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Source: *Vivarium*, 2010, Vol. 48, No. 3/4 (2010), pp. 302-326

Published by: Brill

Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41963867>

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Are the Father and Son Different in Kind? Scotus and Ockham on Different Kinds of Things, Univocal and Equivocal Production, and Subordination in the Trinity

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Abstract

In this paper, I examine how Scotus and Ockham try to solve the following problem. If different kinds of constituents contribute some difference in kind to the things they constitute, then the divine Father and Son should be different in kind because they are constituted by at least some constituents that are different in kind (namely, fatherhood and sonship). However, if the Father and Son are different in kind, the Son's production will be equivocal, and equivocal products are typically less perfect than their producers. Therefore, the Son must be subordinate to the Father. In response, Scotus argues that different kinds of constituents do not necessarily result in different kinds of things, but Ockham rejects this, arguing instead that although the Father and Son are different in kind, they are still equal in perfection because of their identity with the divine essence.

Keywords

Duns Scotus, Ockham, Univocal Production, Equivocal Production, Natural Kinds, Constitution

Under the broad heading of 'medieval trinitarian theology', there are a wide variety of issues, some of which have received more attention than others.¹ Here I want to look at what Scotus and Ockham have to say about one of the issues that has received relatively little attention in the literature. The

¹ For a useful survey of 13th and early 14th century medieval trinitarian theology, which includes an annotated bibliography of important studies, see Russell Friedman, *Medieval Trinitarian Thought from Aquinas to Ockham* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

basic question is this: when the Father begets the Son, is this a case where 'like produces like', or is it a case where 'like produces unlike'?²

On the face of it, it might seem that since the Father and Son are the very same God, surely that amounts to the ideal case of 'like producing like'. Of course, some schoolmen said just that,³ but as with so many other issues in medieval philosophy, there were also dissenters. For some held that the Father and Son are not the same in kind,⁴ and that could provide a scholastic thinker with a solid reason to say that the Father's production of the Son is not a case of 'like producing like'.⁵

² The only two treatments of this issue that I know of are as follows. First, Michael Schmaus provides a very brief summary of Scotus's position in *Der Liber Pugnatorius des Thomas Anglicus und die Lehrunterschiede zwischen Thomas von Aquin und Duns Scotus*, vol. 2 (Münster i. W.: Verlag der Aschendorffsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1930), 154-157. Second, Friedrich Wetter provides a more detailed summary of Scotus's texts in *Die Trinitätslehre des Johannes Duns Scotus* (Münster Westfalen: Aschendorffsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1967), 159-167. Unfortunately, Schmaus and Wetter do little more than summarize the texts. As for Ockham, his position on this issue has not received any attention at all, so far as I know.

³ As we shall see, Scotus holds this position, but there were others, e.g., Walter Chatton, in *Reportatio super Sententias, Liber I, distinctiones 1-9*, ed. Joseph Wey and Girard Etzkorn (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2002), 534-539.

⁴ As Wetter rightly notes (*Die Trinitätslehre*, 160), Henry of Ghent held that the persons are not the same in kind, at least in some sense, e.g.: 'Secundum autem formam respectivam in divinis bene potest esse et est distinctio secundum speciem vel quasi. Sicut enim paternitas et filiatio sunt relationes diversae quasi specie, sic Pater et Filius constitutae personae per illa sunt personae quasi specie diversae' (Henry of Ghent, *Summa Quaestionum Ordinarium* (Paris, 1520; reprinted by St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 1953), II, f. 88vF). Additionally, Wetter says Richard of Conington may have held this view too (*Die Trinitätslehre*, 159-160), for according to the editors of Scotus's *Lectura* [= *Lect.*], 1.7.un., Scotus is probably responding to Richard's arguments there (Scotus, *Opera Omnia* (Civitas Vaticana: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1950-) [= *Vat.*], volume 16, page 490 [= 16: 490]; but cf. note 2 on page 507, as well as similar comments in *Vat.* 4: 125). It is, however, difficult to verify this claim, for Richard's *Sentences* commentary is lost. For more on Richard's works, see V. Doucet, 'L'Oeuvre scolastique de Richard de Conington, O.F.M.', *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 29 (1936), 396-442.

