliche Entwicklung in der altchristlichen Literatur bis zum Abschluss der trinitarischen Auseinandersetzungen* (Freiburg: Herder, 1939); Severino González, *La formula μία οὐσία τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις en san Gregorio de Nisa* (Rome: Gregoriana, 1939); Louise Abramowski, "Trinitarische und christologische Hypostasen," *TP* 54 (1979) 38–49; Patrick Gray, "Theodoret on the 'One Hypostasis.' An Antiochene reading of Chalcedon," in *Studia Patristica 15* (ed. Elizabeth A. Livingstone; Berlin: Akademie, 1984) 301–4; Joseph T. Lienhard, "The 'Arian' Controversy: Some Categories Reconsidered," *TS* 48 (1987) 415–37; Jean Galot, "Une seule personne, une seule hypostase: origine et sens de la formule

the latest years.⁴³ The same is true also in connection with the Trinitarian concept of essence/substance (οὐσία). Christopher Beeley takes a particular position regarding the relationship between οὐσία and ὑποστάσεις in the Trinity according to Gregory Nazianzen. Against a backdrop of causality and monarchy of the Father, divine unity is located “in the monarchy of the Father, by which the Father fully shares his being with the Son and the Spirit.”⁴⁴ As noted by Christophe Erismann, John of Damascus posited ὑπόστασις as individual substance and οὐσία as the essence of all members of a species. I observe this is Origen’s use; John inherited it via the Cappadocians and Maximus the Confessor.⁴⁵

To my knowledge, only Alastair Logan has attempted to explain briefly what might have inspired Origen on this score, and has hypothesized that “gnostics,”⁴⁶

de Chalcédoine,” *Greg* 70 (1989) 251–76; Lucian Turcescu, “*Prosopon* and *hypostasis*,” *VC* 51 (1997) 374–95; Hans Georg Thümmel, “Logos and Hypostasis,” in *Festschrift U. Wickert, Die Weltlichkeit des Glaubens in der Alten Kirche* (ed. Dietmar Wyrwa et al.; Berlin: de Gruyter, 1997) 347–98; David G. Robertson, “Stoic and Aristotelian notions of substance in Basil of Caesarea,” *VC* 52 (1998) 393–417.

⁴³ Jean-Noël Guinot, “De quelques réflexions de Théodore de Cyr sur les notions d’*ousia* et d’*hypostasis*,” in *Munera amicitiae* (ed. Rossana Barcellona and Teresa Sardella; Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2003) 213–27; Peter Gemeinhardt, “Apollinaris of Laodicea,” *ZAC* 10 (2006) 286–301; Kevin Corrigan, “*Ousia* and *Hypostasis* in the Trinitarian Theology of the Cappadocian Fathers,” *ZAC* 12 (2008) 114–34, and Holger Strutwolf, “Hypostase und *Ousia* in *Contra Eunomium des Basilii*,” in *Von Homer bis Landino* (ed. Beate Regina Suchla; Berlin: Pro Business, 2011) 403–34.

⁴⁴ Christopher Beeley, *Gregory of Nazianzus on the Trinity and the Knowledge of God* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 207.

⁴⁵ Christophe Erismann, “A World of Hypostases: John of Damascus’ Rethinking of Aristotle’s Categorical Ontology,” *StPatr* 50 (2011) 267–300.

⁴⁶ The often puzzling complexity of this category is underlined by Karen King in *What Is Gnosticism?* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003), with my review in *Invigilata Lucernis* 25 (2003) 331–34; Iliaria Ramelli, “Gnosticismo,” *Nuovo Dizionario Patristico e di Antichità Cristiane* 2:2364–80; Zlatko Pleše objects to a total deconstruction of the gnostic category (“Gnostic Literature,” in *Religiöse Philosophie und philosophische Religion der frühen Kaiserzeit* [ed. Rainer Hirsch-Luipold et al.; Tübingen: Mohr, 2009] 163–98). Hans F. Weiss studies the reception of the New Testament in “Gnosticism” and accepts this category (*Frühes Christentum und Gnosis* [Tübingen: Mohr, 2010]). Ismo Dundenberg builds upon Williams’s and King’s arguments and regards the term “gnostic” as misleading in particular for Valentinianism, on which he focuses (*Beyond Gnosticism* [New York: Columbia University Press, 2008]). He sees the school of Valentinus, like those of Basilides and Justin, as a philosophical school. Likewise, Philip L. Tite denies the accuracy of umbrella terms such as “Gnosticism” and even “Valentinianism” (*Valentinian Ethics and Paraenetic Discourse: Determining the Social Function of Moral Exhortation in Valentinian Christianity* [Leiden: Brill, 2009]). On the other hand, Weiss regards Gnosticism as a religion of its own, consistent in itself, and opposed to Christianity as a different religion (*Frühes Christentum*, 510); it used the New Testament only in order to confirm its own, non-Christian, ideas (434, 456 and *passim*). An opposite view is held by Barbara Aland, who thinks that Gnosticism (“Gnosis” in her terminology) is a Christian phenomenon, relatively unitary, and unthinkable outside Christianity (*Was ist Gnosis?* [Tübingen: Mohr, 2009]). In Lester Grabbe, Gnosticism is described as a kind of inverted Judaism (*An Introduction to Second Temple Judaism* [New York: T&T Clarke, 2010] esp. 109–27). David Brakke, besides providing a useful history of scholarship on “Gnosticism,” adopts a middle position between the rejection of this category altogether and its uncritical use; this category “must be either abandoned or reformed” (*The Gnostics: Myth, Ritual, and Diversity in Early Christianity* [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University

especially “Valentinians,”⁴⁷ first might have used this terminology in their Platonic exegesis.⁴⁸

This is uncertain, however. First of all, let me point to *Comm. Jo.* 1.24.151, in which, as I have shown, Origen criticizes adversaries who deny that the Son has an individual substance (ὑπόστασις) different from that of the Father. If these adversaries were “Valentinians,” as is likely, this would suggest that there is more of an *opposition* than of a continuity between Origen’s notion of an individual ὑπόστασις for each Person of the Trinity and the Valentinian conception. Moreover, I have already observed that Origen’s technical use of οὐσία to designate a nature that is one and the same for all Persons of the Trinity, and on the other hand one and the same for all rational creatures (whereas each divine Person and each rational creature has an individual substance of its own), developed in the context of his debate *against* “Valentinianism,” which divided humanity into three different natures or οὐσίαι. Thus, it is unlikely that there was a Valentinian notion of one οὐσία and more ὑποστάσεις for the divine nature just as for the human nature. Also, there is no evidence of a gnostic technical use of ὑπόστασις as “individual substance.”⁴⁹ Marcellus of Ancyra may suggest this in a passage edited by Logan,⁵⁰ but he uses the vocabulary of his post-Nicene times, and we cannot be sure that Valentinus used it. Marcellus is criticizing the

Press, 2010] 19), but Irenaeus used it taking the designation γνωστικοί from the Sethians, who, Brakke argues, first applied it to themselves. Mark J. Edwards, too, considers the term “gnostic” not heresiological, but used by some gnostics whom exponents of the Great Church deemed “falsely so called” (*Catholicity and Heresy in the Early Church* [Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2009] 11–34). Hugo Lundhaug avoids the “Gnosticism” category for the *Gospel of Philip* and the *Exegesis on the Soul (Images of Rebirth)* (Leiden: Brill, 2010), and Birger Pearson, keeps the label “gnostic” especially for the Sethians (*Ancient Gnosticism* [Minneapolis: Fortress, 2009]). See also my “Apokatastasis in Coptic Gnostic Texts from Nag Hammadi and Clement’s and Origen’s Apokatastasis: Toward an Assessment of the Origin of the Doctrine of Universal Restoration,” *Journal of Coptic Studies* 14 (2012).

⁴⁷ I put the term in quotation marks. Within Valentinianism itself, different trends can be noticed, as well as common features. See only Christoph Marksches, *Valentinus Gnosticus? Untersuchungen zur valentinianischen Gnosis mit einem Kommentar zu den Fragmenten Valentinus* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1992); idem, “Valentinian Gnosticism: Toward the Anatomy of a School,” in *The Nag Hammadi Library after Fifty Years* (ed. John D. Turner and Anne McGuire; Leiden: Brill, 1997) 401–38; Einar Thomassen, who rightly remarks on the term “Valentinian” as heresiological (*The Spiritual Seed: The Church of the Valentinians* [Leiden: Brill, 2008] 4); Ismo Dundenberg, “The School of Valentinus,” in *A Companion to Second-Century Christian ‘Heretics’* (ed. Antti Marjanen and Petri Luomanen; Leiden: Brill, 2005) 64–99; idem, *Beyond Gnosticism*. On the distinction of a Western and an Eastern Valentinianism (Hippolytus, *Haer.* 6.35; Tertullian *Carn. Chr.* 15) see Joel Kalvesmaki, “Italian versus Eastern Valentinianism?,” *VC* 62 (2008) 79–89, and my *Bardaisan of Edessa* (Piscataway, N.J.: Gorgias, 2009) 62–70.

⁴⁸ “Origen and the Development of Trinitarian Theology,” in *Origeniana IV* (ed. Lothar Lies; Innsbruck: Tyrolia, 1987) 424–29, esp. 424–27.

⁴⁹ Logan is, however, right in seeing Origen’s usage as anti-Monarchian. On Origen’s anti-Monarchianism, see above and Antonio Orbe, “Orígenes y los monarquianos,” *Greg* 72 (1991) 39–72.

⁵⁰ Alastair Logan, “Marcellus of Ancyra (Pseudo-Anthimus), ‘On the Holy Church’: Text, Translation and Commentary. Verses 8–9,” *JTS* 51 (2000) 81–112, at 95.

Arians for their doctrine of three ὑποστάσεις. This is, of course, the doctrine that was eventually accepted by the church as “orthodox,” but Marcellus deemed it heretical and preferred to adhere to what has been defined as a “monoprosopic” view; in fact it was a “monohypostatic” view. In the passage under examination, Marcellus assimilates the Arians’ “heretical” doctrine to Valentinus’s “heretical” doctrine: the Arians “teach three hypostases [ὑποστάσεις], just as Valentinus the heresiarch first invented in the book entitled by him *On the Three Natures* [φύσεις]. For he was the first to invent three hypostases [ὑποστάσεις] and three Persons [πρόσωπα] of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, and he is discovered to have filched this from Hermes and Plato.” Marcellus uses ὑποστάσεις and πρόσωπα, while the only thing that he literally quotes from Valentinus is the title of his book, *On the Three Natures*. This in fact referred to the three natures (οὐσίαι or φύσεις) of human beings theorized by Valentinus, σαρκικοί, ψυχικοί, and πνευματικοί, and rejected by Origen. Marcellus, who ascribes to Valentinus the idea of three divine hypostases, which he himself rejects, states that Valentinus took it from Plato and Hermeticism. Remarkably, the association of ὑποστάσεις and πρόσωπα is not found either in “Gnosticism” or in Origen; it likely reflects Marcellus’s own fourth-century terminology.

Indeed, Origen *never* used πρόσωπον as a synonym of ὑπόστασις in its Trinitarian meaning to designate a Person of the Trinity (whereas this usage is found in Hippolytus, roughly at the same time).⁵¹ In its many occurrences in his writings, even when it refers to God, Christ, or the Spirit, πρόσωπον means either “face/sight/presence,”⁵² or “character” in a rhetorical-literary sense (the character who is

⁵¹ *Haer.* 247.13 Nautin: δύο πρόσωπα ἔδειξεν, δύναμιν δὲ μίαν.

⁵² In *Cels.* 6.41 it is the face of God, according to the Gospel expression: οἱ ἄγγελοι τῶν ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ μικρῶν . . . λέγονται βλέπειν τὸ πρόσωπον τοῦ ἐν οὐρανοῖς Πατρὸς; the same scriptural reference is in *Cels.* 8.34; *Or.* 11.5; 28.3; *Hom. Luc.* 35 p. 198; *Comm. Matt.* 13.28; *Exp. Prov.* PG 17.205.45; *Sel. Ps.* PG 1268.31, 1416.23; see also 1609.35. Other examples in the sense of “face” or “presence” of God or Christ, often based on scriptural echoes, are found in *Cels.* 6.5: “Ἐλαμψε τοῦτο τὸ φῶς . . . τῆς δόξης τοῦ θεοῦ ἐν προσώπῳ Χριστοῦ; *Comm. Jo.* 32.27.338.3: πρὸς φωτισμὸν τῆς γνώσεως τῆς δόξης τοῦ θεοῦ ἐν προσώπῳ Ἰησοῦ; 6.40.206: τὸν ἀποσταλέντα ἄγγελον πρὸ προσώπου τοῦ Χριστοῦ (= 6.23.124); 2.31.190: Ἰσραὴλ ὁ ἐν προσώπῳ θεοῦ; 6.19.104: τὸ φῶς τοῦ προσώπου σου, Κύριε (= *Or.* 9.2; *Hom. Jer.* 5.9 and 6.1; *Sel. Ps.* 1165.17); 13.4.22: ὀφθῆσθαι τῷ προσώπῳ τοῦ θεοῦ; *Philoc.* 15.7: φωτισμὸν τοῦ εὐαγγελίου τῆς δόξης τοῦ θεοῦ ἐν προσώπῳ Χριστοῦ; *Princ.* 4.3: Καίεν ἔξερχόμενος ἀπὸ προσώπου τοῦ θεοῦ (see also *Or.* 23.4; *Schol. Apoc.* 21; *Hom. Jer.* 16.4); *Or.* 23.3: ἐκρύβησαν . . . ἀπὸ προσώπου κυρίου; 5.11: ἀπὸ προσώπου τοῦ θεοῦ εὐλαβούνται. . . τὸ πρόσωπον τοῦ θεοῦ γινόμενον ἐπὶ τοὺς ποιοῦντας τὰ κακά (likewise in *Fr. Lam.* 112; *Sel. Ps.* 1228.17); *Hom. Luc.* 10 p. 64.23: προπορεύση γὰρ πρὸ προσώπου κυρίου ετοιμάσαι ὁδοὺς αὐτοῦ (likewise in *Fr. Luc.* 53a.3); *Philoc.* 15.19: τὸ πρόσωπον θαυμάσις τοῦ Ἰησοῦ μεταμορφωθέν; *Hom. Jer.* 19.12: τὸ πρόσωπον μέχρι τοῦ δεῦρο Ἰησοῦς οὐκ ἀπέστρεψεν ἀπὸ αἰσχύνῃς ἐμπυσμμάτων; *Comm. Matt.* 11.14: τῆς δόξης τοῦ θεοῦ ἐν προσώπῳ τοῦ Χριστοῦ; 12.37: τὸ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ λάμπει ὡς ὁ ἥλιος; likewise in 12.43; *Fr. I Cor.* 66: εἰς τὸ πρόσωπον τοῦ θεοῦ; *Sel. Ps.* PG 12.1061.24: ἐπὶ βλεψον εἰς τὸ πρόσωπον τοῦ Χριστοῦ; 1068.42: οἱ ἀφηρημένοι ἐκ προσώπου Κυρίου; 1165.9: τὸ ὀνομαζόμενον πρόσωπον τοῦ Θεοῦ; 1165.47: τὸ φῶς τοῦ προσώπου Κυρίου; 1188.25: ἀπολούνται ἀπὸ προσώπου τοῦ Θεοῦ; 1188.31: τοῦτο ἐργαζόμενον αὐτοῖς τοῦ προσώπου

speaking in a scene).⁵³ In *Sel. Ps.* PG 12.1424.12 Origen means that the Son is “the face [πρόσωπον] of the Father, as an impression of his individual substance,”⁵⁴ and not “the Person of the Father.” He is the Father’s “face” in that he is the image of the Father’s substance (Heb 1:3; see below) and thus reveals the Father.⁵⁵ The Son reveals the Father’s Person, but is not that Person. Πρόσωπον in Origen *never* means “Person” of the Trinity, at least never directly,⁵⁶ unlike ὑπόστασις, which designates each Person’s individual substance.

Moreover, Marcellus had a somewhat polemically motivated view of Origen’s Trinitarian thought, as is proved by his deeming Origen’s early works a basis for “Arianism,” especially for his idea that the Son is begotten by the Father’s will as

τοῦ Θεοῦ; 1217.12: ἐξέρχεται ἐκ προσώπου τοῦ Θεοῦ; 1224.28: ὀφθήσεται ὁ ἅγιος τῷ προσώπῳ τοῦ Θεοῦ; 1228.21: πῦρ ἀπὸ προσώπου αὐτοῦ κατεφλόγισεν; 1268.22: ζητούντων τὸ πρόσωπον τοῦ Θεοῦ. Ἀλλ’ οὐδεὶς ζητῶν πρόσωπον τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἐνθάδε πρόσωπον Θεοῦ ὄψεται: Οὐ γὰρ ὄψεται ἄνθρωπος ὢν τὸ πρόσωπόν μου καὶ ζήσεται; likewise 1281.25 and 31; 1296.29: Ἀπέστρεψας τὸ πρόσωπόν σου, καὶ ἐγενήθην τεταραγμένος; 1296.37: τὸ πρόσωπον τοῦ Θεοῦ; 1416.16: οἱ ἅγιοι ὀφθήσονται τῷ προσώπῳ τοῦ Θεοῦ; 1505.22: πρόσωπον τοῦ Θεοῦ τῆκει ἀμαρτωλούς; 1505.41: Ταραχθήσονται ἀπὸ προσώπου αὐτοῦ τοῦ πατρὸς.

⁵³ *Cels.* 2.20: ἐν ἑκατοστῷ καὶ ὀγδόῳ λέγεται ἐκ προσώπου τοῦ σωτήρος ψαλμῷ . . . (= *Philoc.* 23.12): Origen means that the speaking voice is that of Christ; likewise *Cels.* 2.62: Προελέεκτο γὰρ ἐκ προσώπου Ἰησοῦ ἐν τῷ προφήτῃ; 5.6: λέγοντι ἐκ προσώπου θεοῦ; likewise 6.55 and 7.20; *Comm. Jo.* 1.2.146; ἐπιφέρῃ ἐκ προσώπου θεοῦ; 6.39.196: ὅσα ἐκ προσώπου Χριστοῦ ἐν ψαλμοῖς ἀναγράφονται; likewise 10.34.222; *Engastr.* 4 refers to the speaking character that is the Spirit: τίνος πρόσωπόν ἐστιν τὸ λέγον . . . ἄρα τὸ πρόσωπον τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος . . . ἢ πρόσωπον ἄλλου τινός; *Philoc.* 13.2: τὸ ἐν Ἐξόδῳ γεγραμμένον ἐκ προσώπου τοῦ θεοῦ; *Hom Jer.* 17.4: ὁ αὐτὸς προφήτης ἔλεγεν ἐκ προσώπου τοῦ θεοῦ; *Comm. Matt.* 13.18: Ἡσαΐα ἐκ προσώπου τοῦ σωτήρος λέγοντι . . . ; 16.3: Ἡσαΐας ἐκ προσώπου τοῦ θεοῦ φησιν; 16.22: ὡς ἐκ προσώπου τοῦ Πατρὸς λεγομένων προφητειῶν; *Ep. Greg.* 2: γεγραμμένον ἐκ προσώπου τοῦ θεοῦ; *Sel. Ps.* PG 12.1125.22: ἐκ προσώπου Χριστοῦ εἶναι τὰ ἐπαγγελλλόμενα; likewise 1125.35; 1144.51: ἀπὸ προσώπου τοῦ Κυρίου; 1168.17: ἐκ προσώπου τοῦ Χριστοῦ ὁ ψαλμὸς ἀπαγγέλλεται; 1284.35: λέγων ὡς ἐκ προσώπου τοῦ Θεοῦ; 1292.16: ἐκ προσώπου τοῦ Χριστοῦ λέγεται; likewise 1293.12; 1409.37: ἐκ προσώπου τοῦ Σωτήρος εἰρησθαι; 1444.23: πρόσωπον Χριστοῦ τὸ λέγον; *Fr. Act.* PG 14.832.14: τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον ἐκ προσώπου τοῦ Θεοῦ λαλεῖ; *Comm. Jo.* 19.16.102.3 τοῦτον εἰρημένον τὸν τρόπον ἐκ προσώπου τοῦ σωτήρος; 32.23.296: τὸν εἰκοστὸν ἔκτον Ψαλμὸν ἐκ προσώπου τοῦ σωτήρος προφητεύεσθαι; *Philoc.* 7.2: τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα ἐκ προσώπου τοῦ θεοῦ λαλεῖ . . . οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ Χριστὸς ὁ λαλῶν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα ἐκ προσώπου τοῦ Χριστοῦ.