⁵ Note, however, that we should distinguish two claims here: (i) that the Father and Son are not the same in kind, and (ii) that the Son's production is not univocal (i.e., not a case of 'like producing like'). Scholastic authors could hold the first of these but not the second, or they could hold both of them. Henry of Ghent, for instance, held the first but not the latter, for he argued that even though the persons are somewhat different in kind (see the previous note), the Son's production is still univocal (even though the *Spirit's* production is not, at least in some sense): 'Unde processus Filii de Patre est conformis generationi univocae caloris de calore, processus vero Spiritus Sancti de Patre et Filio est quasi conformis generationi aequivocae caloris de sole' (*Summa*, II, f. 179vN). Nevertheless, as we shall see, Ockham holds both claims, arguing

As we shall see, the discussions we find in Scotus and Ockham on this issue revolve around an important philosophical question: which constituents in things make them the same or different in kind? As Scotus and Ockham see it, if we can explain that, then we can establish whether the Father and Son are the same or different in kind, and only then can we say whether the Son's production is a case of 'like producing like' or 'like producing unlike'.

Yet there are important theological implications here too. For as I will explain in a moment, one could use well-established Aristotelian claims to argue that the Father and Son *must* be different in kind, and if that is right, that the Son must therefore be *inferior* to the Father. That, however, amounts to subordinationism, which is a 'heresy' any Christian scholastic wants to avoid.⁶ Consequently, whichever side of this debate Scotus or Ockham want to take, they must do so without violating either their philosophical or their theological commitments.

1. The Subordinationist's Argument

The best entry-point for this discussion is what I shall call the 'subordinationist argument'—namely, the argument I mentioned above which employs Aristotelian claims to show that the Son must be inferior to the Father. The argument begins with the assumption that different kinds of constituents contribute some difference in kind to the things they constitute, perhaps loosely analogous to the way that adding chocolate to one batch of cake batter and toffee to another results in two different kinds of cakes: a chocolate cake and a toffee cake. Or, to use a more scholastic sort of example, adding rationality to one animal but not to another results in two different kinds of animals: one that is human, and one that is not. Let me formulate the point like this:

- (T1) For any x and y ,
 x and y differ in kind iff
 x and y differ kind-wise in constitution.

that the Son's production is not univocal precisely because the Father and Son are not the same in kind.

⁶ Unfortunately, when Schmaus and Wetter discuss Scotus's texts on this issue, they fail to note the underlying problem of subordinationism. For a basic sketch of the early development of subordinationism and other 'heresies', see J. N. D. Kelly, *Early Christian Doctrines*, revised edition (San Francisco: Harper, 1978).

However, for Scotus and Ockham, each divine person is constituted by two ingredients: (i) a shared divine essence which makes all the persons the same God, and (ii) a unique constituent like fatherhood or sonship which makes each person the particular person that it is.⁷ Moreover, Scotus and Ockham both agree that these unique personal constituents are different *in kind*. As Scotus nicely puts it:

I well concede that fatherhood and sonship ... belong to different species and have different natures. ... For fatherhood and sonship are more different than fatherhood and fatherhood.⁸

For Scotus and Ockham then, the Father and Son do have different kinds of constituents, namely their unique personal constituents. Hence:

(T2) For any divine persons x and y ,
 x and y differ kind-wise in constitution.