⁵⁴ Πρόσωπον Πατρὸς ὡς χαρακτῆρ ὑποστάσεως αὐτοῦ.

⁵⁵ The same meaning (“face”) is also found *ibidem* 1600.17: Πρόσωπον Θεοῦ ὁ χαρακτῆρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτοῦ; 1204.15: πρόσωπον τοῦ Πατρὸς Υἱός.

⁵⁶ As I have shown, Origen refers to the Son or the Spirit with πρόσωπον in the sense of a character speaking in a scene, which is different from designating their individual substance. According to Marie-Josèphe Rondeau, however, even this designation of the Son or the Spirit as a πρόσωπον or character speaking in a scene eventually contributed to the development of the idea of the Trinity as composed of three Persons (*Les commentaires patristiques du Psautier (III^e–V^e siècles), II: Exégèse prosopologique et théologie* [Rome: Pontificio Istituto Orientale, 1985]). She especially focuses on the expression ἐξ προσώπου, in situations in which the Psalmist is said to speak “from the mouth” or the character of Christ. On Origen’s “prosopological” exegesis, see Andrea Villani, “Origenes als Schriftsteller,” *Adamantius* 14 (2008) 130–50.

a second hypostasis.⁵⁷ On the basis of all the observations adduced so far, therefore, Marcellus cannot be considered a reliable source on Origen's Trinitarian doctrine, its sources, and its aftermath. His assertion that it derives from "Valentinianism" is at best suspect.

■ The Sources of Origen's Notion of ὑπόστασις: The Philosophical Side

If the terminological and conceptual innovation of Origen in his notion of ὑπόστασις does not derive from Valentinianism, and given that no other suggestions seem to have been offered by scholarship so far, it is necessary to direct the present investigation elsewhere. On the basis of a systematic and complete examination of the use and meanings of the term ὑπόστασις in authors anterior to or contemporary with Origen, a Christian Platonist,⁵⁸ I deem it very probable that Origen's Trinitarian concept of ὑπόστασις as "individual substance" of each Person derives from Greek philosophy (besides the Bible, on which see below), and in particular from philosophers of the first and second century C.E.

Indeed, a methodical analysis, based on all extant linguistic evidence from the beginning of Greek literature to Origen's time (first half of the third century C.E.), proves extremely fruitful. I shall not take into consideration here several meanings of ὑπόστασις that are well attested both in classical and in Judaic and Christian literature, but have only little to do with philosophical and theological concepts, such as "basement, foundation" of a building;⁵⁹ "sediment" or even "excrement" or "abscess";⁶⁰ a kind of cloud (Diodorus Siculus, *Bibl. hist.* 1.38); the act of resisting or settling down (Aristotle, *Mete.* 368b line 12), of supporting,⁶¹ or of lying in ambush (Sophocles, fr. 719). Also, ὑπόστασις means one's wealth or property, especially in the LXX⁶² and in papyri (POxy 1274.15), where it also means a document attesting property (POxy 237.viii.26). Other meanings are: "topic, subject" of a literary work, speech, etc.;⁶³ "plan, intention" (Diodorus Siculus, *Bibl. hist.* 1.3, 1.28, 15.70, 16.32); "courage" (Polybius, *Hist.* 4.50.10, 6.55.2); or "hope" (Ezek 19:5; Ruth

⁵⁷ The source of Marcellus's accusation that Origen began to study Christian texts only after he had become expert in Greek philosophy may be Porphyry (*ap. Eus. Hist. Eccl.* 6.19.7–8), according to Alastair Logan, "Marcellus of Ancyra on Origen and Arianism," in *Origeniana VII*, 159–63.

⁵⁸ As I have proposed in "Origen, Patristic Philosophy, and Christian Platonism," *VC* 63 (2009) 217–63, and with further arguments in "Origen the Christian Middle/Neoplatonist," *JECH* 22 (2011) 98–130, Origen could even have been the homonymous Neoplatonist mentioned by Porphyry in his *Vita Plotini* and by subsequent Neoplatonists. This does not affect the present argument.

⁵⁹ Diodorus Siculus, *Bibl. hist.* 1.66; 13.82; Philo, *Belopoeia* 84.9.

⁶⁰ E.g., Hippocrates, *De arte* 40; *Steril.* 242; *Coac.* 146, 389; *Aph.* 4.69, etc.; Aristotle, *Mete.* 358a line 8; 358b line 9; 382b line 14; *Hist. an.* 551b line 29; *Part. an.* 647b line 28; 677a line 15; Theophrastus, *Hist. plant.* 9.8.3; Galen, 6.252.

⁶¹ Hippocrates, *De arte* 55; Aristotle, *Part. an.* 659a line 24; Ps 68[69]:3 [LXX].

⁶² Deut 11:6: τὰς σιγῆν ἀντὼν καὶ πᾶσαν αὐτῶν τὴν ὑπόστασιν; Jer 10:17.

⁶³ Polybius, *Hist.* 4.2.1, Diodorus Siculus, *Bibl. hist.* 1.3.

1:12 [LXX]). Moreover, it was a technical term in Greek astrology and rhetoric, in the latter indicating the full expression of a concept (Hermogenes, *De ideis* 1.11).

But let me turn now to the philosophical side. The primary meaning of ὑπόστασις attested in philosophy is “substance,” which can be used in a generic or a very specific way. This meaning can also apply to material substances, such as a “dry substance” (Aristotle, *Gen. an.* 726a line 21: τῆς ξηρῶς ὑποστάσεως), or wood (Theophrastus, *Caus. plant.* 5.16.4), or any other substance.⁶⁴ One of the best attested meanings of ὑπόστασις is “substance” as “existence,” even “reality,” especially as opposed to “appearance” or “mental abstraction.” This is a relatively generic meaning and occurs very often from Hellenistic philosophy to Origen’s time (sometimes, as I have shown, this sense is used also by Origen himself).⁶⁵ Notably, this is also the meaning attested for Gnosticism in the title of one of the most famous treatises from the Nag Hammadi library (NHC 2.4): the *Hypostasis of the Archons*, in which *hypostasis* (originally the Greek term, transliterated into Coptic) does not mean “individual existence,” as in Origen’s Trinitarian usage, but “reality” and “ontological consistence” as opposed to “fictitiousness.”⁶⁶ The same meaning in Gnosticism is attested in Clement, *Exc.* 3.52.2: evil does not admit of any substance or ontological consistence per se.⁶⁷ According to Hippolytus, *Haer.* 7.21.4–6, Basilides maintained that God, who is beyond being, gave substance (ὑποστήσας) to a seed of the cosmos, but he did not use ὑπόστασις in Origen’s Trinitarian sense. The seed, to which God “gave substance,” becomes the “foundation” of the cosmos; it is identified with the Sonship, which is said to have the same οὐσία as the Father.⁶⁸ Hippolytus is certainly one of the authors whom Eusebius had in mind when in his aforementioned *Letter to his Church* he, motivating the decision of the Nicene council, observed that “ὁμοούσιος” was

⁶⁴ Polybius, *Hist.* 34.9.11: τὴν δὲ πέμπτην ὑπόστασιν χωνευθεῖσαν.

⁶⁵ Boethius, fr. 8: πρὸς τὴν φαντασίαν vs. κατὰ τὴν ὑπόστασιν; Aristotle(?), *De mundo* 395a line 30: κατ’ ἔμφασιν vs. καθ’ ὑπόστασιν; Posidonius, fr. 339 Theiler: κατ’ ἔμφασιν vs. καθ’ ὑπόστασιν; fr. 267: διαφέρειν δὲ τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς ἄλλης τὴν οὖσαν κατὰ τὴν ὑπόστασιν τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ μόνον; fr. 311: κατ’ ἐπίνοιαν καὶ καθ’ ὑπόστασιν; Critolaus, fr. 14, from Stobaeus, *Ecl.* 1.8, 40b: νόημα ἢ μέτρον τὸν χρόνον, οὐχ ὑπόστασιν; *Placit.* 3.6; 4.14; Artemidorus, *Onirocr.* 3.14: φαντασίαν πλοῦτου vs. ὑπόστασιν; Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 26.4: πᾶν τὸ ὄν ὑπόστασιν ἔχει; Lucian, *Par.* 27; Sextus Empiricus, *Pyrrh. Hyp.* 2.94; 2.176; Marcus Aurelius, 9.42; Diogenes Laërtius, 7.135: καὶ κατ’ ἐπίνοιαν καὶ καθ’ ὑπόστασιν; 9.91; Clement, *Strom.* 7.17.107.5: κατὰ τε οὖν ὑπόστασιν κατὰ τε ἐπίνοιαν; Alexander of Aphrodisias, *In Metaph.* p. 375.32: εἰ καὶ μὴ ὑποστάσει, ἀλλὰ τῷ γε λόγῳ; p. 677.1: ἐν ὑποστάσει vs. τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ; *In De sensu* p. 55.7: ἐν φαντασίᾳ vs. ἐν ὑποστάσει.

⁶⁶ See, e.g., Roger Bullard, “The Hypostasis of the Archons,” in *The Nag Hammadi Library in English* (ed. James Robinson; Leiden: Brill, 1996) 162.

⁶⁷ Μὴ καθ’ αὐτὸ τινος ὑποστάσεως λαβόμενον . . . Τοῦτο ‘ζιζάνιον’ ὀνομάζεται συμφυεὺς τῇ ψυχῇ, τῷ χρηστῷ σπέρματι.

⁶⁸ Ὁ οὐκ ὄν θεὸς ἐποίησε κόσμ(ον) οὐκ ὄν<τα> ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, <οὐκ ὄν> καταβαλόμενος καὶ ὑποστήσας σπέρμα τι ἐν, ἔχον πάσαν ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὴν (τ)οῦ (κ)όσ(μ)ου (πα)νοπεριμῖαν . . . Ὑποκειμένου τοίνυν τοῦ κοσμικοῦ σπέρματος . . . ἦν <οὐν>, φησί, ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ σπέρματι υἰότης τοιμερῆς, κατὰ πάντα τῷ οὐκ ὄντι θε<φ> ὁμοούσιος, γεν<ν>ητῆ ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων.

already used by some Christian bishops and writers,⁶⁹ although it is not found in the Bible. In Irenaeus, *Haer.* 1.1.1, too, who is reporting gnostic ideas, the meaning of ὑπόστασις is “foundation of all,” not “individual substance.”⁷⁰ The meanings attested in Gnosticism for ὑπόστασις do not include that of an individual substance and seem to be different from the technical Trinitarian meaning that the term bears in Origen.

The meaning “constitution” is also attested for ὑπόστασις, for instance in the first century B.C.E. by Arius Didymus, *Phys.* fr. 2, in which both matter and form are declared to be indispensable “for the constitution of the body” (πρὸς τὴν τοῦ σώματος ὑπόστασιν).⁷¹ In the first century C.E. Cornutus allegorizes Zeus as the cause of the constitution and coming into existence of all realities.⁷² Likewise, in the same epoch, Josephus *C. Ap.* 1.1 attests to the same meaning, by stating that the Jewish people is very ancient and had an independent origin.⁷³ The same sense is testified to in the second century C.E. by Marcus Aurelius, repeatedly,⁷⁴ and Alcinous.⁷⁵ In Lucian, *Par.* 27, the meaning seems to be “coherent structure,” as is that of philosophy as opposed to different kinds of rhetoric.⁷⁶

In Nicomachus—a first- to second-century C.E. author whom Origen knew very well, as attested by Porphyry—ὑπόστασις means both “substance” and “substratum, foundation”: “bodily and material realities imitate the nature of the eternal material substance that exists from the beginning [τῆς ἐξ ἀρχῆς αἰδίου ὕλης καὶ ὑποστάσεως]” (*Intr. ar.* 1.1.3). Here, ὕλη καὶ ὑπόστασις means “material substance” or “material substratum” and designates the eternal, preexistent principle of matter. In *Exc. Nicom.* 7 ὑπόστασις seems to mean “structure, constitution”: “it is threefold, in that it receives its structure [τὴν ὑπόστασιν] from the same, the different, and the essence, and, similarly to its structure [παραπλησίως τῆ

⁶⁹ Τῶν παλαιῶν τινες λογίους καὶ ἐπιφανεῖς ἐπισκόπους καὶ συγγραφεῖς.

⁷⁰ Ἀρχέγονον Ὀγδοάδα, ῥίζαν καὶ ὑπόστασιν τῶν πάντων.

⁷¹ See also fr. 27: κατὰ τὴν τῆς οὐσίας ὑπόστασιν vs. κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ποιοῦ.

⁷² Αἰτίαν γεγονέναι τῆς τούτων ὑποστάσεως (*Comp.* 9 Lang; see also 33: τὴν ὑπόστασιν λαμβάνουσι).

⁷³ Τὴν πρώτην ὑπόστασιν ἔσχεν ἰδίαν.

⁷⁴ *Ad seips.* 9.1.5: ὑποστάσεων τε καὶ μεταβολῶν καὶ διαδοχῶν: “origins, transformations, and successions”; 9.42.3: τὸ δὲ κακόν σου . . . ἐναυθὰ πάσαν τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔχει: “your evil has here all its origin”; 10.5.1: ἡ ἐπιπλοκή τῶν αἰτίων συνέκλωθε τὴν τε σὴν ὑπόστασιν ἐξ αἰδίου καὶ τὴν τούτου σύμβασιν: “the concatenation of causes has established from all eternity both your birth/origin and these events.”

⁷⁵ *Did.* 14.3: “When it is said that the cosmos is γενητόν, this should not be interpreted in the sense that there had been a time when the cosmos did not exist, but the fact that it is always coming into being [ἐν γενέσει] shows that there is a principal cause of its origin/constitution [τῆς αὐτοῦ ὑποστάσεως].”

⁷⁶ “Rhetoric and philosophy are different, first of all in respect to their structure [κατὰ τὴν ὑπόστασιν]; for philosophy has a structure, the various kinds of rhetoric do not. Indeed, we do not conceive rhetoric as one and the same thing, but some deem it an art, others, on the contrary, a non-art . . . I claim that what has no coherent structure [ἢς οὐκ ἔστιν ὑπόστασις] is not even an art.”

ὑποστάσει], it receives a treble differentiation into the rational, the irrational, and the physical part.” This applies to the soul and its threefold structure. The same is the case with another second-century Middle Platonist, Alcinoüs, in whose work I have already pointed out the meaning “origin” for ὑπόστασις. In *Did.* 25.1, the soul is said to be an incorporeal essence (οὐσία), “immutable in its constitution or substance” (ἀμετάβλητος κατὰ τὴν ὑπόστασιν). Immutability is a constitutive characteristic of the soul. On the contrary, “what is not” (τὸ μὴ ὄν) has no substance and no existence: ἀνύπαρκτον ... μηδεμίαν ἔχον ὑπόστασιν (*Did.* 35.1). Again, the same meaning of ὑπόστασις in relation to the soul is found in another second-century Middle Platonist, Atticus, whose work survives only in fragments quoted by Eusebius and Proclus. In fr. 9.10, in turn quoted by Eusebius *Praep. ev.* 15.9, he claims that Dicaearchus in his psychology “has entirely destroyed the substance (or the structure) of the soul” (ἀνήρηκε τὴν ὅλην ὑπόστασιν τῆς ψυχῆς). Origen likely knew Atticus’s work, and I have argued elsewhere that Atticus and Origen held the same concept of the soul of God the creator.⁷⁷

Now, among the meanings of ὑπόστασις in early imperial philosophy, the closest to Origen’s innovative application of ὑπόστασις to each Person of the Trinity is “separate, individual existence” or “separate substance of its own.” This meaning is found in several philosophical authors of the early imperial era whose works Origen either certainly or probably knew. It is on this usage in these authors that my research will now focus. The meaning “individual substance” for ὑπόστασις, with the addition of the adjective ἰδίᾳ, interestingly emerges in Democritus, fr. 156, but one cannot be sure that it is not due to the early imperial source of the fragment, Plutarch:⁷⁸ Democritus “called ‘something’ [δέν] the body and ‘nothing’ [μηδέν] the void, as though the latter, too, had a certain nature and a substance of its own” (φύσιν τινὰ καὶ ὑπόστασιν ἰδίαν). In Eudemus, fr. 150.2, ὑπόστασις seems to assume the meaning of “individual substance”; it designates each of “the three intelligible hypostases” (τὰς τρεῖς νοητὰς ὑποστάσεις), identified with Ether, Eros, and Metis. However, the same proviso must be made: one cannot be certain that this was Eudemus’s own wording. A noteworthy fragment from Chrysippus (SVF 2.473) is reported by Alexander of Aphrodisias in *De mixtione*:⁷⁹ “the soul, having its own substance [ἰδίαν ὑπόστασιν], just like the body that hosts it, extends through the whole of the body, but, while mixing with it, nevertheless it keeps its own substance [τὴν οἰκείαν οὐσίαν].” Here the notion of an individual, separated substance of its own appears, but—differently from what can be seen

⁷⁷ In “Atticus and Origen on the Soul of God the Creator: From the ‘Pagan’ to the Christian Side of Middle Platonism,” *Jahrbuch für Religionsphilosophie* 10 (2011) 13–35.

⁷⁸ The same methodological problem arises with Parmenides, fr. 1.20, in which, moreover, there is no question of any individual substance, but only of ὑπόστασις as “substance” or even “foundation”: “they posited a double foundation/substance [διττὴν ὑπόστασιν ὑπερ(θεντο), the one of what really is, i.e., the intelligible, the other of what becomes, the sense-perceptible.”

⁷⁹ I. Bruns, ed., *Alexandri Aphrodisiensis praeter commentaria scripta minora* (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca suppl. 2.2; Berlin: Reimer, 1892) 213–38, at 216.

in Origen, both in his Trinitarian usage and in reference to the *logika*—it is not distinctively conveyed by *ὑπόστασις* as differentiated from *οὐσία*; indeed, *ἰδιὰν ὑπόστασιν* and *οἰκειὰν οὐσίαν* seem to be synonymic here, all the more so in that the same meaning is also conveyed, shortly after, by the third, equivalent expression *οἰκειὰν φύσιν*. All other uses of *ὑπόστασις* in Chrysippus mean “substance” or even “structure” or “existence,” and do not refer to an individual substance, proper to each representative of a species and different from that of every other representative.⁸⁰ Notably, the expression *καθ’ ὑπόστασιν* in SVF 3.305 (virtues, inseparable from one another, belong to the soul’s directive part *καθ’ ὑπόστασιν*) again parallels *κατ’ οὐσίαν* in 3.306, where the same concept is simply expressed with a different wording.

Philo’s use of *ὑπόστασις* is worth considering carefully, all the more so in that he is a philosopher-exegete with whose works Origen was notoriously well conversant. In *Aet.* 88 and 92 Philo insists on the idea of “a substance of its own”: the light or *αὐγή* “has no substance per se [*καθ’ ἑαυτὴν ὑπόστασιν οὐκ ἔχει*], but it derives from what precedes it, the coal and the flame . . . it has no substance of its own [*ὑπόστασιν ἰδιὰν οὐκ ἔχει*].” The light of the flame has no substance of its own. The concept, which here is denied in reference to the *αὐγή*, is that of an individual substance that originates from another but, from then on, is distinct from it. This is not dissimilar from Origen’s concept of the generation of the Son’s *ὑπόστασις* from that of the Father; each of them has a *ὑπόστασις* of his own.⁸¹ What is different is that Philo feels the need to add specifiers to *ὑπόστασις*, such as *καθ’ ἑαυτὴν* and *ἰδιὰ*, to make it clear that he means the product’s individual substance, insofar as it is distinct from that of the producer. Origen usually will not add such specifiers in his Trinitarian terminology, since for him *ὑπόστασις* already means “individual substance” as distinct from *οὐσία*, which is the common essence of all the Persons of the Trinity. However, I have shown that even he sometimes adds *ἰδιὰ*, to emphasize the notion of the individuality of a *ὑπόστασις*.

Plutarch’s use of *ὑπόστασις*, too, is worth exploring, being that of a Middle Platonist chronologically not far from Origen. But his conceptualization of *ὑπόστασις* is, interestingly, quite different. I have already cited above *Adv. Col.* 1109a, line 8 as a fragment from Democritus (fr. 156), which likely contains Plutarch’s own wording rather than a literal quotation from Democritus: *φύσιν τινὰ καὶ ὑπόστασιν ἰδιὰν*

⁸⁰ E.g., SVF 2.503: Vacuum is unlimited “according to its substance or structure” (*κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ ὑπόστασιν*); SVF 2.541: There must necessarily exist “a certain substance of the void” (*τινα ὑπόστασιν κενού*).

⁸¹ According to Radice, Philo is the first who considered the Logos a hypostasis, just as the author of the prologue to the Gospel of John did. This concept simply did not exist outside the Mosaic tradition. See Roberto Radice, “Philo’s Theology and Theory of Creation,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Philo* (ed. Adam Kamesar; Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2010) 125–45, at 137. As he remarks, this notion had no parallel in Middle Platonism. I observe that, on the other hand, it has a parallel in the Epistle to the Hebrews, which, as I shall discuss later in the present essay, might even have been influenced by Philo and was paramount to the formation of the technical use of *ὑπόστασις* in Origen.

ἔχοντος. Here the notion is, indeed, “a substance of its own”; however, ὑπόστασιν and φύσιν are used as synonyms—there is no question of an individual having a particular substance different from those of every other individual of the same species. In Pseudo-Plutarch we find ὑπόστασις in the sense of “substance” both in reference to bodily substance⁸² and in reference to things that “have a substance or subsistence of their own” (τὰ μὲν καθ’ ὑπόστασιν γίνεται), as opposed to others that “are only apparent and have no subsistence of their own” (τὰ δὲ κατ’ ἔμφασιν ἰδίαν οὐκ ἔχοντα ὑπόστασιν: *Plac. philos.* 894b, line 1). To specify this, the author felt the need to add ἰδία to ὑπόστασις. Moreover, here ὑπόστασις is understood in a material sense: an example of a thing that is κατ’ ἔμφασιν is the rainbow, one of a thing that has a ὑπόστασις of its own is hail. A rainbow is considered to be merely apparent, while hail has material substance. The addition of ἰδία to ὑπόστασις is also found in the anonymous second-century C.E. Middle-Platonic commentary on Plato’s *Theaetetus* 63: οὐδὲ τὰ αἰσθητήρια ἔχειν ἰδίαν ὑπόστασιν, “Neither do the organs of sense-perception have a substance of their own.” It is not clear, however, whether an individual substance for each organ is meant. In 68 the notion of individuality is again attached to the concept of ὑπόστασις, as is emphasized by the addition of the expressions καθ’ αὐτὸ and κατὰ ἰδίαν.⁸³

Numenius, the second-century Middle Platonist and Neopythagorean who was well known to Origen, as is attested both by Origen himself and by Porphyry, uses γεωμετρικὴ ὑπόστασις as *ens geometricum*, a geometrical entity.⁸⁴ Since each geometrical figure is an entity of its own, the meaning of ὑπόστασις here seems to get close to that of “individual substance.” One of the authors who deserve the utmost attention in this connection is Soranus, a philosophical and medical author from the first half of the second century C.E. In his work, a special reflection is devoted to the constitution of a new individual substance from another individual substance.⁸⁵ In *Gyn.* 2.27 Soranus observes that the new individual separates (χωρισθέντα) from the parent and constitutes “an individual substance of its own” (πρὸς ἰδίαν ὑπόστασιν), so that it “enjoys an existence of its own” or “has its own individual substance” (ἰδίᾳ χρῆσάμενον ὑποστάσει: *Gyn.* 2.57; see also 4.5). Since ὑπόστασις previously meant “substance” or “existence” in general, rather than “individual substance,” Soranus here felt the need to add ἰδία to convey the notion of a substance proper to a single being. In relation to Origen’s use of ὑπόστασις in reference to the Son and the Father, it is most interesting that here in Soranus the matter is of a child in respect to his or her mother, and how he acquires

⁸² In *Plac.* 882e, line 10: τῆς σωματικῆς ὑποστάσεως.

⁸³ Οὐδὲν καθ’ αὐτὸ ἔχει τὴν ὑπόστασιν, τοῦτ’ ἔστιν, οὐδὲν κατὰ ἰδίαν.

⁸⁴ Fragments, section 5 fr. 39: οἱ μὲν ἀριθμὸν αὐτὴν εἰπόντες ἐκ μονάδος ποιοῦσιν, ὡς ἀμερίστου, καὶ τῆς ἀορίστου δυάδος, ὡς μεριστῆς, οἱ δ’ ὡς γεωμετρικὴν ὑπόστασιν οὐσαν ἐκ σημείου καὶ διαστάσεως, τοῦ μὲν ἀμεροῦς, τῆς δὲ μεριστῆς.

⁸⁵ 1.33: The conception is aimed “at the constitution of the living being” (εἰς ὑπόστασιν τοῦ ζώου).

a substance of his own, different from that of his parent. Precisely this idea was transposed by Origen to the relationship between the Son and the Father, although, of course, Origen was concerned with the difference between the generation of the Son and the biological generation of humans and animals.⁸⁶

Notably, Soranus, like Galen (who uses ὑπόστασις 159 times!),⁸⁷ was also a philosopher and wrote a book *On the Soul*,⁸⁸ now fragmentary, that was used by Tertullian in which he denied the immortality of the soul. Soranus was active in Alexandria and then in Rome, under Trajan and Hadrian, in the first four decades of the second century C.E. Origen probably had Soranus's writings available, at least his work on the soul. Origen, too, as the *Dialogue with Heraclides* shows, discussed the question of the immortality of the soul, which he also denied in respect to the "real death" caused by evil. Origen was familiar with medical authors of his day, and seems to have read and followed Galen, for instance, on good health as being a result of a balance of humors, and the treatment of relevant disorders in *Hom. Luc.* 1.⁸⁹ Another interesting parallel with Galen is the following: just as Origen had his pupils study all the philosophical schools without becoming followers of one, in order to preserve their intellectual critical capacity,⁹⁰ so did also Galen before him: he had his pupils study all the medical schools without becoming followers of one, in order to preserve their intellectual openness to rational argument.⁹¹

Sextus Empiricus, too, the skeptic philosopher of the second/third century C.E., in *Math.* 9.338 expresses the notion of individual substance by means of ὑπόστασις. A whole (ὅλον), such as a human being, a plant, an animal, or an object, is "something else than the sum of its parts, and is conceived according to its own individual substance and essence [κατ' ἰδίαν ὑπόστασιν καὶ οὐσίαν]." Differently from Soranus, Sextus seems to treat ὑπόστασις and οὐσία as virtual synonyms here. Sextus also uses ὑπόστασις in the widespread meaning of "substance" in

⁸⁶ Thus, for instance, in *Comm. Jo.* 20.18.157 it is stressed that the generation of the Son did not entail a diminution of the οὐσία of the Father, as is the case with a woman who gives birth, for this would imply that God has a corporeal nature.

⁸⁷ The *Corpus Hippocraticum* has 110 occurrences, but none in the sense used by Soranus (and Sextus). On Galen's notion of the soul, the body, and the individual, see Christopher Gill, *Naturalistic Psychology in Galen and Stoicism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

⁸⁸ On which see now Pietro Podolak, *Soranus von Ephesos, Peri psyches: Sammlung der Testimonien, Kommentar und Einleitung* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2010).

⁸⁹ That Galen was well known in Alexandria already to Clement is argued on the basis of good evidence by Matyas Havrda, "Galenus Christianus? The Doctrine of Demonstration in *Stromata* VIII and the Question of its Source" *VC* 65 (2011) 343–75. On Origen's knowledge of Galen, see Jonathan Barnes, "Galen, Christians, Logic," in *Classics in Progress* (ed. Timothy P. Wiseman; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 299–417.

⁹⁰ See my "Origen, Patristic Philosophy."

⁹¹ This last parallel was acutely noticed by Jaap Mansfeld in his *Prolegomena: Questions to be Settled before the Study of an Author or a Text* (Leiden: Brill, 1994) 165.

general.⁹² But he repeatedly presents the notion of individual substance conveyed by ὑπόστασις, although usually with the addition of ἰδέα, for example in *Math.* 2.219. Here Sextus is dealing with genera and species, which, in a hypothesis, are considered to be contents of thought (ἐννοήματα), but in the opposite hypothesis are considered to possess a substance of their own (ἰδίαν ὑπόστασιν). In 3.99 Sextus reflects again on the relationship between the whole and its parts: if the whole is merely the sum of its parts, it will have “no substance of its own” (ὑπόστασιν ἰδίαν), namely, no substance besides that of its parts. The same notion underlies 3.157: a number cannot be identified with the things that are numbered, but it has “a substance of its own” (ἰδίαν ὑπόστασιν) besides these things. If Sextus thought that each number had an individual substance, this would be very similar to Origen’s notion of an individual substance for each single representative of the same species. In *Math.* 8.161 Sextus is distinguishing things that are opposed to one another and things that are in a certain relation to one another; the former are “all those which are conceived in their own substance in an absolute way [κατ’ ἰδίαν ὑπόστασιν καὶ ἀπολύτως], such as white/black or sweet/bitter.” In *Math.* 1.137 Sextus seems to assign an individual substance to each part or member: “parts are included in those things of which they are said to be parts, each of them occupying its own place and having its own substance [ἴδιον τόπον ἐπέχοντα καὶ ἰδίαν ὑπόστασιν ἔχοντα].” But the most interesting passage for its similarity to Origen’s Trinitarian notion of ὑπόστασις is *Math.* 10.335–336:

What generates something, if it changes into something else, either goes out of its own substance [τῆς ἰδέας ὑποστάσεως], when it transforms itself and generates, or it remains in its own substance [ἐν τῇ οἰκείᾳ ὑποστάσει] and generates by means of assuming one form instead of another one. But if it goes out of its own substance [τῆς ἰδέας ὑποστάσεως] it will perish into non-existence. If, instead, it remains in its own substance [ἐν τῇ ἰδέᾳ ὑποστάσει] and generates by means of receiving one quality instead of another, it falls into the same aporia.

This passage is crucial in that the issue is the generation of a substance from another substance; therefore, the situation parallels the generation of the Son from the Father and the problem of how to describe them in terms of their substances. Sextus’s argument could be read as suggesting the conclusion that the subject that generates remains in its individual substance, and the action of generating does not produce any alteration in it, not even in its qualities. This is what Origen maintained of the Father in the begetting of the Son. In Sextus’s discourse, it was possible to understand the producer’s individual substance as different from the individual substance of the product. This was certainly the way in which Origen understood the relationship between the Father and the Son. Sextus was an earlier contemporary of Origen; he lived circa 160–210 C.E., and he too, like Soranus and

⁹² E.g., *Pyrrh.* 3.58: ἡ τῶν ποιότητων ὑπόστασις ἐν ταῖς οὐσίαις ἐστίν, in that qualities can subsist only in things, not in themselves.

Galen, was both a physician and a philosopher. He seems to have lived in Alexandria. He also uses οὐσία and ὑπόστασις as synonyms, but, like Origen, not when he means ὑπόστασις as “individual substance.” Thus, in *Math.* 10.335–336, in which ὑπόστασις has this technical meaning, he never replaces it with οὐσία or φύσις. This is because for him, just as for Origen, the generator and the generated have the same nature, but different individual substances.

Alexander of Aphrodisias is another philosopher certainly known to Origen (who very probably also inspired him in several respects)⁹³ who deserves the utmost attention. In *De Anima* p. 19.19⁹⁴ Alexander speaks of an independent substance, with both the nominal and the verbal expression of an independent substance. The soul and the spirit have different independent substances or ὑποστάσεις, and therefore it is inferred that the spirit cannot be described as a genus of the soul, since a genus has no independent substance of its own, but the spirit does have a substance of its own.⁹⁵ This is not identical to Origen’s idea of a sharing of nature (οὐσία, φύσις) and a differentiation of individual ὑποστάσεις, but it is remarkable for the notion of a differentiation of ὑποστάσεις. On p. 88.7 Alexander is saying that the forms subsist ontologically per se, even without being conceived by an intellect;⁹⁶ this is what it means that they have a “substance of their own” (κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ὑπόστασιν). It is unclear, however, whether here Alexander is distinguishing the individual substance of each form. Alexander in *De mixtione* (pp. 216–17) is speaking of the Stoics; indeed, this passage is the same as Chrysippus’s fragment SVF 2.473, quoted above. I have already noticed that in this passage ἰδίαν ὑπόστασιν is close to τὴν οἰκείαν οὐσίαν, both indicating the substance that is proper to the soul, in opposition to that of the body; these substances remain separate. Indeed, in *Comm. in Met.* (p. 83.32), Alexander uses ὑπόστασιν καὶ φύσιν as a synonymic couple. The expression ἐν ὑποστάσει (p. 110.13) probably means “in existence”⁹⁷ and occurs again (on p. 230.26): “If they were beings and substances [ὄντα καὶ οὐσίαι], they would be in sense-perceptible bodies; for only these things are in existence [ἐν ὑποστάσει]; but if they were not, they would not be substances [οὐσίαι] either.” Only οὐσίαι can be ἐν ὑποστάσει, which may mean that only substances can subsist; indeed, they are also said to be

⁹³ As I have posited in “Origen, Patristic Philosophy,” his Περὶ Ἀρχῶν may have inspired Origen’s homonymous work. I found striking correspondences between Origen’s and Alexander’s thought and terminology, but I shall have to treat them in a separate work. One is already detected in my “Maximus’ on Evil, Matter, and God: Arguments for the Identification of the Source of Eusebius *PE VII 22*,” *Adamantius* 16 (2010) 230–55.

⁹⁴ I. Bruns, ed., *Alexandri Aphrodisiensis*, 1–100.

⁹⁵ Οὐ γὰρ δὴ γένος οἶόν τε λέγειν τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ πνεῦμα, ἔχον ὑπόστασιν καθ’ αὐτό. οὐδὲν γὰρ γένος τοιοῦτον, ὡς ὑφ’ ἐστάναι καθ’ αὐτό.

⁹⁶ On forms and their subsistence in Alexander, see Robert Sharples, “Alexander of Aphrodisias on Universals,” *Phronesis* 50 (2005) 43–55, on *De an.* 90.2–8 and *Quaest.* 1.11.

⁹⁷ Gr. ἐκάστου τῶν ἐν ὑποστάσει ζώων = “each of the existing animated beings.”

ὄντα, existing beings. On p. 233.23, too, metaphysical form, nature, and substance seem to be virtual synonyms.⁹⁸

On p. 180.4, ἐν οἰκείᾳ ὑποστάσει corresponds to ἐν ἰδίᾳ ὑποστάσει and indicates that the principles “have a substance of their own and exist per se” (ἐν οἰκείᾳ ὑποστάσει εἰσὶ καὶ καθ’ αὐτάς), just as each individual being (τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστα τῶν ὄντων) exists, unlike the genera and common species, which have no substance of their own—an idea that I have already pointed out in Sextus Empiricus—but exist only in being predicated. This passage is significant in that the substance (ὑπόστασις) is conceived as proper to each principle and to each of the beings, so that ὑπόστασις here seems to be understood as “individual substance.” This would be the same meaning as in Origen’s Trinitarian terminology: “individual substance,” each being in a species having its own ὑπόστασις, distinct from that of the others. Genera and species do not have an individual substance (κατ’ ἰδίαν ὑπόστασιν), but individual beings (τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστα) do (p. 18.12). The same concept underlies the following passage: “The principles become for them substances, and substances on their own, different from the others [καθ’ αὐτάς οὐσίαι καὶ διαφέρουσαι τῶν ἄλλων] . . . for the substance of common species is not independent, [οὐ γὰρ καθ’ αὐτήν ἢ τῶν κοινῶν ὑπόστασις]” (p. 234.33). It is notable that each principle becomes a substance of its own, different from the others. Again, however, οὐσία and ὑπόστασις are close to each other, and the expressions καθ’ αὐτάς οὐσίαι and καθ’ αὐτήν ὑπόστασις correspond to each other. On p. 199.20 Alexander is speaking of people who conceive mathematical entities by abstraction from sense-perceptible realities and do not ascribe to them “a substance of their own” (ἰδίαν ὑπόστασιν). It is not specified, but it seems to be probable, that each mathematical entity, just like each principle (see above), is considered to have its own individual substance.⁹⁹ Finally, in *In Analyt. Pr.* (p. 4.10–13)¹⁰⁰ there is an interesting differentiation, close to that drawn by Origen, between οὐσία and ὑπόστασις, the latter being paired with ὑπαρξίς: some things, such as matter and form, can be separated from one another only mentally and cannot subsist without one another in their actual existence (ὑποστάσει and ὑπάρξει), but are different in their nature and essence (κατ’ οὐσίαν).¹⁰¹ Here, therefore, the case is of realities with different οὐσίαι, but inseparable in their ὑπόστασις. In the case of the Trinity, in Origen’s technical terminology, we find the opposite: three different ὑποστάσεις but one and the same οὐσία.

⁹⁸ Τῷ εἶδει, ἦτοι λέγων τῇ φύσει καὶ τῇ ὑποστάσει.

⁹⁹ See also p. 263.16: αὐτὰ καθ’ αὐτὰ τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔχοντα; p. 561.23: οὐκ ἔστι καθ’ αὐτὸ ἐν ὑποστάσει ὄν.

¹⁰⁰ *Alexandri in Aristotelis analyticorum priorum librum I commentarium* (ed. Maximilian Wallies; *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca* 2.1; Berlin: Reimer, 1883) 1–418.