And from T1 and T2, it follows that the divine persons must be different in kind:⁹

⁷ On the constitution of the persons, see Scotus, *Quodlibeta* [= *Quod.*], 3, n. 4 (in *Opera Omnia*, ed. Luke Wadding (Lyons, 1639; reprinted by Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1968) [= Wad.], volume 12, page 70 [= 12: 70]; English translation in *God and Creatures: The Quodlibetal Questions*, ed. and trans. Felix Alluntis and Allan Wolter (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975) [= AW], 64, n. 3.19): 'Essentia [divina] autem et relatio [e.g., paternitas vel filio], secundum omnes, constituunt personam, qualemcumque rationem habeant principii; ergo hoc est in quantum concurrunt, quod non posset esse nisi ut relatio est in essentia. Ex hoc habeo, quod essentia et relatio constituunt personam'. For the claim that the divine essence makes the persons the same God while the unique (relational) constituents make the persons distinct, see Scotus, *Ordinatio* [= *Ord.*], 1.5.2.un., n. 127 (Vat. 4: 72, lines 16-19 [= Vat. 4: 72.16-19]): 'Concedo relationem [e.g., paternitatem vel filiationem] esse actum personalem, non actum quiditativum,—quia personaliter distinguit et non quiditative. Essentia [divina] autem est actus quiditativus et quiditative distinguens'.

⁸ Scotus, *Ord.*, 1.7.1, n. 51 (Vat. 4: 129.3-7): 'Sed bene concedo quod paternitas et filio sunt ... alterius speciei et alterius rationis. ... magis etiam distinguitur paternitas a filiatione, quam paternitas a paternitate'. Ockham too, in *Ordinatio* [= *Ord.*], 1.9.2 (in *Opera Theologica* (St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 1967-1986) [= OTh], volume 3, page 281, lines 13-14 [= 3: 281.13-14]): 'sicut conceditur quod paternitas et filio sunt alterius rationis'; *ibid.*, (OTh 3: 280.11-13): 'Sed paternitas in Patre, quae est sibi essentialis, non tantum assimilatur filiationi quae est Filio essentialis quantum assimilaretur si essent duae paternitates in divinis'.

⁹ As Scotus puts it on behalf of the subordinationist, *Ord.*, 1.7.1, n. 44 (Vat. 4: 125.10-12): 'paternitas et filio differunt specie, ergo personae constitutae per eas.—Antecedens probatur, quia differunt secundum quiditates'. Also, *Ord.*, 1.7.1, n. 57 (Vat. 4: 131.7-11): 'Sed adhuc pondero argumentum: quia istae relationes—in proposito—sunt subsistentes, ergo tantam

- (T3) For any divine persons x and y ,
 x and y differ in kind.

Further, every medieval student of Aristotle learns that a production is called 'univocal' if like produces like, or 'equivocal' if like produces unlike.¹⁰ We can thus define equivocal production as follows:

- (T4) For any x and y ,
 if x produces y by a production P ,
 P is equivocal =_{df} iff
 x and y differ in kind.

differentiam habent in quantum subsistentes quantam in rationibus propriis; subsistentes autem sunt personae, ergo tantam differentiam habent personae quantam habent relationes'; *Reportatio* 1A [= *Rep.* 1A], 1.7.3, n. 71 (in *The Examined Report of the Paris Lecture (Reportatio I-A)*, volume 1, ed. Allan Wolter and Oleg Bychkov (St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 2004) [= Wolter], 326): 'paternitas et filiatio differunt specie vel sunt alterius rationis, quia sunt duae quiditates relativae et non sicut duo individua eiusdem quiditatis, et sic constituta per ea differunt specie'.