¹⁰¹ Διαιρεῖν ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων τῷ λόγῳ δύνασθαι τὰ διαφέροντα μὲν ἀλλήλων κατ’ οὐσίαν, τῇ μέντοι ὑποστάσει τε καὶ ὑπάρξει μὴ δυνάμενα χωρὶς ἀλλήλων εἶναι . . . ὕλη τε καὶ εἶδος . . . ἀχώριστα γὰρ τῇ ὑποστάσει ταῦτα ἀλλήλων καὶ οὐ δυνάμενα θάτερον αὐτῶν εἶναι χωρὶς θατέρου.

■ A Revealing Comparison with Plotinus, and Porphyry's Role: Origen's Influence on Porphyry?

On the basis of the analysis that I have carried out, the philosophical background to Origen's innovative notion of ὑπόστασις appears rich, and it seems probable that Origen did have at his disposal sources of inspiration in this respect in early imperial philosophical and medical authors. Plotinus is also very interesting with regard to the present investigation. He was a fellow disciple of Origen at Ammonius's school and is considered to be the "inventor" of the three Neoplatonic hypostases.¹⁰² Therefore, one might expect him to have a very innovative and specialized use of the term ὑπόστασις in his protology, comparable to that of Origen in the Trinitarian field. In fact, in Plotinus there are many occurrences of ὑπόστασις, but, contrary to what one might suppose, these have general, rather than technical, meanings; they virtually never refer to the three hypostases of his triad of principles, the One, the Intellect, and the Soul. It seems to me that it was rather Porphyry who ascribed to Plotinus this technical meaning, as I shall argue.

Let me briefly analyze the use of ὑπόστασις in Plotinus's work. Sometimes it is close in meaning to οὐσία and denotes "substance." Indeed, Plotinus at times seems to employ the two terms as synonyms, for instance in *Enn.* 6.4.9, in reference

¹⁰² See, e.g., John Deck, *Nature, Contemplation, and the One: A Study in the Philosophy of Plotinus* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967) 56; Belford Jackson, "Plotinus and the *Parmenides*," *Journal for the History of Philosophy* 5 (1967) 315–27, with a comparison between Plotinus's thought and Plato's *Parmenides* and an examination of the relation of Plotinus's third hypostasis, the Soul, to the *Parmenides*; John Anton, "Some Logical Aspects of the Concept of Hypostasis in Plotinus," *Review of Metaphysics* 31 (1977) 258–71, who argues that the One for Plotinus is the first hypostasis proper, and should not be regarded as a quasi-hypostasis; he appeals to *Enn.* 5.1.10.1 and 2.9.33.1–2 to claim that for Plotinus the hypostases are only three; Jerome Schiller, "Plotinus and Greek Rationalism," *Apeiron* 12 (1978) 37–50, sees Plotinus's three hypostases as solutions to three problems that arise from Plato's thought. The hypostasis One answers the question of the justification of the ultimacy of reality; the hypostasis Intellect answers that of the certitude of knowledge, and the hypostasis Soul answers that of the relationship between the realm of forms and that of things; John Deck, "The One, or God, is Not Properly Hypostasis," in *The Structure of Being: A Neoplatonic Approach* (ed. Ramson Harris; Albany, N.Y.: University of New York Press, 1982) 34–39; John Dillon, "The Mind of Plotinus, III," *Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy* 3 (1988) 333–57; Ubaldo R. Pérez Paoli, *Der plotinische Begriff der Hypostasis und die augustinische Bestimmung Gottes als subiectum* (Würzburg: Augustinus, 1990); Henri Crouzel, *Origène et Plotin. Comparaison doctrinale* (Paris: Téqui, 1991); Francesco Romano and Daniela P. Taormina, eds., *Hyparxis e hypostasis nel Neoplatonismo* (Florence: Olschki, 1994); Salvatore Lilla, "Neoplatonic Hypostases and Christian Trinity," in *Studies in Plato and the Platonic Tradition* (ed. Mark Joyal; Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997) 127–89, who has examined the parallels between the hypostases of Plotinus and Porphyry and the Trinitarian thought of Clement, Origen, and the Cappadocians, among others, but without attention to the specific terminology of ὑπόστασις and its presence or lack in Plotinus; Stephen Menn, "Plotinus on the Identity of Knowledge with Its Object," *Apeiron* 34 (2001) 233–46, who analyzes *Enn.* 5.9.7, remarking that Plotinus does not mean that the knower is identical to the object known, but that knowledge is identical to the object, and the hypostasis Nous is knowledge containing all sciences and existing separately from souls, which participate in this knowledge.

the production of a substance by the “first act.”¹⁰³ In 6.2.4, the reference is to “an intelligible substance” (τινα νοητὴν ὑπόστασιν) that Plotinus describes as “truly being, or better One.” In *Enn.* 1.8.11 Plotinus is saying that privation is “not a substance per se” (ἐπ’ αὐτῆς οὐχ ὑπόστασις), but is always found in something else.¹⁰⁴ In 1.8.3 the meaning is “reality” or “substance”; Plotinus is asking: Which is the reality or substance in which aspects of evil are present without being different from that reality, but being that reality itself?¹⁰⁵ In 2.9.1 Plotinus focuses on the distinction between “in theory” and “in fact” (implying the distinction between real existence and mere conceptuality or non-existence), speaking of the One, or the Good, against the gnostics: “If the gnostics say that the distinction between various Intellects is only theoretical [ἐπινοία, and therefore not of substance, so that there is no distinction between substances, but only one substance], first of all they will have to renounce the plurality of substances” (τῶν πλειόνων ὑποστάσεων). In *Enn.* 5.3.12 Plotinus is speaking of the procession of various operative powers or activities (ἐνέργειαι) from the Intellect, which is one; these activities, remaining forever, will be considered to be substances (ὑποστάσεις); these substances, precisely because they are substances and not simply modalities or qualities, will be different from the Intellect, from which they derive.¹⁰⁶

Sometimes ὑπόστασις is a synonym of ὑπαρξίς, “existence,” for instance in 3.7.13, where Plotinus remarks that in case one should claim that time is “not in existence or subsistence” (ἐν οὐχ ὑποστάσει ἢ ἐν οὐχ ὑπαρξίει), it is clear that one does not tell the truth in positing it, when saying “it was” or “it will be.” Likewise, in 1.4.9 it is argued that if the existence (ὑπόστασις) of wisdom is “in a substance, or better the substance” (ἐν οὐσίᾳ τινί, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ), this substance (οὐσία) does not perish. Similarly in 2.5.5, speaking of matter, Plotinus observes: “If you introduce actuality into those things that have being and substance [τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν] in potency, you have destroyed the cause of their existence [τῆς ὑποστάσεως], in that being [τὸ εἶναι] for them was in potency.” Here, just as in the previous passage, “substance” is οὐσία, whereas ὑπόστασις means “existence.” The same is the case also in 1.8.15.¹⁰⁷ In 6.4.9 ὑπόστασις means again “existence”: πᾶν τὸ παρ’ ἄλλου τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔχον means “all that which has its existence

¹⁰³ Ἡ δύναμις ἐκεῖ ὑπόστασις καὶ οὐσία ἢ μείζον οὐσίας; likewise 6.7.40: πρώτη ἐνέργεια ὑπόστασιν γεννήσασα εἰς οὐσίαν.

¹⁰⁴ See also *Enn.* 3.5.7: Οἱ δὲ παρὰ φύσιν σφαλόντων πάθη ταῦτα καὶ οὐδαμῆ οὐσία οὐδὲ ὑποστάσεις οὐσιώδεις οὐ παρὰ ψυχῆς ἔτι γεννώμενα and 3.5.2: ἡ ἐνέργεια αὐτῆς ὑπόστασιν καὶ οὐσίαν εἰργάσατο. In both passages, οὐσία and ὑπόστασις are nearly synonyms.

¹⁰⁵ Τίτι οὖν ὑποστάσει ταῦτα πάρεστιν οὐχ ἕτερα ὄντα ἐκείνης, ἀλλ’ ἐκείνη.

¹⁰⁶ Ἐνὸς τοῦ νοῦ ἀπλοῦ ὄντος φήσουσι τὰς ἐνεργείας προελθεῖν . . . Εἶτα τὰς ἐνεργείας μενούσας αἰεὶ καὶ ὑποστάσεις θήσονται· ὑποστάσεις δὲ οὐσαί ἕτεραι ἐκείνου, ἀφ’ οὗ εἰσιν, ἔσονται.

¹⁰⁷ If one claims that matter does not exist, one must demonstrate to him or her the necessity of the existence of matter: Εἰ δὲ τις τὴν ὕλην μὴ φησιν εἶναι, δεικτέον αὐτῷ . . . τὴν ἀνάγκην τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτῆς. Here ὑπόστασις corresponds to εἶναι, “to be”; it is the fact of being, therefore existence.

from something else,” and likewise in 6.6.11–12, in which Plotinus is focusing on the henad or unit.¹⁰⁸ Here ὑπόστασις does not designate the hypostasis of the One, but means “existence” much more generically. In 6.6.13, the meaning of ὑπόστασις is again “subsistence, existence,” not “hypostasis”: the One is necessary “for the existence of every substance” (εἰς οὐσίας ἐκάστης ὑπόστασιν).¹⁰⁹ A lexical hue related to the meaning “existence” and found in Plotinus is “reality,” as opposed to non-existence, fictitiousness, and the like.¹¹⁰ Another meaning of ὑπόστασις attested in Plotinus is “way of being,” exemplified for instance in 6.6.5, where ὑπόστασις indicates the way of being of the number, which makes it not a substance (οὐσία), but an accident.¹¹¹ Another meaning of ὑπόστασις, which was already found in Greek beforehand, as I have documented above, is also attested in Plotinus, namely that of “constitution, production,” in this case production of a substance (5.5.3).¹¹²

In 5.6.3, very interestingly, the notion emerges of an individual and autonomous substance or existence, however not in reference to one of the supreme principles, later called hypostases, but in a discussion concerning the parts of a compound: “One thing that is simple cannot constitute by itself that which is a compound of many elements, since none of these can have an individual substance or existence,” a ὑπόστασιν καθ’ ἑαυτό.¹¹³ The use of ὑπόστασις in relation to the Good (the One) requires an especially careful consideration in order to establish whether it can indicate the hypostasis of the One/Good. In τῇ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὑποστάσει (6.8.13), Plotinus takes up Plato’s expression ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φύσις, “the nature of the Good,” from *Philebus* (20d line 1, 54c line 10, 60b lines 4–10), changing φύσις into ὑπόστασις, and immediately after he also speaks of the οὐσία of the

¹⁰⁸ Ὡς γὰρ ἡ μία τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔχει, διὰ τί οὐ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι; . . . οὐ μία μόνον ἐνὰς τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔξει καὶ οὕτως πλῆθος ἔσται ἐνάδων, the question being whether only one henad has existence, and why not the others, so that there would be a great number of henads; τὸ ἐν καὶ τὴν μονάδα μὴ ὑπόστασιν λέγοι ἔχειν, the hypothesis being that the One and the Monad have no *existence*.

¹⁰⁹ See also 6.6.16: ἀριθμῶντος ἅμα καὶ ἀριθμὸν γεννῶντος καὶ ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ὑπόστασιν ποιῶντος ποσοῦ, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τῷ βαδίζειν ὑπόστασιν τινος κινήσεως.

¹¹⁰ 6.1.29: The mode would have more reality (τό πως ἔχειν ἐνταῦθα ὑπόστασις μάλλον); and yet, if not even here there were reality (εἰ μὴ κάκει ὑπόστασις).

¹¹¹ Ἡ τοιαύτη ὑπόστασις ἀφίτησι τὸν ἀριθμὸν τοῦ οὐσίαν εἶναι, συμβεβηκὸς δὲ μάλλον ποιεῖ. Likewise in 6.1.9, where the meaning may be either “way of being” or “substance”: Εἰ μὲν οὖν γενικῶς τὴν τοῦ πρὸς τι σχέσιν ὡς εἰδὸς τις θήσεται, γένος ἐν καὶ ὑπόστασις ὡς λόγος τις πανταχοῦ· if the relationship is deemed a form, then there will be one single genus and way of being.

¹¹² Τὴν τοῦ προπάτορος οἶον ἐνεργεῖαν εἰς ὑπόστασιν οὐσίας. See also 6.8.10 where Plotinus refers to the constitution, coming into being and creation of something, in order to deny that the first principle was constituted by anything else: Αὐτὴν οὖν ἡ ἀνάγκη ὑπέστησεν; ἡ οὐδὲ ὑπέστη τῶν ἄλλων ὑποστάντων τῶν μετ’ αὐτὸ δι’ αὐτό. Τὸ οὖν πρὸ ὑποστάσεως πῶς ἂν ἡ ὑπ’ ἄλλου ἢ ὑφ’ αὐτοῦ ὑπέστη.

¹¹³ Rather than conceiving his three principles as individual hypostases, Plotinus may have thought of the Ideas as individual forms or substances (as opposed to abstraction, genera, and species). The latter thesis is supported by James Sikkema, “On the Necessity of Individual Forms in Plotinus,” *International Journal of the Platonic Tradition* 3 (2009) 138–53, who argues that “had Plotinus not posited individual forms . . . there would be no ground for appropriating each thing as intelligible” (152).

Good; therefore, it seems that φύσις, οὐσία, and ὑπόστασις are almost synonyms and indicate the substance of the Good. As a consequence, ὑπόστασις, although it refers to the Good, cannot be taken here as a technical term (“hypostasis”) as in Origen, who has a clear distinction between οὐσία and ὑπόστασις in the Trinity. Likewise, in 6.8.15 Plotinus uses ὑπόστασις in reference to the Good, which he describes as “first substance,” in the same way as in 6.6.10.¹¹⁴ However, not even here can ὑπόστασις be regarded as the technical term “hypostasis,” being rather a synonym of φύσις or οὐσία. In particular, in 6.6.10 Plotinus is explaining that the first substance/nature/being/essence (not “hypostasis”) is that of the Good, while the others are those substances or beings that are not good by nature, but by accident.

Plotinus *never* uses ὑπόστασις to indicate a hypostasis in a technical sense, that is, to indicate his three first principles. He does not employ this term in the way Origen does, to designate the individual substance of one person different from the individual substance of every other within the same nature (οὐσία, φύσις), be the latter the divine or the human nature, or the rational nature of the *logika*. Indeed, in the case of Plotinus’s three principles, not only would it be improper to speak of Persons, like those of the Trinity or of humanity or the *logika*, but the relationship between the One, the Nous, and the Soul is not a relation of equality, whereas the Persons of the Trinity (and those composing humanity and the whole nature of the *logika*) are equal. This was already suggested by Origen¹¹⁵ and was then emphasized by Gregory of Nyssa, who knew Plotinus and was inspired by him in many respects (Gregory ascribed to the whole Trinity the characteristics of Plotinus’s One). These distinctions between Plotinus’s triad and Origen’s Trinity are clear, as are those between their respective οὐσία / φύσις / ὑπόστασις terminologies.

But Porphyry, paradoxically enough,¹¹⁶ would seem to be responsible for an assimilation. For it is arguably Porphyry who ascribed the technical use of ὑπόστασις (as “hypostasis,” in reference to the three principles), very similar to Origen’s technical use of the term, to Plotinus. In *Vit. Plot.* 25, indeed, Porphyry himself attests this usage in his well-known redactional work¹¹⁷ he entitled *Enn.* 5.1 “On the three Hypostases that constitute the principles,” Περὶ τῶν τριῶν ἀρχικῶν ὑποστάσεων. This title was obviously not given by Plotinus. Likewise, in *Vit. Plot.* 4, Porphyry repeats the title of

¹¹⁴ 6.8.15: Τοῦτο [sc. τὸ ἀγαθόν] δέ ἐστιν ὃ ἐστι καὶ μονούμενον. Ὑπόστασις δὲ πρώτη οὐκ ἐν ἀψύχῳ οὐδ’ ἐν ζωῇ ἀλόγῳ; 6.6.10: εἰ τὰ πρῶτα λέγει, ὑπόστασιν λέγει τὴν πρώτην· εἰ δὲ οἷς συμβέβηκε τὸ ἀγαθόν, δεῖ εἶναι φύσιν ἀγαθοῦ.

¹¹⁵ As I have argued in “Origen’s Anti-Subordinationism,” *VC* 65 (2011) 21–49.

¹¹⁶ It is paradoxical given his hostility to Christianity. Most recently, Mark Edwards offered that his fifteen discourses *Κατὰ Χριστιανῶν* were discrete works (“Porphyry and the Christians,” in *Studies on Porphyry* [eds. George Karamanolis and Anne Sheppard; London: Institute of Classical Studies, 2007] 111–26). For a *status quaestionis* on this work, see the introduction and edition by Enrique A. Ramos Jurado et al., *Porfirio de Tiro contra los cristianos* (Cádiz: Universidad, 2006) and Robert M. Berchman, *Porphyry against the Christians* (Leiden: Brill, 2005).

¹¹⁷ On which see Henri Dominique Saffrey, “Pourquoi Porphyre a-t-il édité Plotin? Réponse provisoire,” in *Porphyre. La vie de Plotin* (eds. Luc Brisson et al.; 2 vols.; Paris: Vrin, 1992) 2:31–57.

Enn. 5.1; moreover, the title Porphyry has given to *Enn.* 5.3 reads again: Πεὶ τῶν γνωριστικῶν ὑποστάσεων. It is especially in the famous title of *Enn.* 5.1 that the technical meaning of ὑπόστασις as “hypostasis” emerges. The One, the Intellect, and the Soul are the three principal (ἀρχαί) Hypostases. This is much more Porphyry’s terminology than Plotinus’s.

But why did Porphyry introduce this innovation? Which examples or sources of inspiration did he have for such a conceptualization of ὑπόστασις as “hypostasis”? I suspect that he may even have been inspired by Origen, whose work he knew quite well, and by his technical use of ὑπόστασις, which Porphyry transposed from the Trinity to Plotinus’s triad of first principles.¹¹⁸ In fact, both the “hypostatic” meaning of ὑποστάσεις, which Porphyry ascribed to Plotinus, and the identification of the three hypostases with the ἀρχαί or first principles of all that exists, make me suspect that Porphyry may have had in mind Origen’s Trinitarian technical terminology of ὑπόστασις and his philosophical masterpiece Πεὶ ἀρχῶν.¹¹⁹ For here Origen presents God the Trinity as the principle of all, and more specifically the three ὑποστάσεις of the Christian Trinity as the ἀρχαί of all reality.¹²⁰

In Πεὶ ἀρχῶν, Origen declares that he wants to work on and complete what is revealed in Scripture, and to apply to the latter the philosophical research and parameters of Greek philosophy (*Princ.* 1 *pr.* 9–10).¹²¹ Thus, he begins by dealing with the first ἀρχή, God, and in particular with the Father, the first ὑπόστασις; the Son, who is presented as Wisdom and Logos, the seat of the Ideas; and the Spirit. Origen constantly bases his argument on Scripture and proceeds via rational deduction throughout his Πεὶ ἀρχῶν. He immediately adds a treatment of the rational natures’ participation in the Good, that is, God, the fall, and the apokatastasis.¹²² Thanks to such an application of philosophy to Scripture, Origen

¹¹⁸ According to Radice, “Philo’s Theology,” 144, Plotinus depends on Philo for the conception of the Ideas not only as thoughts of the divine Intellect, but also as intelligent powers. If Plotinus could depend on Philo, then Porphyry could certainly depend on Origen.

¹¹⁹ It is probable that Origen in turn was inspired especially by Alexander of Aphrodisias in conceiving the very structure of his masterpiece, as I have argued in “Origen, Patristic Philosophy.”