¹⁰ Scotus, *Ord.*, 1.3.3.2, n. 513 (Vat. 3: 304.2-4, 8-10): 'quando agens agit univoce, hoc est inducit in passum formam eiusdem rationis cum illa per quam agit. ... In agentibus autem aequivoce, id est in illis agentibus quae non agunt per formas eiusdem rationis cum illa ad quam agunt'; Ockham, *Quaestiones in Libros Sententiarum* [= *Quaest. in Sent.*], 2.12-13 (OTH 5: 287.20-22): 'causa univoca causat per assimilationem, et ideo est univoca quia effectus sibi assimilatur'. I cannot find a place where Aristotle explicitly defines univocal and equivocal production, but medieval Aristotelians derived this idea from a comment in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, 7.8, 1033b29-31 (in *Metaphysica, Lib. I-XIV; Recensio et Translatio Guillelmi de Moerbeka*, ed. G. Vuillemin-Diem (Leiden, and New York-Köln: E. J. Brill, 1995) [= AL, 25, 3.2], page 147, lines 406-409 [= 147.406-409]; cf., *Metaphysica, Lib. I-X, XII-XIV; Translatio Anonyma sive 'Media'*, ed. G. Vuillemin-Diem (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1976) [= AL 25.2], page 136, line 24, through page 137, line 3 [= 136.24-137.3]; and *Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois Commentariis*, ed. Johannes Franciscus Bagolinus, et al. (Venice: Giunta, 1562-1574) [= Iunt.], volume 8: 177rF): 'In quibusdam uero palam quia generans tale quidem est quale generatum, nec tamen idem nec unum numero, sed unum specie, ut in phisicis (homo namque hominem generat)'. See also, *ibid.*, 7.7, 1032a24-25 (AL, 25, 3.2: 143.304-307; cf., AL 25.2: 133.9-11; Iunt., 8: 171vM-172rA): '(factum enim habet naturam, ut planta aut animal) et a quo quae secundum speciem dicta natura quae eiusdem speciei (hec autem in alio); homo namque hominem generat'; *ibid.*, 7.8, 1034a4-8 (AL, 25, 3.2: 147.415-419; cf. AL 25.2: 137.8-12; Iunt., 8: 177vG-H): 'sed sufficiens est generans facere et speciei causam esse in materia. Omnis vero iam talis species in hiis carnibus et ossibus, Callias et Socrates; et diversa quidem propter materiam (diversa namque), idem vero specie; nam individua species'; and various other places like *De Historia Animalium*, 5.1, 539a21-23 (Iunt., 6: 42vK-L): 'Sic animalia nasci alia ex animalibus solent per formae cognitionem, alia sponte, nullo cognationis semine antecedente, creantur'.

Of course, the Creeds say that the Father begets the Son, so clearly the Father *produces* the Son in some sense or other:¹¹

(T5) The Father produces the Son by a production *P*.

But if T3 is right, then the Son's production must be equivocal:¹²

(T6) The Son's production *P* is equivocal.

On top of that, every medieval student of Aristotle also learns that equivocal products are *less perfect* than their producers:¹³

(T7) For any *x* and *y*,
if *x* produces *y* by an equivocal production *P*,
y is less perfect than *x*.

A medieval Aristotelian might hold T7 for a variety of reasons, but Scotus's reasoning illustrates the point well enough. According to Scotus, kinds are ranked in terms of the more or less perfect, so for any two kinds (e.g., human-kind and horse-kind), one will be more perfect than the other.¹⁴ Further, Scotus maintains that causes cannot produce effects that are greater

¹¹ For example, the Nicene Creed says, 'We believe in... the Son of God... begotten from the Father' (in *The Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils*, 2 volumes, ed. Norman Tanner (London: Sheed and Ward, and Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1990), 1: *5).

¹² Scotus, summarizing the subordinationist's argument, *Lect.*, 1.7.un., n. 51 (Vat. 16: 490. 20-24): 'sed ista generatio qua Filius in divinis producitur, magis assimilatur generationi equivocae quam univocae, quia termini sunt formaliter distincti, nec conveniunt in una forma secundum speciem suam oppositae relationes, et sunt oppositarum rationum'.

¹³ As Ockham puts it, *Quaestiones in Libros Physicorum Aristotelis* [= *Quaest. in Phys.*], q. 140 (in *Opera Philosophica* (St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 1974-1988) [= OPh], volume 6, page 777, lines 26-31 [= 6: 777.26-31]): 'omne agens totale aut est univocum aut est equivocum. Si univocum, est aequae perfectum sicut effectus productus, quia causa univoca habet effectum univocum pro termino adaequato suae potentiae. Si sit agens equivocum, tunc est agens perfectius quam suus effectus, quia causa equivocata totalis est perfectior quam causa univoca totalis'.

¹⁴ Scotus, *De Primo Principio*, 3.25 (in *A Treatise on God as First Principle*, 2nd revised edition, trans. and ed. Allan Wolter (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1966), 56-57): 'Duae naturae sub eodem communi non habent gradum aequalem. Probatur per differentias dividentes genus; si sunt inaequales, ergo et esse unius erit perfectius esse alterius'.

than themselves. They can produce effects that are equal or lesser, but not effects that are greater.¹⁵

Consequently, although a producer can produce a product that belongs to the same kind or a lesser kind, it cannot produce a product that belongs to a greater kind. Thus, when *like produces like*, the product will be equal to its producer, for it belongs to the same kind, but when *like produces unlike*, the product will be inferior, for it belongs to a lesser kind.

Likewise in God: if the Son's production is equivocal (T6), then the Son will be inferior to the Father, just like any other equivocal product:¹⁶

(T8) The Son is less perfect than the Father.

With that, we have subordinationism. In brief, the subordinationist reasons that since the Father and Son are different in kind, the Son's production must be equivocal. But since every equivocal product is inferior to its producer, the Son must therefore be subordinate to the Father too.

2. John Duns Scotus

Obviously wanting to avoid this conclusion, Scotus responds by focusing primarily on T1: that different kinds of constituents contribute some difference in kind to the things they constitute. According to Scotus, T1 is simply not true.

¹⁵ Scotus, *Rep.* 1A, 1.7.1, n. 30 (Wolter, 313): 'omne principium formale producendi aliquid aequivoce est perfectius productio termino, et si sit productio univoca, est aequae perfectum termino productio'. See also *Ord.*, 1.7.1, n. 47 (Wat. 4: 127.2-4) and *Lect.*, 1.7.un., n. 57 (Wat. 16: 493.17-19). Ockham too, *Quaest. in Phys.*, q. 140, (OPh 6: 777.32-33): 'sive causa [univoca] sive aequivoca det esse vel producat effectum, non potest dare esse perfectius se ipsa'.

¹⁶ When he formulates the subordinationist's argument, Scotus does not explicitly draw this conclusion, but surely he thought it obvious, for elsewhere in the same question, he argues that if fatherhood and sonship were the respective 'forms' of the Father and Son, the Son's production would be equivocal, in which case the Son would be less perfect than the Father. *Ord.*, 1.7.1, n. 38 (Wat. 4: 122.18-123.3): 'quia tunc paternitas esset simpliciter perfectior filiatione.—Probatio consequentiae dupliciter. Primo, quia illud quo producat productum, si non est eiusdem rationis cum forma producti, continet eam virtualiter et est perfectior ea: ergo si paternitas est quo Pater agit, et non est eiusdem rationis cum filiatione, continet filiationem virtualiter et est perfectior ea'. Thus, Scotus clearly had it in mind that the Son would be subordinate to the Father if he were an equivocal product.

To this end, Scotus first claims that two things need not be as different in kind as their constituents.¹⁷ For example, although humans and donkeys differ in species because humans are rational and donkeys are not, humans and donkeys are not as different as rationality and irrationality, for they are both animals.¹⁸ Thus, even if two things have some constituents that are different in kind, if they share other constituents, they will at least have that much in common.¹⁹

Scotus points out, however, that certain constituents which are different from each other (like the colors white and black) are also incompatible (i.e., they cannot exist in the same thing at the same time).²⁰ Hence, a table cannot be entirely white and entirely black simultaneously. For Scotus, this means that two things will always be just as incompatible as their constituents (e.g., a white and black table will be just as incompatible as the colors white and black).²¹ Nevertheless, incompatible things can still have something in common. After all, although a white and black table are incompatible, they are still both tables.