¹²⁰ This notion is so deeply rooted in Origen’s thought as to return in *Comm. Jo.* 1.102: ἀρχὴ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καὶ ἀρχὴ δημιουργημάτων ὁ δημιουργὸς καὶ ἀπαξιαπλῶς ἀρχὴ τῶν ὄντων ὁ θεός.

¹²¹ “We shall see whether what the Greek philosophers call incorporeal is found in Scriptures under another name. It will be necessary to investigate how God should be considered: whether corporeal . . . or having a different nature . . . it will be necessary to extend the same investigation also to Christ and the Holy Spirit, then to the soul and every rational nature . . . to order the rational explanation of all these arguments into a unity . . . with clear and irrefutable demonstrations . . . to construct a consistent work, with arguments and enunciations, both those found in the sacred Scripture and those thence deduced by means of a research made with exactitude and logical rigor.”

¹²² Origen treats God, the rational creatures, the world, and eschatology systematically in the first two books; the rational creatures’ free will, providence, and restoration, in the third; and in the fourth, Trinitarian matters (in a sort of *Ringkomposition* with the beginning) and Scriptural exegesis. This is perceived as belonging to the exposition of metaphysics in that Origen’s philosophy is a Christian philosophy, grounded in Scripture and facing, by means of rational arguments, questions that are not defined by Scripture and tradition.

won for the Church the most culturally-demanding and philosophically-minded people, who often were attracted by various forms of Gnosticism. He made it impossible to accuse Christianity any longer of being a religion for simpletons and unlearned people. Therefore, he was esteemed as a philosopher by several non-Christian philosophers, such as Porphyry himself. Porphyry also wrote a *Περὶ ἄρχῶν*,¹²³ in which he demonstrated the eternity of the second hypostasis, the Intellect. He surely knew both the homonymous work by Longinus, who was his teacher, and that by Alexander of Aphrodisias, whose writings were regularly read at Plotinus's classes, which he attended. But he certainly knew Origen's *Περὶ ἄρχῶν* as well.

Indeed, Porphyry knew Origen's thought and philosophical sources in depth. In a *μνήμη* of his, preserved by Eusebius, *Hist. Eccl.* 6.19.4–8, from the third book of Porphyry's writing against the Christians,¹²⁴ he described Origen as an excellent philosopher who reasoned as a Greek in metaphysical matters, although he lived as a Christian, therefore "against the law." In this fragment Porphyry, after disapproving of the application of philosophical allegoresis to the Bible, states that the initiator of this hermeneutical method was Origen, whom he depicts as nevertheless illustrious for his writings. Porphyry states that he met Origen when he was young,¹²⁵ that Origen's parents were Greek, and that he received a Greek education, but then he embraced a "barbarian way of life." Porphyry indeed draws a sharp opposition between Origen's way of life (*βίος*), which was Christian, and Origen's philosophy, which was Greek. In metaphysics and theology, according to Porphyry, Origen was a Greek philosopher, and he interpreted Scripture in the light of philosophy.¹²⁶ A noteworthy list of Origen's favorite philosophical readings follows (*Hist. Eccl.* 6.19.8), largely coinciding with the authors read by Plotinus and

¹²³ *Suda*, s.v. Πορφύριος; Proclus, *Theol. Plat.* 1.51.5.

¹²⁴ On this passage, see Pier F. Beatrice, "Porphyry's Judgment on Origen," in *Origeniana Quinta* (ed. Robert J. Daly; Leuven: Peeters, 1992) 351–67; Theodor Böhm, "Origenes—Theologe und (Neu-)Platoniker? Oder: Wem soll man misstrauen: Eusebius oder Porphyrius?" *Adamantius* 8 (2002) 7–23; Marco Zambon, "*Paranomos zen*: la critica di Porfirio a Origene," in *Origeniana Octava* (ed. Lorenzo Perrone; Leuven: Peeters, 2003) 553–63; Anthony Grafton and Megan Williams, *Christianity and the Transformation of the Book* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap, 2006) 63–65; Ilaria Ramelli, "Origen and the Stoic Allegorical Tradition," *InvLuc* 28 (2006) 195–226; eadem, "Origen, Patristic Philosophy"; eadem, "The Philosophical Stance of Allegory in Stoicism and its Reception in Platonism, Pagan and Christian," *IJCT* 18 (2011) 335–71; on Porphyry's attitude toward Christianity, see Jeremy Schott, "Porphyry on Christians and Others: 'Barbarian Wisdom,' Identity Politics, and Anti-Christian Polemics on the Eve of the Great Persecution," *J ECS* 13 (2005) 277–314.

¹²⁵ See also Athanasius Syrus's preface to his *Isagoge*: "Porphyry was from Tyre and was a disciple of Origen;" and Eunapius *V. Soph.* 457. Porphyry was born in 232/3 C.E., and Origen died around 255. Therefore Porphyry was no older than twenty-two when he met Origen. It is unclear whether he was a Christian at that time, as Socrates and Porphyry's knowledge of Scripture may suggest, but he is certainly not mistaken when he identifies our Origen with a disciple of Ammonius, and therefore a fellow-disciple of Plotinus.

¹²⁶ Κατὰ δὲ τὰς περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ τοῦ θεοῦ δόξας ἐλληνίζον τε καὶ τὰ Ἑλλήνων τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ὑποβαλλόμενος μῦθος.

his disciples: Plato, Middle Platonists and Neopythagoreans, and Stoic allegorists. Porphyry regarded Origen as a convert to Christianity, a Christian in his life but a Greek philosopher in his metaphysics and theology.

Precisely because he considered Origen's metaphysical principles to be Greek, Porphyry felt a profound continuity between *Origen's* discourse on the three ἀρχαί of all (that is to say, the Trinity) and *Plotinus's* discourse on the three ἀρχαί of all (i.e., his protological triad: the One, the Intellect, and the Soul). And, since Origen used ὑποστάσεις in a technical sense for his own three ἀρχαί, Porphyry may indeed have applied this term to Plotinus's three ἀρχαί as well, although Plotinus's triad presents considerable divergences from Origen's Trinity, and although "ὑπόστασις," as I have pointed out, was not a technical term in Plotinus for an individual substance different from the other individual substances that share in the same essence or οὐσία, nor was it used by him in the sense of "hypostasis" proper, to designate specifically his three principles. The present supposition would gain even more strength if Origen the Christian and Origen the Neoplatonist, mentioned by Porphyry in his *Vita Plotini* and by later Neoplatonists, were in fact one and the same person. Interestingly, Porphyry attributes his own description of demonology in *De abstinentia* to "some of the Platonists"; indeed, this work is based on Origen's work on the demons, which Porphyry mentions in his biography of Plotinus as a work of Origen the Neoplatonist.¹²⁷

My suspicion that the technical use of *hypostasis* in Plotinus's titles, created by Porphyry and inspired by Origen, is further strengthened by the fact that Porphyry himself, in his own linguistic use, did *not* employ ὑπόστασις in the aforementioned technical sense. For, in Porphyry's own writings, ὑπόστασις means "existence, way of existence," or seems to be nearly a synonym of οὐσία.¹²⁸ These are the same meanings I have detected in Plotinus. Thus, in ascribing the technical notion of "hypostasis" to Plotinus's three principles, Porphyry seems to have drawn, not on his own or Plotinus's terminology, but on some other source of inspiration. I

¹²⁷ Beatrice, "Porphyry's Judgment," 362 and Heidi Marx-Wolf, "High Priests of the Highest God: Third-Century Platonists as Ritual Experts," *J ECS* 18 (2010) 481–513, at 498 accept that this work was by Origen the Christian. I have argued for the identification of the two Origenes in "Origen, Patristic Philosophy," and, with further proofs, in "Origen the Christian Middle/Neoplatonist."

¹²⁸ See *Sent.* 4: "Incorporeal beings have a substance of their own and do not mix with bodies [τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ ἀσώματα ὑποστάσει καὶ οὐσία οὐ πάρεστιν οὐδὲ συγκίρονται τοῖς σώμασι]"; 40: "The question is of an eternal substance": ἀένναιον οὐσίαν . . . ὑπόστασιν ἀκάματον . . . οὐδαμῆ μὲν ἔλλειπουσιν; here οὐσία and ὑπόστασις are synonyms. In *Ep. ad An.* 2.4b, too, ὑπόστασις means "substance": μικτόν τι γίνεται ὑποστάσεως εἶδος, ἐξ ἡμῶν τε τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ ἔξωθεν θείας ἐπινοίας; *Comm. in Parm.* 1: τὸ ἄγαν ἐξηλλαγμένον τῆς ἀνεπινοήτου ὑποστάσεως, 11: τις ἰδιότης ὑποστάσεως ἐνεικονιζομένη μὲν τὴν ἀπλότητα τοῦ ἐνός. *Sent.* 33: πραγμάτων παντελῶς ἐκβεβηκότων ἀπ' ἀλλήλων κατ' ἰδιότητα ὑποστάσεως; 43: ὀνόματος διαφορᾶς προστεθείσης τῇ τοῦ νοῦ ὑποστάσει καὶ τῆς φαντασίας: the attribution of ὑπόστασις not only to the intellect, but also to φαντασία excludes that it means the "hypostasis" of the Intellect. On Porphyry's hypostases, see John Dillon, "Intellect and the One in Porphyry's *Sententiae*," *International Journal of the Platonic Tradition* 4 (2010) 27–35; and Bernard Collette-Ducic, *Plotin et l'ordonnement de l'être* (Paris: Vrin, 2007).

have argued that this source is probably Origen's technical, Trinitarian meaning of *ὑπόστασις*, which Porphyry then transposed to Plotinus's triad of principles.

Of course, Porphyry would never have admitted that he had taken such a fundamental conception from Origen (given that Origen, albeit an excellent philosopher in his opinion, was nevertheless a Christian); he rather endeavored to refer Plotinus's three hypostases back to Plato, as is revealed by the following passage from Book 4 of Porphyry's *History of Philosophy*:¹²⁹

Πορφύριος γάρ φησι, Πλάτωνος ἐπιθέμενος δόξαν· “ἄρχη γὰρ τριῶν ὑποστάσεων, ἔφη Πλάτων, τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ προελθεῖν οὐσίαν· εἶναι δὲ τὸν μὲν ἀνωτάτω θεὸν τὰγαθόν, μετ’ αὐτὸν δὲ τὸν δευτέρου καὶ δημιουργόν, τρίτον κτλ.”

Porphyry, reporting a thought of Plato, says: “The essence of the divinity—Plato said—proceeds up to three hypostases: the highest God is the Good; after it there comes the second God, the Demiurge, and the third, etc.”

Thus, Porphyry claims that Plato posited the three principles that were later theorized by Plotinus, and called them “hypostases,” and not only this, but that Plato even ascribed to these three principles one and the same divine οὐσία. Remarkably, this was not Plato's own theological doctrine,¹³⁰ nor even Plotinus's interpretation of Plato (in *Enn.* 5.1.8 he does refer to the *Second Letter* and its “three kings” as a basis for his own three principles, but with no mention of hypostases!), nor any Middle Platonist's doctrine or exegesis of Plato proper, but it rather resembles much more closely *Origen's* view of the Trinity: God is the Good, the Son is the agent of creation, and the Spirit is the third principle; they all share the same divine οὐσία, but they are three different ὑποστάσεις. I am further confirmed in my suspicion by the fact that in his *Κατὰ Χριστιανῶν* Porphyry criticizes the Johannine presentation of Christ as God's Logos by reading it through the lenses of Origen's understanding of the Son having the same οὐσία as the Father but a different ὑπόστασις. The fragment is reported by three Byzantine authors, but only one version was included in Harnack's collection¹³¹ as fr. 86;¹³² the two other versions come from Psellus.¹³³ The most complete and relevant to the present argument is Psellus's first quotation:

¹²⁹ Preserved by Cyril, *C. Julian.* 8 p. 271a: γράφει τοίνυν Πορφύριος ἐν βιβλίῳ τετάρτῳ Φιλοσόφου ἱστορίας . . .

¹³⁰ On Plato's theology, about which scholarship does not enjoy a basic consensus, I limit myself to referring to Michael Bordt, *Platons Theologie* (Freiburg: Karl Alber, 2006), who advocates the presence of a coherent and constant theology in Plato and offers an overview of past scholarship.

¹³¹ Adolf von Harnack, *Porphyrius, “Gegen die Christen,” 15 Bücher. Zeugnisse, Fragmente und Referate* (Berlin: Königliche Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1916).

¹³² About which see John Granger Cook, *The Interpretation of the New Testament in Greco-Roman Paganism* (Tübingen: Mohr, 2000) 148–49.

¹³³ They have been added to Pophyry's fragments by Richard Goulet, “Cinq nouveaux fragments nominaux du traité de Porphyre *Contre les Chrétiens*,” *VC* 64 (2010) 140–59, esp. 141–44.

If [the Son] is a logos, it is either expressed [προφορικῶς] or immanent [ἐνδιάθετος]. But if it is expressed, it is not substantial [οὐσιώδης], because at the same time as it is uttered, it has already gone. If, on the other hand, it is immanent, it will be inseparable from the Father's nature [φύσεως]; in which case, how is it that it has separated and from there has descended to life?¹³⁴ (*Op. theol.* 75.107–10)

Now, Porphyry was reading John 1:1 with Origen's interpretation of Christ-Logos in mind; therefore he argued that, if the Logos is προφορικῶς, it cannot have an οὐσία, let alone a divine οὐσία, and if it is ἐνδιάθετος, it cannot have a ὑπόστασις of its own, separated from the Father. Porphyry's parallel fr. 86 is also telling, in that it shows that he argues that Christ-Logos, being neither προφορικῶς nor ἐνδιάθετος—exactly what Origen claimed (see below)!—cannot be a Logos at all.¹³⁵ This conclusion is diametrically opposed to Origen's and, I suspect, is aimed at refuting it. Indeed, among Christian authors, Theophilus, *Autol.* 2.22 had presented the Logos of God as a Logos ἐνδιάθετος that never separates from the Father, but he had no Trinitarian notion of ὑπόστασις as individual substance. But Origen had it, and Origen, precisely in a polemic with another imperial Platonist, Celsus, discussed John 1:1 in the light of the categories of logos ἐνδιάθετος and προφορικῶς. In *Cels.* 6.65 Origen refuses to apply the notions of logos ἐνδιάθετος or προφορικῶς to Christ-Logos, since these can only be applied to human logos, whereas the divine Logos is superior; the divine Logos-Son can grasp God, and even reveal God, whereas the human logos cannot.¹³⁶ In the same way, in fr. 118 on John, Origen applied the concept of logos ἐνδιάθετος, not to Christ, but to the human rational faculty or ἡγεμονικόν, over which Christ-Logos presides.¹³⁷ Likewise in *Comm. Matt.* 11.2.12 Origen, interpreting the multiplication of loaves and fishes, speaks of logos ἐνδιάθετος and προφορικῶς in reference to human reason: after equating the bread with the rational faculty that Jesus can expand in each person, he interprets the two fishes as the two kinds of this faculty, logos ἐνδιάθετος and logos προφορικῶς. In *Schol. Apoc.* 9, too, Origen refers the idea

¹³⁴ *Michaelis Pselli Theologica* (ed. Paul Gautier; Stuttgart-Leipzig: Teubner, 1989) 1:301.

¹³⁵ Ἦτοι προφορικῶς ἢ ἐνδιάθετος, ἀλλὰ μὴν οὔτε τοῦτο, οὔτε ἐκείνο· οὐκ ἄρα οὐδὲ λόγος ἐστι.

¹³⁶ Εἰ μὲν λόγῳ τῷ ἐν ἡμῖν, εἴτε ἐνδιαθέτῳ εἴτε καὶ προφορικῷ, καὶ ἡμεῖς φήσομεν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἐφικτὸς τῷ λόγῳ ὁ θεός· εἰ δὲ νοήσαντες τὸ “Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν θεόν, καὶ θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος,” ἀποφανόμεθα ὅτι τοῦτῳ τῷ λόγῳ ἐφικτὸς ἐστὶν ὁ θεός, οὐ μόνῳ αὐτῷ καταλαμβανόμενος ἀλλὰ καὶ ὃ ἂν αὐτὸς ἀποκαλύψῃ τὸν πατέρα. On the notions of λόγος ἐνδιάθετος and προφορικῶς in Origen, see also David Robertson, “Origen on Inner and Outer Logos,” *StPatr* 46 (2010) 201–6.

¹³⁷ Θεὸς λόγος ἦν· οὗτος δὲ παντὶ λογικῷ πάρεστι. τὸ δὲ διανοητικὸν ὃ καὶ ἡγεμονικὸν καλεῖται, μεσαίτατον ἡμῶν ἔστιν· ἐκεῖ γάρ ἐστιν ὁ ἐνδιάθετος λόγος, καθ' ὃν λογικοὶ ἔσμεν, ὃν καὶ ἐπισκοπεῖ ὡς θεὸς ὁ χριστὸς καὶ λόγος.

of *logos προφορικός* to the human *logos*, and not to the divine *Logos*.¹³⁸ Again, in *Exp. Prov.* PG 17.252.12 Origen applies the same notion of *logos προφορικός* to the human rational faculty, and not to the divine *Logos*.¹³⁹ The same line was followed by three Origenist theologians: Eusebius, who refused to apply the notions of *logos ἐνδιάθετος* and *προφορικός* to Christ-*Logos* and blamed Marcellus for doing so;¹⁴⁰ Athanasius, who even had the assimilation of Christ-*Logos* to the *logos ἐνδιάθετος* and *προφορικός* included in anathemas (*Syn.* 27.3.8); and Gregory of Nyssa, who, like Eusebius, found this assimilation “Sabellian,” in that it denied the separate hypostasis of the Son.¹⁴¹

Porphry likely knew at least Origen’s *Περὶ Ἀρχῶν* and *Contra Celsum*, and probably even his *Commentary on John*, which included many philosophical treatments. Porphry’s polemical fragment did not simply address John 1:1, but implied Origen’s notion of Christ-*Logos* as having the same οὐσία as the Father but a ὑπόστασις of his own.¹⁴² When Porphry claimed that Christ-*Logos*, if it is neither ἐνδιάθετος nor *προφορικός*, is not even a *logos*, he clearly had in mind

¹³⁸ Speaking of “one who turns one’s intellect to the true light,” he remarks that, in order to be useful to other people, “who have not yet had a chance to be illuminated by the true Sun,” this person should teach them by means of his or her *logos προφορικός*.

¹³⁹ “The spindle is a pure intellect . . . or a *logos προφορικός* that pulls spiritual contemplation from the intellect.”