Given this, Scotus claims that we need to be careful when we say two things are 'distinct' because of their differing constituents. We might think, for instance, that incompatible things are *more* distinct than different kinds of things, for incompatible constituents are flat out incompatible, whereas

¹⁷ Scotus, *Ord.*, 1.7.1, n. 56 (Vat. 4: 131.4-6): 'in omnibus enim falsum est quod quanta est distinctio vel differentia formalium constituentium, quod tanta sit differentia constitutorum'.

¹⁸ Scotus, *Rep.* IA, 1.7.3, n. 81 (Wolter, 329): 'Tanta enim est repugnantia hominis et asini quanto est rationalis et irrationalis, et tamen non est inter se tanta distinctio, quia differentiae ultimae sunt primo distinctae'.

¹⁹ Scotus, *Ord.*, 1.7.1, n. 54 (Vat. 4: 130.3-11): 'numquam distinguuntur tantum conveniunt quantum conveniunt illa quae per illa distinguuntur, sicut patet discurrendo per omnia distinguuntur. Differentiae enim specificae non includunt genus in quo conveniant, species autem distinctae per illas includunt genus in quo conveniant: et ratio est, quia distinguuntur aliquid praesupponunt in ipsis distinctis quod ipsa distinguuntur non includunt in intellectu suo, distincta tamen per illa includunt illud; ideo distincta conveniunt in eo, distinguuntur autem non conveniunt in illo'.

²⁰ More precisely, Scotus says that distinction and incompatibility are not the same. That is, two things *x* and *y* may be different in some way, but on top of that, they may or may not also be incompatible. Scotus, *Rep.* IA, 1.7.3, n. 81 (Wolter, 329): 'est hic sciendum quod non est idem aliqua distinguere et habere repugnantiam'.

²¹ Scotus, *Ord.*, 1.7.1, n. 53 (Vat. 4: 129.19-130.2): 'Unde universaliter: quanta est distinctio, id est repugnantia, constituentium vel formaliter distinguuntur, tanta est et distinctorum, quia si album et nigrum sunt impossibilia, et constituta per ea sunt impossibilia. Et ita est in proposito: quanta est impossibilitas paternitatis et filiationis—propter quam paternitas non est filio—tanta est Patris et Filii, ita quod Pater non est Filius'.

different kinds of constituents need not be. Whiteness and humanity, for example, are different kinds of constituents altogether, but they are compatible, for humans can be white.²²

But Scotus says this is not the proper way to use the phrase ‘more distinct’. When we say two things are ‘properly distinct’, we mean they have less in common. So strictly speaking, two things are ‘more distinct’ than two other things when the first pair has less in common than the second pair.²³

Accordingly, a human and whiteness are ‘more distinct’ than white and black, for even though white and black are incompatible, they still have something in common (they are both colors). A human and whiteness, on the other hand, have practically nothing in common, for they belong to different genera altogether (humans are animals, but whiteness is a color).²⁴ Thus, Scotus concludes that although two things will be just as incompatible as their constituents, they need not be as different in kind as their constituents.²⁵

Of course, the subordinationist need not claim that two things will be *just* as different in kind as their constituents. The subordinationist only needs to claim that they will be *somewhat* different in kind if they include different kinds of constituents.

But to this, Scotus argues that two things can be entirely the same in kind even if they include different kinds of constituents. As is well known, Scotus maintains that for any two members of a species, each includes two ingredients:

²² Scotus, *Ord.*, 1.7.1, n. 52 (Vat. 4: 129.10-14): ‘intelligendum est quod aliqua dicuntur quandoque magis distingui propter maiorem repugnantiam vel impossibilitatem eorum, sicut contraria dicuntur magis distingui, ut album et nigrum, quam disparata, ut homo et album’.

²³ Scotus, *Ord.*, 1.7.1, n. 52 (Vat. 4: 129.14-16): ‘et hoc modo non est proprie dictum “aliqua magis distingui”; plus enim “proprie distinguuntur” quae minus conveniunt in aliquo’.