¹⁴⁰ In *Eccl. Theol.* ten passages prove this. In 1.17.7 Eusebius avers that the assimilation of God’s *Logos* to the human *logos ἐνδιάθετος* and *προφορικός* (μηδὲ ποτὲ μὲν ἐνδιάθετον ὡς ἐπ’ ἀνθρώπῳ λόγον ποτὲ δὲ σημαντικὸν ὡς τὸν ἐν ἡμῖν προφορικὸν καὶ ἐν τῷ θεῷ ὑποτίθεσθαι) is not Christian, but “Jewish” or “Sabellian,” in that it denies the Son of God as a distinct substance; see also 2.14.20: κατὰ δὲ τὸν Σαβέλλιον ἓνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι ἀποφανόμενος υἱὸν καὶ πατέρα καὶ ποτὲ μὲν αὐτὸν ἐνδιάθετον εἰσάγων λόγον ποτὲ δὲ προφορικόν. Two chapters in Book 2 are devoted to countering Marcellus’s presentation of God’s *Logos* as similar to human *logos*, sometimes ἐνδιάθετος and sometimes προφορικός (title of ch. 11: ποτὲ μὲν αὐτὸν προφορικὸν τοῦ θεοῦ λόγον, ποτὲ δὲ ἐνδιάθετον ὁμοίως τῷ ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἔφασκεν; of ch. 15: ἡρνεῖτο τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ θεοῦ σαφῶς προφορικὸν λόγον καὶ ἐνδιάθετον φάσκων εἶναι αὐτόν). In 2.15.2–3, indeed, Eusebius paraphrases Marcellus on this point, and in 2.11.1 levels the same charge against him: καταπίπτει ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρωπείου λόγου ὁμοιότητα . . . ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ λόγου σημαντικὸν αὐτὸν δίδωσιν καὶ ὅμοιον τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ ὡς ποτὲ μὲν λέγειν αὐτὸν ἡσυχάζειν ἐν τῷ θεῷ ποτὲ δὲ προϊέναι τοῦ θεοῦ . . . καθ’ ὁμοιότητα τοῦ παρ’ ἡμῖν λόγου, τοῦ τε ἐνδιαθέτου καλουμένου καὶ τοῦ κατὰ προφορὰν διὰ φωνῆς ἑξακουομένου. Idem in 2.15.4: ἐνδιάθετον λόγον ᾧ διαλογίζεται τις καὶ προφορικὸν ᾧ διαλέγεται προσῆψεν τῷ θεῷ, τοιοῦτόν τινα οἶον τὸν καθ’ ἡμᾶς τὸν ἐν τῷ θεῷ εἶναι λόγον ὑποθέμενος. 2.17.6: ὁ τοῦ παμβασιλέως θεοῦ τέλειος Λόγος, οὐ κατὰ τὸν προφορικὸν ἀνθρώπινον λόγον.

¹⁴¹ *Adv. Ar. et Sab.* (ed. Friedrich Mueller; *Gregorii Nysseni Opera*; vol. 3.1; Leiden: Brill, 1958) 71–85; 81.10–25.

¹⁴² On which see Joël Letellier, “Le Logos chez Origène,” *RSPT* 75 (1991) 587–611; Joseph Wolinski, “Le recours aux *epinoiai* du Christ dans le *Commentaire sur Jean* d’Origène,” in *Origeniana Sexta* (ed. Gilles Dorival and Alain Le Boulluec; Leuven: Peeters, 1995) 465–92; Joseph O’Leary, “Logos,” in *The Westminster Handbook to Origen* (ed. John A. McGuckin; Louisville: John Knox, 2004) 142–45; my “Clement’s Notion of the Logos ‘All Things As One’: Its Alexandrian Background in Philo and its Developments in Origen and Nyssen,” in *Alexandrian Personae: Scholarly Culture and Religious Traditions in Ancient Alexandria* (ed. Zlatko Pleše; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2012).

Origen's thesis that Christ-Logos is neither ἐνδιάθετος nor προφορικός, since Origen was the only Christian supporter of this thesis then. Precisely Porphyry's polemic and Origen's interpretation were known to Eusebius—the author of an extensive refutation of Porphyry—who reflects them in *Eccl. theol.* 2.9.1. Here he posits the same problem of the individual subsistence of the Son-Logos as raised by Porphyry, and even uses the same notion and vocabulary of Christ-Logos ἀχώριστος from the Father as found in Porphyry's objection; he turns it against Marcellus, but not to claim that Christ is a logos προφορικός; he rather asserts that Christ-Logos is *similar* to it.¹⁴³

One last hint is found in the title and content of Eusebius's *Praep. ev.* 11.21. Its title, chosen by Eusebius himself, exactly coincides with that chosen by Porphyry for *Enn.* 5.1: Περὶ τῶν τριῶν ἀρχικῶν ὑποστάσεων.¹⁴⁴ This cannot be accidental, all the more in that here, on the basis of the Platonic *Second Letter* 312d–e (the same that Plotinus cited in *Enn.* 5.1.8 to provide a basis for his doctrine of the three principles, but notably without speaking of hypostases, unlike Porphyry), Eusebius argues that Plato's triad depends on the “Jewish oracles,” the *Sapientia Salomonis*. This theology was interpreted by “the exegetes of Plato,” i.e., Plotinus and Porphyry, as a reference to the three hypostases (“first god,” “second cause,” and “third god” or world soul), and by the Christian tradition as a reference to the Trinity. This tradition was represented by Clement, who interpreted the “three kings” of the *Second Letter* in reference to both the Trinity and the Platonic principles. But Eusebius knew that it was Origen who first spoke of the Persons of the Trinity in terms of hypostases, probably inspiring even Porphyry, who read Plotinus's principles as individual substances in Origen's sense, and who further tried to ascribe this novelty, not to Origen, but to Plato, who in fact did not anticipate it. Porphyry had the *Second Letter* in mind, that to which Clement, Origen, Plotinus, and then Eusebius referred. Clement, Origen, and Plotinus may have derived the interpretation of that letter from Ammonius; Eusebius was well acquainted with their, and Porphyry's, exegesis of that letter. Now, Plotinus did not speak of hypostases in his exegesis of it, but Porphyry, inspired by Origen, did so in his history of philosophy and in the title he chose for *Enn.* 5.1, and Eusebius's choice of his own title suggests that he was thinking precisely of Origen and Porphyry. Did he suspect any influence of the former on the latter?

On the basis of the analysis of the ὑπόστασις terminology in Plotinus and Porphyry that I have conducted, and of all the considerations I have expounded

¹⁴³ “If it has a hypostasis of its own [καθ' ἑαυτὸν ὑφεστώς] and thus is a different being than God [ἕτερος τοῦ Θεοῦ], Marcellus's labor is in vain, and if, although it proceeded from God similarly to our logos προφορικός, it remained inseparable [ἀχώριστος] from the Father, then it has always and uninterruptedly been in God, even while it was working.”

¹⁴⁴ Eusebius knew Plotinus through Porphyry's edition (this is the conclusion of Marie-Odile Goulet-Cazé, “Deux traités plotiniens chez Eusèbe de Césarée,” in *The Libraries of the Neoplatonists* [ed. Cristina D'Ancona; Leiden: Brill, 2007] 63–97). According to Paul Kalligas, “Traces of Longinus' Library in Eusebius' *Praeparatio Evangelica*,” *CQ* 51 (2001) 584–98, Eusebius knew Plotinus, as well as most of Porphyry, from Longinus's library.

in the course of the present section, I do suspect a possible influence of Origen on Porphyry in respect to the technical meaning of ὑπόστασις as “hypostasis.” Porphyry might have even ascribed it to Plotinus under the influence of Origen, an influence that, however, he would have never acknowledged. This is why Porphyry attempted, rather, to trace this innovation back to Plato. This would not be the only example of Origen’s influence on Porphyry. For instance, Robert M. Grant has maintained that Origen’s *Stromateis* inspired many exegetical *quaestiones* in his work against the Christians.¹⁴⁵

■ The Scriptural Side: Hebrews 1:3

In addition to the philosophical side, Scripture must necessarily be taken into consideration in an investigation into the sources of Origen’s technical conception of ὑπόστασις. For, besides Greek philosophers, Origen’s thought was informed by the Bible, both the LXX and the New Testament, and he always buttressed his rational arguments, even in his philosophical masterpiece, with scriptural quotations and interpretations. In the New Testament, the meaning “confidence” for ὑπόστασις is found in Paul’s authentic letters, especially 2 Corinthians.¹⁴⁶ But the most interesting passages for the present investigation belong to the Book of Hebrews. Here the sense “confidence” is found again, at least in 3:14; while in 2 Corinthians the connotation is always negative, here it is very positive, and ὑπόστασις as “confidence” assumes a meaning that is very close to “faith.”¹⁴⁷ Indeed, in 11:1 ὑπόστασις appears in the very definition of “faith”: ἔστιν δὲ πίστις ἐλπυζομένων ὑπόστασις. The expression is difficult to translate; the RSV, like the ASV, renders: “Faith is the assurance of things hoped for”; the KJV, like the Webster, is closer to Dante’s rendering, less ethical and more ontological: “Faith is the substance of things hoped for” (Dante had: “Fede è sustanza di cose sperate,” *Par.* 24.64). Likewise the Darby Bible: “Faith is the substantiating of things hoped for.” In his Latin version of Origen’s *Commentary on Romans* (4.6), Rufinus, adhering to the “ontological” line, translated ὑπόστασις in a quotation of Heb 3:14 as *substantia*. The same translation is found in the *Vetus Latina* and the *Vulgate*.¹⁴⁸

But the passage from Hebrews that most of all seems to have influenced Origen’s Trinitarian use of ὑπόστασις is surely 1:3, in which the Son is described as ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης καὶ χαρακτῆρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτοῦ (*sc.* of the

¹⁴⁵ “The *Stromateis* of Origen,” in *Epektasis. Mélanges J. Danérou* (ed. Jacques Fontaine and Charles Kannengiesser; Paris: Cerf, 1972) 275–92.

¹⁴⁶ 9:4: εὐρωσιν ὑμᾶς ἀπαρρασκευάστους καταισχυρθώμεν ἡμεῖς, ἵνα μὴ λέγω ὑμεῖς, ἐν τῇ ὑποστάσει ταύτῃ; 11:17: λαλῶ ... ὡς ἐν ἀφροσύνῃ, ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ὑποστάσει τῆς καυχήσεως.

¹⁴⁷ Μέτοχοι τοῦ Χριστοῦ γεγόναμεν, ἐάνπερ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς ὑποστάσεως μέχρι τέλους βεβαίαν κατάσωμεν: “we have become participants in Christ, if only we keep our initial confidence steadfast until the end.”

¹⁴⁸ For this passage we have Origen’s Greek, preserved in P. Cair. 88748 and cod. Vat. gr. 762: ὀριζόμενος ἢ ὑπογράφων ὁ λόγος ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ Ἐβραίου ἐπιστολῇ τὴν πίστιν φησὶν· Ἔστιν δὲ πίστις ἐλπυζομένων ὑπόστασις, πραγματῶν ἐλεγχος οὐ βλεπομένων.

Father).¹⁴⁹ The Son is the effulgence of the Father's glory and the expression, the express image, stamp, imprint, or exact representation, of the Father's own substance. It is remarkable that this is precisely the passage on which Origen commented while asserting the coeternity of the Son with the Father in the aforementioned fragment quoted by Athanasius, to which I shall return in a moment. And in Heb 1:3 Origen found that a Person of the Trinity, in this case the Father, has a ὑπόστασις of its own. The Son is like the impression of the individual substance of the Father; thus, he must in turn have a ὑπόστασις of his own, different from that of the Father.

The notion of ὑπόστασις that emerges in Heb 1:3 is similar to that which I have pointed out in Philo. Indeed, there exist interesting convergences between Hebrews and Philo, whose works, according to some scholars, were known to the author of the letter.¹⁵⁰ Most recently, Folker Siegert has claimed that, among New Testament writings, "the clearest evidence of at least indirect Philonic influence are the Epistle to the Hebrews and the Gospel of John."¹⁵¹ The former was addressed to Jewish Christians in Rome and, according to some scholars, its author may be

¹⁴⁹ Already Clement commented on Heb 1:2–4, in *Strom.* 7.3.16: the Son is the *character* of the universal King and almighty Father, and *character* of the Glory of the Father. See James W. Thompson, "The Epistle to the Hebrews in the Works of Clement of Alexandria," in *Transmission and Reception: New Testament Text-Critical and Exegetical Studies* (ed. Jeff Childers and David C. Parker; Piscataway, N.J.: Gorgias, 2006) 239–54, esp. 240–42.

¹⁵⁰ The main comparative studies of Philo and Hebrews are: Česlas Spicq, *L'Épître aux Hébreux* (2 vols.; Paris: Lecoffre, 1952–1953), who contends that the author of Hebrews was a Philonian who converted to Christianity; Sidney Sower, *The Hermeneutics of Philo and Hebrews* (Zürich: EVZ, 1965); Ronald Williamson, *Philo and the Epistle to the Hebrews* (Leiden: Brill, 1970); Kumar Dey, *The Intermediary World and Patterns of Perfection in Philo and Hebrews* (SBLDS 25; Missoula, Mont.: Scholars, 1975), who does not see specific contacts between Philo and Hebrews, but admits that they probably had a common cultural background; Lincoln Hurst, *The Epistle to the Hebrews: Its Background of Thought* (SNTSMS 65; Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1990), according to whom it is not proven that Hebrews had Philo and Middle Platonism in its intellectual background (which is admitted by Harold Attridge, *The Epistle to the Hebrews* [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1989] 29, and David Runia, *Philo in Early Christian Literature: A Survey* [Minneapolis: Fortress, 1993] 78); Kenneth Schenck, *A Brief Guide to Philo* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2005) esp. in the chapter "Philo and Christianity," 73–96, advocates close similarities in the conception of the Logos, the interpretation of the Tabernacle, and the representation of angels (see 74–86, esp. 82–84 for convergences with Hebrews); idem, "Philo and the Epistle to the Hebrews: Ronald Williamson's Study after Thirty Years," *SPhilo Annual* 14 (2002) 112–35, notes that the main difference is that Hebrews is eschatologically oriented, while Philo is not, and that the latter allegorizes Scripture, while Hebrews does not, but the similarities are more remarkable; he calls attention to the quotations from the OT that are uniquely common to Hebrews and to Philo. See also Gert Steyn, "Torah Quotations Common to Philo, Hebrews, Clemens Romanus, and Justin Martyr," in *The New Testament Interpreted* (ed. Cilliers Breytenbach, Johan Thom, and Jeremy Punt; Leiden: Brill, 2006) 135–51, who thinks that the author of Hebrews was acquainted with Philo's works, and wrote from Alexandria to Christians in Rome.

¹⁵¹ "Philo and the New Testament," in *The Cambridge Companion to Philo* (ed. Adam Kamesar; Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2009) 175–209, at 175. For the presence of Platonism in Hebrews, see Peter J. Tomson, "Le Temple céleste: pensée platonisante et orientation apocalyptique dans l'Épître aux Hébreux," in *Philon d'Alexandrie. Un penseur à l'intersection des cultures gréco-romaine, orientale, juive, et chrétienne* (eds. Baudouin Decharneux and Sabrina Inowlocki; Turnhout: Brepols, 2011).

Prisca, one of the first apostles and heads of churches; Siegert dates it before 68 C.E. and, while admitting that there is no evidence that Roman Jews possessed Philo's writings at that time, he deems it safe to assume that the author of Hebrews, like other Jews in Rome, "may have learned of Philo's teachings orally, even from hearing him directly."¹⁵² To the convergences already highlighted by scholars (for instance, in the conception of the Logos, in that of angels, in the interpretation of the Tabernacle, etc.) I add the present one concerning the concept of ὑπόστασις. Even more specifically, just as Philo in the aforementioned passage in which he used ὑπόστασις in the sense of "individual substance" was speaking of the ἀυγή, so is the author of Hebrews here speaking of the Son as an ἀπαύγασμα of the Father's glory; and as such he also defines him as the expression of the Father's *individual substance*. In the light of this previously unnoticed close parallel, I wonder whether the author of Hebrews even had Philo's passage in mind while he was describing the Son in such terms. The correspondences are indeed striking, to the point of suggesting a dependence on Philo's passage:

ἀυγή = ἀπαύγασμα;
 ὑπόστασις ἰδίᾳ = ὑπόστασις as individual substance;
 derivation of the ἀυγή from its producer = derivation of the Son—ἀπαύγασμα from
 the Father.¹⁵³

In this passage of Hebrews, whether or not influenced by Philo, Origen found a concept of ὑπόστασις as individual substance, furthermore one specifically applied to the Father and the Son. He then interpreted what he found in the New Testament concerning the ὑποστάσεις of the Son and the Father in light of the philosophical use of ὑπόστασις, in particular that found in the early imperial period.

In order to demonstrate that Origen's Trinitarian notion of ὑπόστασις developed in connection with his exegesis of Heb 1:3, let me briefly analyze all extant passages

¹⁵² Siegert, "Philo," 177–78.

¹⁵³ Moreover, another passage of Philo could lie behind Heb 1:3: *Opif.* 145–146, in which the human being is described as akin to God (σφῆξιν τοὺς τύπους τῆς πρὸς τὸν προπάτορα συγγενείας) and an ἀπαύγασμα of God because of its affinity with God's Logos: πᾶς ἄνθρωπος κατὰ μὲν τὴν διάνοιαν ὠκειώται Λόγῳ θεῷ, τῆς μακαρίας φύσεως . . . ἀπαύγασμα γεγονώς. Here, however, Wis 7:25–26 could have worked as a common source of inspiration, while this cannot be the case for the striking parallel I have pointed out in the text. Again, the characterization of the Son as χαρακτήρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως of the Father has a parallel in *Det.* 83: ἡ δὲ [*sc.* δύναμις] ἐκ τῆς λογικῆς ἀπορρουεῖσα πηγῆς τὸ πνεῦμα . . . τύπον τινὰ καὶ χαρακτήρα θείας δυνάμεως (see also, but less relevant, *Plant.* 18: τῆς λογικῆς ψυχῆς . . . χαρακτήρ ἐστὶν ὁ αἰδῖος λόγος; Williamson, *Philo*, 80, and Thompson, "The Epistle to the Hebrews," 240–42, underline the continuity between Philo, Hebrews, and Clement in this description of the Logos as χαρακτήρ). In respect to my main argument, however, and to Origen's understanding, Heb 1:3 is different, since it describes the Son as the express image of *the Father's individual substance*, and not of the divine power in general. The latter, in Origen's view, is shared by the Son, whereas the Son does not share the Father's individual substance.

in which he interprets this biblical verse.¹⁵⁴ In *Hom. Jer.* 9.4 he quotes Heb 1:3 joined to Wis 7:26 in support of the eternal generation of the Son from the Father, just as the light always produces its splendor;¹⁵⁵ he only quotes the first part of the verse, not the subsequent phrase containing ὑπόστασις. Likewise in *Comm. Jo.* 13.25.153 he quotes the first part, combining it with Wis 7:25–26, and again in 32.28.353, within a reflection on the glory of God. The same theme occurs again in *Comm. Rom.* 2.5.59–63, in which Origen quotes the second part of the verse as well: Rufinus translated ὑπόστασις as *substantia*, and Origen interpreted the verse in reference to the generation of the Son as the irradiation of the glory of the Father, who is its source.¹⁵⁶ The mediating role of Christ-Logos is clear in this description, in which Christ-Logos is the seat of all Ideas, therefore of all virtues, all capacities, etc. Rational creatures do not possess these virtues, capacities, and so on, but participate in them insofar as they participate in Christ-Logos.¹⁵⁷ Likewise, in 4.8.111–117 the definition of Christ in Heb 1:3 is quoted entirely and ὑπόστασις is rendered as *substantia*.¹⁵⁸ In *Princ.* 1.2.5, too, Origen joins Heb 1:3 to Wis 7:25–26: the Son's individual substance is here rendered *subsistentia* by Rufinus as a translation of ὑπόστασις, in line with his technical rendering (shortly beforehand, in the quotation from Heb 1:3, ὑπόστασις is rendered by Rufinus as *substantia*, but probably under the influence of the *Vetus Latina*).¹⁵⁹ This is confirmed by *Princ.* 1.2.2, in which Origen speaks of the Son's individual substance, identifying the Son with God's eternal Wisdom. Origen thus counters a "monarchian" view of the Trinity, which denies that the Son had an individual substance; on the contrary, he claims that the Son-Wisdom is not "anything without substance" (*aliquid insubstantivum*), but "something that makes people wise: the Son of God is God's Wisdom which subsists as an individual substance" (*res aliqua quae sapientes efficiat: Filium Dei sapientiam eius esse substantialiter subsistentem*). The last two words are of the utmost importance; the underlying Greek here likely was ὑποστατικῶς ὑπάρχουσιν; in any case, ὑπόστασις or a

¹⁵⁴ In addition to those I shall discuss, Origen quotes Heb 1:3 also in a number of other passages among those preserved—and we have lost a great deal—such as *Sel. Ps.* PG 12.1424.12–13; 1600.17; 1204.15 and 978; *Cels.* 8.12: τὸν υἱὸν ὄντα ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης καὶ χαρακτηριστὴρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως τοῦ θεοῦ, and 8.14: ἀπαύγασμά ἐστι τῆς δόξης καὶ χαρακτηριστὴρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτοῦ.