²⁴ Scotus, *Ord.*, 1.7.1, n. 52 (Vat. 4: 129.16-18): ‘et ita distincta genere generalissimo plus distinguuntur quam contraria quae sunt eiusdem generis, licet contraria magis repugnent’; *Rep. IA*, 1.7.3, n. 81 (Wolter, 329): ‘quia quae maxime distinguuntur quandoque nullam habent repugnantiam, ut albedo et lapis maxime distant et tamen non repugnant. Magis enim distingui aliqua est in paucioribus convenire, ut homo et albedo sunt magis non idem entia sive non convenientia quam albedo et nigredo, quae conveniunt in colore etc., et tamen magis sibi repugnant albedo et nigredo, et homo et albedo magis compatiuntur se’.

²⁵ Scotus, *Ord.*, 1.7.1, n. 55 (Vat. 4: 130.13-131.2): ‘dico quod maior distinctio—id est maior non-convenientia (hoc est, in paucioribus convenientia)—potest esse principiorum quam principiatorum, sicut differentiae specificae, quae sunt principia specierum, non conveniunt in genere, in quo conveniunt ipsae species; et ita etiam est de differentiis individualibus et individuus, respectu naturae specificae’; *ibid.*, *Rep. IA*, 1.7.3, n. 81 (Wolter, 329): ‘unde si comparentur constituta ad distinguenda ut repugnant, sic sunt constituta [ut repugnant]; si autem comparentur ut sunt distincta sive ut non conveniunt, sic non conferunt [non-convenientia] constitutis’.

(i) a shared specific nature, and (ii) a unique, individualizing constituent typically referred to as a 'haecceity' or 'thisness'.²⁶ Of these, the shared nature makes the two individuals members of the same species, while their unique haecceities make them distinct individuals.²⁷

Nevertheless, even though the respective haecceities of, say, Socrates and Plato have nothing in common,²⁸ this does not mean that Socrates and Plato have nothing in common themselves. On the contrary, they are both humans. So here we have a case where two individuals (Socrates and Plato) are the same in kind, yet still have certain constituents (their haecceities) that are totally different.²⁹ For Scotus then, it is simply not true that different kinds of constituents *always* contribute some difference in kind to the things they constitute. On the contrary, haecceities are paradigm examples of constituents that do not do this.³⁰

²⁶ For more on Scotus's theory of individuation, see (for example) Allan Wolter, *The Philosophical Theology of Duns Scotus*, ed. Marilyn McCord Adams (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), 27-41; Peter King, 'Duns Scotus on the Common Nature and the Individual Differentia', *Philosophical Topics* 20 (1992), 51-76; Peter King, 'Duns Scotus on Singular Essences', *Medioevo* 30 (2005), 111-137; and Marilyn McCord Adams, *William Ockham*, 2 volumes (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987), 1: 43-46.

²⁷ Scotus, *Ord.*, 2.3.1.5-6, n. 170 (Vat. 7: 475.15-17): 'Ergo praeter naturam in hoc et in illo [e.g., praeter naturam humanitatis in Socrate et Platone], sunt aliqua primo diversa [i.e., haecceitates], quibus hoc [Socrates] et illud [Plato] differunt (hoc [haecceitas] in isto [Socrate] et illud [haecceitas] in illo [Platone]);' *Ord.*, 1.5.2.un., n. 128 (Vat. 4: 73.5-8): 'humanitas distinguitur in Socrate et Platone per *a* et *b*, et ideo ibi actus distinguens—etiam individualiter—est actus eius quod non distinguit, quia actus ille distinguens distinguit ipsam naturam, quae non distinguit'; *Lect.*, 1.7.un., n. 52 (Vat. 16: 491.6-8): 'in creaturis natura praesupponitur principio individuanti, sicut in Socrate humanitas praesupponitur principio individuationis, et sit illud *a* [puta]'.
²⁸ Scotus, *Rep.* 1A, 1.7.3, n. 76 (Wolter, 327): 'quia si [proprietates individuales] in aliquo convenirent, non sunt ultimo diversa nec ultimae differentiae; ... illae autem in nullo [conveniunt], quia tunc non essent ultimae'.