¹⁵⁵ Ἀπαύγασμα δόξης, ἀπαύγασμα φωτὸς αἰδίου.

¹⁵⁶ Quia sit splendor gloriae et imago expressa substantiae eius. Perque haec declaratur ipsum fontem gloriae Patrem dici ex quo splendor gloriae Filii generatur, cuius participatione omnes creaturae gloriam habere dicuntur.

¹⁵⁷ See, for instance, *Cels.* 6.64: "Our Savior does not participate in justice, but is Justice itself, and the just participate in him."

¹⁵⁸ Haec autem gloria quae speratur . . . numquam destruitur; est enim talis de qua idem apostolus dicit loquens de Christo: "qui est," inquit, "splendor gloriae et figura expressa substantiae eius."

¹⁵⁹ Splendor gloriae et figura expressa substantiae eius. Invenimus nihilominus etiam in Sapientia quae dicitur Salomonis descriptionem quandam de Dei Sapientia . . . Vapor est enim, inquit, virtutis Dei et ἀπόρροια (id est manatio) gloriae omnipotentis purissima . . . Sapientiam vero Dei dicimus subsistentiam habentem non alibi nisi in eo, qui est initium omnium, ex quo et nata est.

derivative was surely present in Origen's syntagm. Origen clearly insists on the notion of the Son's individual, independent, and real substance, his ὑπόστασις, and develops this precisely while reflecting on the definition of the Son in Heb 1:3.

In *Princ.* 1.2.8 Origen focuses specifically on the explanation of the meaning of χαρακτήρ ὑποστάσεως αὐτοῦ in Heb 1:3. In Rufinus's translation, he comments on Heb 1:3, "figura expressa substantiae vel subsistentiae eius," trying to determine "how the figure of the Father's individual substance is said to differ from the individual substance or existence of God the Father" (quomodo alia praeter ipsam Dei substantiam vel subsistentiam . . . figura substantiae eius esse dicatur). Here Rufinus rendered ὑπόστασις as *substantia et subsistentia*, twice, probably feeling that *substantia* alone—as ὑπόστασις was translated in the Vetus Latina and then the Vulgate—could also render οὐσία (indeed, Socrates, in a time very close to Rufinus's, in *Hist. Eccl.* 3.7 noticed that "the more recent philosophers" used ὑπόστασις in the sense of οὐσία, therefore "substance, essence"); Rufinus wanted to avoid ambiguity in the light of Origen's focus on ὑπόστασις as "individual substance." It is noteworthy that in the passage under examination Origen conceives the Son as a ὑπόστασις that is different from the Father's ὑπόστασις: "alia praeter ipsam Dei substantiam vel subsistentiam" (here, Rufinus first quotes the Vetus Latina's translation of ὑπόστασις, *substantia*, then adds his own, more technical, version: *subsistentia*). The Son's individual substance differs from that of the Father; however, it is an image of it and reveals it: "secundum hoc ipsum, quod intelligi atque agnosci facit Deum, figuram substantiae vel subsistentiae eius dicatur exprimere."

The same is confirmed in *Princ.* fr. 33, from Athanasius *Decr.* 27, which I have quoted above *in extenso* and which supports my idea that Origen developed his Trinitarian notion of ὑπόστασις as "individual substance" in the context of his exegesis of Heb 1:3. In this core passage, Origen observes that the Son is the image, or expression, of the Father's individual substance or hypostasis, which is ineffable,¹⁶⁰ and furthermore insists on the coeternity of the Father's and the Son's individual substances. Here ὑπόστασις indicates the individual substance of the Father, not the common substance/nature of the Father and the Son, which Origen calls οὐσία, and this meaning, as I argue, was suggested by Origen's reflection on Heb 1:3. Also, in *Hom. Gen.* 1.13 Origen is saying that the human being is made in the image of God, that is, Christ, who is "splendor aeterni luminis et figura expressa substantiae Dei," that is to say, of the individual substance of the Father. Here *substantia* translates ὑπόστασις (Rufinus kept again the translation of the Vetus Latina, since this is a biblical quotation; this is why he did not use his technical *subsistentia*) and Origen interprets it as the Father's individual substance, as is confirmed by the equation *Deus = Pater* in the immediately subsequent lines.

An interesting corroboration comes from a change in terminology in *Cels.* 7.17. Here, Origen paraphrases Heb 1:3, but transforms ὑπόστασις, which in his

¹⁶⁰ Ἡ τῆς ἀρρήτου καὶ ἀκατονομάστου καὶ ἀφθέγκτου ὑποστάσεως.

own Trinitarian terminology is technical (the Father's or the Son's "individual substance"), into φύσις, which is more apt to the debate with a Middle Platonist. Thus, the concept here is no longer the Father's individual substance, of which the Son is the express image, but the nature of God altogether.¹⁶¹ Indeed, Middle Platonic theology did not contemplate three Persons being one God, but a first and a second (and sometimes a third) God, the second functioning as a mediator.¹⁶² But in the same work, when his argument requires this, Origen does introduce his Trinitarian terminology and distinction, interestingly again in connection with a discussion and quotation of Heb 1:3, in *Cels.* 8.12. Here Origen distinguishes between the individual substance (ὑπόστασις) of the Father and that of the Son: in their respective individual substance, the Father and the Son are two distinct beings, but in their concord they are one and the same thing.¹⁶³

One of the most important attestations of Heb 1:3 in Origen, and one of the most relevant to my present argument, is found in *Princ.* fr. 33 quoted by Athanasius (*Decr.* 27), which I have already cited, since here Origen's reflection on Heb 1:3 leads him to assert the coeternity of Christ-Logos with the Father (indeed, this is one of the main attestations of Origen's use of the formula οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτε οὐκ ἦν, anti-"Arian" *ante litteram*; Origen himself imported it from the Greek philosophical debate into the christological field, as I hope to have demonstrated elsewhere¹⁶⁴). Here, indeed, Origen argues that the Son, being the image of the individual substance of the Father, which is entirely ineffable, must necessarily exist eternally and have existed *ab aeterno*.¹⁶⁵ That Origen attached the argument for the coeternity of the

¹⁶¹ Τῆς θείας φύσεως ἀπαύγασμα καὶ χαρακτήρ τις ἐνανθρωποῦση ψυχῇ ἰερωῶ τῇ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ συνεπιδημήσει ἐν τῷ βίῳ, ἵνα σπείρη λόγον οἰκείουοντα τῷ τῶν ὄλων θεῷ.

¹⁶² In *Comm. Cant.* prologue, unfortunately preserved only in Rufinus's Latin translation, Origen paraphrases Heb 1:3 by saying that the Logos is the image and splendor of the invisible God; no equivalent of ὑπόστασις, however, appears here, given that "the image of God" simplifies the phrase "the express image of the Father's individual substance." We do not know whether the simplification is due to Rufinus or was already present in Origen's prologue. But ὑπόστασις appears at *Comm. Cant.* 2: the Son of God, the Logos, is "the splendor of the glory and of the individual substance of God" the Father: the simplification here involves the elimination of χαρακτήρ from the quotation of Heb 1:3. In *Comm. Cant.* 3 Origen explains that the left hand of the Logos represents its passion and the healing of humanity, by the assumption of the human nature; its right hand represents its divine nature, "the nature that is all right, and all light, and splendor, and glory." Here Origen is focusing on Christ's human and divine nature, not on the individual substance and common nature of the Persons of the Trinity.

¹⁶³ Τὸν πατέρα τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ τὸν υἱὸν τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ὄντα δύο τῆ ὑποστάσει πράγματα, ἐν δὲ τῇ ὁμοιῳ καὶ τῇ συμφωνίᾳ καὶ τῇ ταυτότητι τοῦ βουλήματος . . . τὸν υἱὸν ὄντα ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης τοῦ Θεοῦ.

¹⁶⁴ Ramelli, "Maximus."

¹⁶⁵ Πότε δὲ ἡ τῆς ἀρρήτου καὶ ἀκατονομάστου καὶ ἀφθέγκτου ὑποστάσεως τοῦ πατρὸς 'εἰκῶν', ὁ 'χαρακτήρ', ὁ λόγος . . . οὐκ ἦν; κατανοεῖτω γὰρ ὁ τολμῶν καὶ λέγων· ἦν ποτε ὅτε οὐκ ἦν ὁ υἱός', ὅτι ἐρεῖ καὶ τό σοφία ποτὲ οὐκ ἦν κτλ.

Father and the Son to his reflection on ὑπόστασις in Heb 1:3 is also confirmed by *Princ.* fr. 32.¹⁶⁶

Two other passages are revealing. They come from Origen's lost commentary on Hebrews,¹⁶⁷ are preserved by Pamphilus, a reliable source, and focus on Heb 1:3. The first indicates that Origen was accused of positing two equal principles, precisely for his Trinitarian reflection on the relationship between the Father and the Son, each one endowed with an individual substance of his own, and exactly in connection with his exegesis of Heb 1:3 and Wis 7:25–26 and his postulation of the coeternity of the Son with the Father:

How else should the “eternal light” be understood than “God the Father”? For there was no time when the light existed, but its effulgence did not exist along with it. . . . If this is true, there was no time when the Son did not exist. Now, he existed not as *innate*, as we have said concerning the eternal light, to avoid the impression of introducing *two principles of the light*, but as the effulgence of the ingenerated light, having that light as its principle and spring, since it is born from that light, to be sure, but there was *no time when it did not exist*.¹⁶⁸ (*Apol.* 50)

Origen was charged with the introduction of two equal and innate principles, as is also confirmed by Pamphilus *Apol.* 87: “they say he described the Son of God as innate” (dicunt eum innatum dicere Filium Dei). Such an accusation is easily understandable in the light of his distinction of two ὑποστάσεις or individual substances, one of the Father and one of the Son. Marcellus of Ancyra, fr. 37, from Eusebius *C. Marc.* 1.4, accused Origen of regarding the Logos as a second substance, clearly because of Origen's characterization of the Logos as a distinct hypostasis, different from that of the Father. Marcellus misunderstood Origen because he did not grasp the difference between ὑπόστασις and οὐσία drawn by Origen in his technical terminology.

The second passage, too, *Apol.* 95–99, comes from the section on Heb 1:2–4 of Origen's lost commentary on Hebrews. And it clearly shows—strongly confirming what I have argued—that it was precisely in commenting on Heb 1:3, in connection

¹⁶⁶ Ἐκ θελήματος τοῦ πατρὸς ἐγενήθη . . . εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ἀοράτου καὶ ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης αὐτοῦ χαρακτῆρ τε τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτοῦ . . . οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτε οὐκ ἦν: p. 349.12 Koetschau, from Justinian's *Epistula ad Mennam*. This is per se a deeply unreliable source, but here it is trustworthy as for the relation of the coeternity of the Son with the Father, their individual substances, and Heb 1:3, since in this respect it is confirmed by Athanasius *Decr.* 27. See also Pamphilus *Apol.* 47–48, from Book 1 of Origen's lost commentary on Genesis: De eo quod non sit Pater ante quam Filius, sed coaeternus sit Filium Patri, in primo libro de Genesi haec ait: Non enim Deus, cum prius non esset Pater, postea Pater esse coepit . . .

¹⁶⁷ *Apol.* 49: *ex libris epistulae ad Hebraeos*.

¹⁶⁸ Lux autem aeterna quid aliud sentiendum est quam Deus Pater? Qui numquam fuit quando lux quidem esset, splendor vero ei non adesset . . . quod si uerum est, numquam est quando Filius non fuit. Erat autem non sicut de aeterna luce diximus innatus, ne duo principia lucis uideamur inducere, sed sicut ingenitae lucis splendor, ipsam illam lucem initium habens ac fontem, natus quidem ex ipsa, sed non erat quando non erat.

with Wis 7:25–26, that Origen reflected on, and established, the technical Trinitarian usage of the terms ὑπόστασις and οὐσία, and possibly also ὁμοούσιος. In *Apol.* 95 Origen supports the doctrine that the Son of God is God against “eos quos piget confiteri Deum esse Filium Dei,” and observes that human nature has nothing of divine substance (*substantia*) in itself. Here “substance,” translated *substantia* by Rufinus, does not mean the individual substance of each Person of the Trinity, but divine nature or essence; it must have been οὐσία in Greek. In the same passage, *substantia*, *subsistentia*, and *natura* probably render, respectively, οὐσία, ὑπόστασις, and φύσις. In *Apol.* 99 Origen focuses on the generation of the Son from God’s substance, the divine essence or οὐσία;¹⁶⁹ hence a *communio substantiae* between the Father and the Son. Here *substantia* clearly reflects Greek οὐσία. The Father and the Son are two distinct individuals who share in the same οὐσία. Therefore, the Son is ὁμοούσιος (*id est unius substantiae*, as Rufinus glosses, thus giving the impression that the Greek term was indeed in Origen’s text) with the Father. Pamphilus’s conclusion in *Apol.* 100 summarizes: *Filium Dei de ipsa Dei substantia natum dixerit, id est ὁμοούσιον (quod est eiusdem cum Patre substantiae, Rufinus glosses again).*¹⁷⁰ Soon after, in *Apol.* 102, the term ὑπόστασις was surely introduced in the original Greek in Origen’s technical Trinitarian sense to designate the Son’s individual substance and existence, in a quotation from *Princ.* 1.2.6: “The Father’s will must be enough for the existence of what the Father wants [ad subsistendum hoc quod uult Pater] . . . the individual substance of the Son [Fili]i subsistentia] is generated by him.” Here *subsistentia* renders ὑπόστασις, and *ad subsistendum* renders εἰς/πρὸς ὑπόστασιν or a form of ὑφίστημι.

It is clear, therefore, from all I have argued so far, that Origen’s reflection on the individual substances or ὑποστάσεις of the Persons of the Trinity (for which Origen does not use the term πρόσωπον, as I have demonstrated) and their common divine nature and essence (οὐσία) rests upon two main sources of inspiration: one *philosophical* and one *scriptural*, the latter mainly consisting in Heb 1:3. These sources should be considered to be intertwined, in that Origen read Scripture in the light of philosophy (especially Middle Platonism and proto-Neoplatonism). Moreover, Scripture itself was far from being impermeable to philosophy; in particular, Heb 1:3 reveals striking correspondences with Philo, as I have pointed out.

A remarkable confirmation of the importance of Heb 1:3 for the understanding of intra-Trinitarian relationships comes from a theologian who was deeply inspired by Origen, especially in his Trinitarian doctrine: Gregory of Nazianzus.¹⁷¹ For he

¹⁶⁹ Secundum similitudinem uaporis qui de substantia aliqua corporea procedit . . . sic et Sapientia ex ea procedens ex ipsa Dei substantia.

¹⁷⁰ Compare *Fr. in Ps.* 54.3–4 (dubious, but not necessarily spurious) in which the Son is called ὁμοούσιος with the Father: ὁ Υἱὸς τοῦ Πατρὸς ὁ ὁμοούσιος βασιλεύς, ἀλλὰ δούλου μορφὴν φέγων.

¹⁷¹ See for instance, Anne Richard, *Cosmologie et théologie chez Grégoire de Nazianze* (Paris: Institut d’études augustiniennes, 2003) and, more specifically and with a survey of previous

surely had in mind Origen's reflection on Heb 1:3 and his theory of Christ's ἐπίνοιαι when he listed ἀπαύγασμα and χαρακτήρ, the two characterizations of the Son in Heb 1:3, among those ἐπίνοιαι of Christ that reveal the divinity of the Son (*Or.* 29.17), and again χαρακτήρ among the ἐπίνοιαι of Christ that imply that the Son has the same nature (οὐσία) as the Father (*Or.* 30.20).

Apart from Heb 1:3 and the New Testament, Origen of course knew the use of ὑπόστασις in the LXX. Here, like in early Christian authors who were influenced by the Greek Bible, ὑπόστασις means the existence of an individual, thus the duration of his or her life, or its beginning, its origin, for instance in Ps 88(89):48; Ps 38(39):6;¹⁷² Ignatius *Phil.* 12.3: "God is the cause of my birth and the Lord and preserver of my existence" (τὸν τῆς ἐμῆς . . . ὑποστάσεως φύλακα). This is a meaning that actually has to do with the notion of individual substance or existence; I deem it probable that Origen, who knew the Septuagint practically by heart, in addition to knowing many Greek philosophical sources, was indeed influenced by this usage as well.

From the examination I have conducted in the present section, it emerges that Origen's specific notion of ὑπόστασις in the Trinitarian field developed not only on the basis of the influence of early imperial philosophy, but also in connection with his Scriptural exegesis, especially of Heb 1:3, whether or not the notion of ὑπόστασις in this passage was inspired in turn by Philo, another author well known to Origen.

■ Conclusion: The Clement Problem and Origen's Role in the Trinitarian Use of ὑπόστασις

Besides joining the biblical use with the philosophical use of his day, Origen surely knew the use of ὑπόστασις in earlier *Christian* philosophers, at least in Clement and Pantaeus, and possibly Justin. Regarding Pantaeus, we know nothing about his notion of ὑπόστασις from his scattered fragments, but we have enough material on Clement. And this raises a remarkable question that must be, at least briefly, addressed.

In most cases, Clement's use of ὑπόστασις is in line with the most widespread meanings of this term I have outlined. In *Strom.* 2.35.2 Clement means that Paul says that the Law manifested the knowledge of sin, but did not produce the substance of it; knowledge of a thing is opposed to the thing itself.¹⁷³ But in another passage knowledge is said to become a living substance in the 'gnostic' (*Strom.* 4.136.4–

scholarship, Joseph Trigg, "Knowing God in the *Theological Orations* of Gregory of Nazianzus: The Heritage of Origen," in *God in Early Christian Thought*, 83–104.

¹⁷² Παλαιστάς ἔθου τὰς ἡμέρας μου, καὶ ἡ ὑπόστασις μου ὡσεὶ οὐθὲν ἐνώπιόν σου; see also Ps 38(39):8: τίς ἡ ὑπομονή μου; οὐχὶ ὁ κύριος; καὶ ἡ ὑπόστασις μου παρὰ σοῦ ἐστίν; Ps 138(139):15; Ezek 19:5: ἀπόλετο ἡ ὑπόστασις αὐτῆς.

¹⁷³ Ὁ ἀπόστολος . . . γνώσιν εἶπεν ἁμαρτίας διὰ νόμου πεφανερῶσθαι, οὐχὶ ὑπόστασιν εἰληφέναι.

5);¹⁷⁴ here οὐσία and ὑπόστασις appear to be very close, just as in *Strom.* 5.3.2, in which οὐσία, φύσις, and ὑπόστασις are mentioned on the same plane.¹⁷⁵ The general meaning “substance” is also found in *Ecl.* 2.2,¹⁷⁶ where ἰδίαν ὑπόστασιν does not indicate the individual substance of each member of the same species, but the substance of the abyss, which is unlimited in its own substance per se but limited by the power of God.

The most interesting passage is *Strom.* 2.96.2. The interpretation of ὑπόστασις in it is controversial, but it must be tackled, because it depends on whether Clement anticipated Origen in the application of this term to each Person of the Trinity. Clement is speaking of the four cardinal virtues theorized by Plato and by the Stoics: “The tetrad of the virtues is consecrated to God; the third stage already connects to the fourth *hypostasis* of the Lord [τῆς τρίτης ἤδη μονῆς συναπτούσης ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ κυρίου τετάρτην ὑπόστασιν].” Some scholars interpret ὑπόστασις here as “step,” a rare meaning, never attested elsewhere in Clement;¹⁷⁷ Van den Hoek follows Prestige in interpreting ὑπόστασις as “station” or “stop,” paired with “abode” (μονή), which occurs more frequently in passages in which the ascent to ‘gnostic’ perfection is referred to.¹⁷⁸ The number four refers to perfection. The only problem with this exegesis is that the stages or μοναί of the spiritual ascent occur again in *Strom.* 7.40.4 (see also 4.26.3), and a relation between the notion of “abode” in spiritual ascent and the number three is found throughout *Strom.* 6.105–114, and again in 6.107.2, but only three abodes are mentioned; no question of a fourth ὑπόστασις or even μονή. According to Mortley, who follows Potter,¹⁷⁹ the fourth ὑπόστασις is Christ as “second Logos,” the “fourth” Person of the Trinity. This would entail a meaning of ὑπόστασις as individual substance applied to each person of the Trinity, exactly as in Origen. However, it is far from

¹⁷⁴ Τὸ μὲν γὰρ νοεῖν ἐκ συνασκήσεως εἰς τὸ ἀεὶ νοεῖν ἐκτείνεται, τὸ δὲ ἀεὶ νοεῖν, οὐσία τοῦ γινώσκοντος κατὰ ἀνάγκησιν ἀδιάστατον γενομένη καὶ ἀίδιος θεωρία, ζῶσα ὑπόστασις μένει.

¹⁷⁵ On this see Matyas Havrda, “Some Observations on Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata*, Book 5,” *VC* 64 (2010) 1–30, at 5–7.

¹⁷⁶ Ἄβυσσος γὰρ τὸ ἀπεράτῳ κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν ὑπόστασιν, περαιούμενον δὲ τῆ δυνάμει τοῦ θεοῦ.

¹⁷⁷ See C. Leonard Prestige, “Clem. *Strom.* II 18 and the sense of ὑπόστασις,” *JTS* 30 (1929) 270–72, who interprets this fourth step or stage as baptismal initiation; also Clemente, *Stromati* (intro., trans., and comm. Giovanni Pini; Milan: Paoline, 1985) 308–9; Pini renders: “la tetrad delle virtù è consacrata a Dio e già la terza tappa del resto confina col quarto gradino, che è quello del Signore.” This interpretation is rejected by Witt, “Hypostasis,” 333, and Camelot in a note in Clément, *Stromate II* (ed. and trans. Claude Mondésert; SC 38; Paris: Cerf, 1954) 179.

¹⁷⁸ Annewies van den Hoek, *Clement of Alexandria and his Use of Philo in the Stromateis* (VCSup 3; Leiden: Brill, 1988) 100–1.

¹⁷⁹ Raoul Mortley, *Connaissance religieuse et herméneutique chez Clément* (Leiden: Brill, 1973) 84–85; John Potter, *Clementis Alexandrini opera quae extant omnia* (Oxford, 1715; Venice, 1757), reproduced in PG 8–9. Another theological explanation is offered by Karl Prümm, “Glaube und Erkenntnis im zweiten Buch der *Stromateis* des Klements,” *Scholastik* 12 (1937) 17–57, at 50.

certain that Clement himself maintained a conception of a double Logos,¹⁸⁰ and I think Van den Hoek is right not to see a reference to the Trinity (or a Quaternity!) in the aforementioned passage.¹⁸¹

This idea of two Logoi, rejected by Photius,¹⁸² was also ascribed to Clement by him. Photius is a witness who must not be overlooked, since he was still able to read the whole of Clement's *Hypotyposesis*, where Clement spoke of the Logos within the framework of his biblical exegesis. But Photius may easily have been mistaken in his interpretation.¹⁸³ Edwards argued that Clement never supported the view that the Logos was embedded from eternity in the Father and became a second hypostasis when the Father brought it forth, before the ages, as an instrument of creation.¹⁸⁴ I agree that Clement probably never maintained a doctrine of two Logoi and rather conceived several aspects of the Logos, but without necessarily conceptualizing them as successive stages of the Logos's existence (which rather fits in with a "Valentinian" view, with which Clement was familiar and which he also reported in *Exc.* 7). Photius's aforementioned fragment refers—according to Edwards—to Clement's conception of λόγος προφορικός, which coincides with human logos and which Clement kept distant from divine Logos (*Strom.* 5.6.7). This is one reason why Photius may have been mistaken, and I note that a concern for the distinction of λόγος προφορικός and ἐνδιάθετος from Christ-Logos is evident in Theophylactus, who lived a little later than Photius and was a disciple of Psellus;¹⁸⁵ the same concern may thus have been at work in Photius.

¹⁸⁰ Paden interpreted the Logos in Clement in the light of Nicene theology. This approach was deemed unhistorical by several scholars, who found two or three Logoi in Clement. One of these scholars was Robert Casey, "Clement and the Two Divine Logoi," *JTS* 25 (1923) 43–56. Other scholars, such as Eric Osborn, *Clement of Alexandria* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2005), followed recently by Oleh Kindiy, *Christos Didaskalos: The Christology of Clement of Alexandria* (Saarbrücken: Müller, 2008), find only one Logos in Clement, identifiable with the Son of God.

¹⁸¹ This is also why she has not included it in her treatment of Clement's theology in "God Beyond Knowing: Clement of Alexandria and Discourse on God," in *God in Early Christian Thought*, 37–60.

¹⁸² Photius, *Bibl. cod.* 109 = Clement, fr. 23, III 202 Staehlin.

¹⁸³ Piotr Ashwin-Siejkowski, *Clement of Alexandria on Trial: The Evidence of 'Heresy' from Photius' Bibliotheca* (VCSup 101; Leiden: Brill, 2010) analyzes, one by one, the eight "heresies" that Clement's *Hypotyposesis* contained according to Photius, *Bibl. cod.* 109, considering the differences between Photius's post-Nicene theology and Clement's. My review is forthcoming in *GNOMON*.

¹⁸⁴ Mark J. Edwards, "Clement of Alexandria and His Doctrine of the Logos," *VC* 54.2 (2000) 159–77; Ashwin-Siejkowski, *Clement on Trial*, has devoted a chapter to this Photian fragment (57–74); he also favors the unicity of the Logos in Clement and suspects a misunderstanding on the part of Photius (63–65). Cf. Fabienne Jourdan, "Le Logos de Clément soumis à la question" *RE* 56 (2010) 135–72.

¹⁸⁵ *Enarr. Joh.* PG 123.1141: "God's Logos is neither προφορικός nor ἐνδιάθετος. For those characterizations are proper to natural realities and according to us (humans), but since the Logos of the Father is superior to nature, it is not subject to inferior subtleties . . . The evangelist [sc. John] destroyed in advance this subtle argument by stating that ἐνδιάθετος and προφορικός are predicated of human and natural logoi, but nothing of the sort can be predicated of the Logos that is above nature."

Another possible reason, I find, may be that Photius was quoting from Clement's quotation or paraphrase of some *gnostic* interpretation of the incarnation. This is Photius's passage:

According to Clement, the Logos did not become flesh, but did so only *in appearance*. In his monstrous arguments, he posits *two Logoi of the Father*, between which it is the inferior one that manifested itself to the human beings, or rather not even that one. For he says: "The Son, too, is called *Logos*, by *homonymy with the Father's Logos*, but it is not this the one that *became flesh*, nor indeed the *paternal Logos*, but rather a kind of power of God, like an *emanation of God's Logos*, became intellect and inhabited the *minds of the human beings*"¹⁸⁶ (*Bibl. cod.* 109)

I suspect that Clement was reporting a "gnostic" conception, misunderstood by Photius—hostile to the assimilation of human logos to divine Logos—as his own doctrine. For that conception strikingly resembles Valentinian ideas preserved precisely by Clement, especially in *Excerpta ex Theodoto*. The very notion that several realities are called "Logos" according to a principle of homonymy (ὁμωνύμως) is typically gnostic, and more specifically Valentinian, as Clement himself attests in *Exc.* 1.25.1, where he asserts that the Valentinians called the aeons Logoi *by homonymy* with the Logos.¹⁸⁷ Moreover, exactly like in Photius's passage, they distinguished a Logos proper (ὁ ἐν ταυτότητι Λόγος, *Exc.* 1.8.1; 1.19.1,2,4), which is the Father's Logos, and the Son, i.e., the offspring of that first Logos; the Son, therefore, which is also the creator/demiurge, is not the highest Logos (*Exc.* 1.19.4).¹⁸⁸ The Valentinian fragmentation of the Son-Christ-Logos-creator is also clear in Clement's account in *Exc.* 1.6.2–3.¹⁸⁹ Tellingly, Clement, far from endorsing the aforementioned fragmentation, criticizes it and opposes to it another doctrine, which he describes as supported by the Christian group he belongs to ("we, on the contrary, maintain . . .") and which identifies the highest Logos that is God with the Logos that is in God and with the Logos that is the creator of all realities—

¹⁸⁶ Μὴ σαρκωθῆναι τὸν Λόγον, ἀλλὰ δόξα. Λόγους τε τοῦ Πατρὸς δύο τερατολογῶν ἀπελέγχεται, ὧν τὸν ἥττονα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐπιφανῆναι, μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδὲ ἐκείνον· φησὶ γάρ· "Λέγεται μὲν καὶ ὁ Υἱὸς Λόγος, ὁμωνύμως τῷ πατρικῷ Λόγῳ, ἀλλ' οὐχ οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ σὰρξ γενόμενος, οὐδὲ μὴν ὁ πατρὸς Λόγος, ἀλλὰ δύναμις τις τοῦ Θεοῦ, οἷον ἀπόρροια τοῦ Λόγου αὐτοῦ νοῦς γενόμενος τὰς τῶν ἀνθρώπων καρδίας διαπεφοίτηκε."

¹⁸⁷ Οἱ ἀπὸ Οὐαλεντίνου . . . λέγουσι καὶ τοὺς Αἰῶνας ὁμωνύμως τῷ Λόγῳ λόγους.

¹⁸⁸ "Ἀοράτου . . . Θεοῦ εἰκόνα" τὸν υἱὸν λέγει τοῦ Λόγου τοῦ ἐν ταυτότητι· "Πρωτότοκον δὲ πάσης κτίσεως," ὅτι γεννηθεὶς ἀπαθῶς, κτίστης καὶ γενεσιάρχης τῆς ὅλης ἐγένετο κτίσεως τε καὶ οὐσίας· "ἐν αὐτῷ" γὰρ ὁ Πατὴρ τὰ πάντα ἐποίησεν.

¹⁸⁹ "Ἀρχὴν" μὲν γὰρ τὸν Μονογενῆ λέγουσιν, ὃν καὶ Θεὸν προσαγορεύεσθαι . . . Τὸν δὲ Λόγον τὸν "ἐν τῇ Ἀρχῇ"—τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ Μονογενεῖ, ἐν τῷ Νῷ καὶ τῇ Ἀληθείᾳ—μηνύει τὸν Χριστόν, τὸν Λόγον καὶ τὴν Ζωήν. See also *Exc.* 1.20.1: Τὸ γὰρ "πρὸ ἐωσφόρου ἐγέννησά σε" οὕτως ἐξακούομεν ἐπὶ τοῦ πρωτοκτίστου Θεοῦ Λόγου.

spiritual, intelligible, and sense-perceptible—in *Exc.* 1.8.1.¹⁹⁰ Furthermore, the distinction between the Father’s Logos and the Son, who is the offspring of that Logos, is related, exactly as in Photius’s passage, to an alternative interpretation of the Logos’s incarnation, in *Exc.* 1.19.1–2, which again reports Valentinian ideas.¹⁹¹

The concept of a docetic incarnation and the interpretation of the Logos’s incarnation as the presence of the rational faculty in the minds of human beings, which are found in Photius’s fragment, are also Valentinian rather than Clementine. That docetism was a feature of “Valentinianism” does not need to be argued. As for the “incarnation” of the Logos in human minds, the vivifying function of the Logos-rational faculty on human souls is attested by Clement himself in several passages in *Excerpta ex Theodoto* in which he reports Valentinian ideas.¹⁹² Instead of an incarnation once and for all, we have here a continual vivification of humans on the part of the rational faculty. This coincides with the interpretation of the incarnation of the Logos that Photius ascribes to Clement, but may refer to the Valentinian(s) he was citing.

Notably, the notion of a duality or multiplicity of Logoi that Clement found in his adversaries seems to me to be the same that Origen found in his adversaries as well—probably Valentinians, again—and refuted in *Comm. Jo.* 20.6.43–44, in which he emphasizes the unity of the Logos against those who “want to kill the Logos and to break it to pieces . . . to destroy the unity of the greatness of the Logos.”

Therefore, Origen, as it seems more probable from my argument so far, did not find in Clement an anticipation of his own use of ὑπόστασις as individual substance

¹⁹⁰ Ἡμεῖς δὲ τὸν ἐν ταυτότητι Λόγον Θεὸν ἐν Θεῷ φαμεν, ὃς καὶ “εἷς τὸν κόλπον τοῦ Πατρὸς” εἶναι λέγεται, ἀδιάστατος, ἀμέριστος, εἷς Θεός. “Πάντα δι’ αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο” κατὰ τὴν προσεχὴ ἐνέργειαν τοῦ ἐν ταυτότητι Λόγου, τὰ τε πνευματικὰ καὶ νοητὰ καὶ αἰσθητὰ.

¹⁹¹ “Καὶ ὁ Λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο,” οὐ κατὰ τὴν παρουσίαν μόνον ἄνθρωπος γενόμενος, ἀλλὰ καὶ “ἐν Ἀρχῇ” ὁ ἐν ταυτότητι Λόγος, κατὰ περιγραφήν καὶ οὐ κατ’ οὐσίαν γενόμενος Υἱός. Καὶ πάλιν σὰρξ ἐγένετο διὰ προφητῶν ἐνεργήσας. Τέκνον δὲ τοῦ ἐν ταυτότητι Λόγου ὁ Σωτὴρ εἴρηται. Διὰ τοῦτο ἐν Ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ Λόγος, καὶ ὁ Λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν Θεόν· ὃ γέγονεν ἐν αὐτῷ, Ζωὴ ἐστίν· Ζωὴ δὲ ὁ Κύριος. Ashwin, *Clement on Trial*, 70, following Sagnard, thinks that these words are Clement’s. I rather suspect that this passage expresses “Valentinian” ideas. That it does not reflect Clement’s own thought is also suggested by Mark Edwards, “Gnostics and Valentinians in the Church Fathers,” *JTS* 40 (1989) 26–47. Ashwin-Siejkowski himself notes that “Photius found Clement’s erroneous theology of the Logos in the *Hypotyposesis*, but he did not mention any errors on the same subject in the *Stromateis*” (*Clement on Trial*, 73): this is, I think, because in the latter he did not find “gnostic” quotations or paraphrases that he could mistake for Clement’s own thought, since in the *Stromateis* those quotations were fewer and their markers very clear, whereas the opposite was the case in the *Hypotyposesis* and in the *Excerpta ex Theodoto*.

¹⁹² See, e.g., 1.27.3: ἡ ψυχὴ . . . ἐμψυχουμένη ὡς εἰπεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου προσεχῶς. “The soul is continually vivified by the logos.” On the vivifying function of the logos in respect to the soul for the Valentinians, see also 1.2.1: Οἱ δ’ ἀπὸ Οὐαλεντίνου, πλασθέντος φασὶ τοῦ ψυχικοῦ σώματος, τῇ ἐκλεκτῇ ψυχῇ οὐσίᾳ ἐν ὕπνῳ ἐντεθῆναι ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου σπέρμα ἀρρενικόν, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀπόρροια τοῦ ἀγγελικοῦ, ἵνα μὴ ὑστέρημα ἦ (note also the concept of ἀπόρροια, which appears in Photius’s quotation as well); 1.1.3: Τὸ ἐκλεκτὸν σπέρμα φαμὲν καὶ σπανθῆρα ζωοποιούμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ Λόγου. On the higher plane of the three races postulated by the Valentinians, the whole elect race (that of the “pneumatics”) is a sparkle vivified by the Logos.

applied to the Trinity. Indeed, Clement himself reflected on Heb 1:3 in *Strom.* 7.6.15, but he abbreviated the quotation and even dropped the word ὑπόστασις from it, thus speaking of the Son as ὁ τῆς τοῦ παμβασιλέως καὶ παντοκράτορος δόξης χαρακτήρ. Now, if Origen did not find in Clement an anticipation of his own Trinitarian use of hypostasis as individual substance, he was more closely influenced by philosophical and medical authors of the early imperial age, and by Scripture, especially Heb 1:3. Subsequently, it was mainly under the influence of the Cappadocians that the terminology was clarified and standardized, with the formula μία οὐσία, τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις, which will be used and ascribed to them still by the Origenist John the Scot Eriugena.¹⁹³ But they, and especially Gregory of Nyssa, in fact depended on Origen. With the present research I hope to have clarified the genesis of that formula, the scriptural and philosophical roots of the Trinitarian concept of ὑπόστασις, and the outstanding role of Origen in its definition, to the point that he might have even influenced the characterization of the Neoplatonic three principles—against Plotinus’s use—as three Hypostases: αἱ τρεῖς ἀρχαὶ καὶ ὑποστάσεις.

¹⁹³ In his *Adnotationes in Marcianum* 77.8 (Ramelli, Tutti i Commenti a Marziano Capella: Scoto Eriugena, Remigio di Auxerre, Bernardo Silvestre e anonimi, Essays, improved editions, translations, commentaries, appendixes, bibliography [Milan: Bompiani–Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Filosofici, 2006] 226) God, the threefold One, is beyond all: Eriugena uses ἐπέκεινα to indicate divine transcendence and interprets ἄπαξ καὶ δις in Martianus’s phrase ἄπαξ καὶ δις ἐπέκεινα in reference to the Father and the Son (ἄπαξ *Pater*, δις *Filius*), who are different in their Persons or individual substances (ὑποστάσεις) but one in their essence or nature (οὐσία), according to the distinction that originated with Origen and was maintained by the Cappadocians, Ps. Dionysus, and Maximus the Confessor. Eriugena explicitly cites them as sources for the difference between οὐσία and ὑπόστασις in *Periphyseon* 2.34: “Sanctus quidem Dionysius Ariopagita et Gregorius Theologus eorumque elegantissimus expositor Maximus differentiam esse dicunt inter οὐσίαν, id est essentiam, et ὑπόστασιν, id est substantiam, οὐσίαν quidem intelligentes unicam illam ac simplicem divinae bonitatis naturam, ὑπόστασιν vero singularum personarum propriam et individuum substantiam. Dicunt enim μίαν οὐσίαν ἐν τρισὶν ὑποστάσεσιν, hoc est unam essentiam in tribus substantiis.”