²⁹ Scotus, *Lect.*, 1.7.un., n. 60 (Vat. 16: 494.16-18): 'Similiter, si Socrates esset formaliter hac paternitate et Plato hac filiatione, non distinguerentur Socrates et Plato specificè, sicut nec modo, cum habeant proprietates individuales diversas'.

³⁰ Scotus, *Ord.*, 1.7.1, n. 59 (Vat. 4: 131.21-132.3, 132.5-10): 'dico quod non sequitur: "istis [paternitate et filiatione] praecise distinguuntur [personae divinae], et ista distinguuntur specie, ergo personae distinguuntur specie",—sicut nec de differentiis individualibus respectu individuorum. ... dico quod ... potest esse distinctio distinctorum aliqua, alia quam sit ipsorum distinguuntur,—et minor [distinctio], sicut per differentias individuales est aliqua distinctio individuorum, alia quam ipsarum differentiarum, quia differentiae sunt primo diversae; sed "distincta" non sunt primo diversa, sed tantum sunt distincta numero, in eadem specie'.

Note that Scotus is assuming a distinction between two fundamentally different sorts of constituents here: those that contribute to something's kind, and those that contribute to something's individuality instead. For convenience, let me call the former 'quidditative constituents' (or, if you prefer a less scholastic sounding label, 'suchness constituents' would do just as well), and let me call the latter 'individual constituents'.

The crucial difference between these two is this: quidditative constituents are intrinsically repeatable (or at least shareable), but individual constituents are not. That is, there can be many exemplifications of a quidditative constituent, but there can only be one exemplification of an individual constituent. Thus, no matter what else two things might have in common, they will never have their unique individual constituents in common.

For this reason, Scotus maintains that an individual constituent contributes only to something's *individuality*, not its *kind* (after all, a kind is defined by what its members have in common, not by what they do not have in common). And that, in turn, is why Scotus can reject T1. For Scotus, only quidditative constituents contribute to something's kind, so T1 is only true if we restrict it to quidditative constituents.³¹

What about the divine persons? As I explained earlier, each divine person is constituted by two ingredients: the divine essence, and a unique constituent like fatherhood or sonship. According to Scotus, the divine essence is a quidditative constituent, whereas fatherhood and sonship are not. That is, the divine essence contributes to the Father's and Son's kind, but fatherhood and sonship do not do this. On the contrary, they simply distinguish the Father and Son from each other.³²

Notice that this means fatherhood and sonship must be unrepeatable. For otherwise, if they were repeatable, they would contribute to the Father's and Son's kind after all. Scotus knows this, but early in his career, he has trouble

³¹) Scotus, *Ord.*, 1.7.1, n. 50 (Vat. 4: 128.13-25): 'Secundo applicatur ad propositum, quia si illae differentiae individuales—quae sunt primo diversae—constituunt producta non primo diversa sed inter quae est generatio univoca (propter similitudinem in natura), si istae differentiae individuales essent species alterius generis, adhuc non constituerent "distincta" tanta distinctione quanta esset eorum in suo genere, quia tunc differentiae individuales constituerunt primo diversa. Quod autem "constituta" modo non sunt primo diversa, hoc est propter naturam, in qua natura individua conveniunt: ita etiam tunc convenirent in eadem natura, licet differentiae constituentes essent species alterius generis. Ergo tunc constituta essent eiusdem speciei, sicut modo'.

³²) See Scotus, *Ord.*, 1.5.2.un., n. 127 (Vat. 4: 72.16-19), cited above in note 7.

seeing how fatherhood and sonship would *not* be repeatable.³³ Indeed, one could point out that there are many fathers and sons in this world, so fatherhood and sonship certainly seem to be the sorts of relationships that can be exemplified more than once.

Perhaps this is one of the reasons that Scotus (famously) toys with the view that the Father and Son are constituted not by fatherhood and sonship relationships, but rather by unique, non-relational haecceities (or at least entities that are very much like haecceities). For then the Father and Son would be distinguished by genuinely unrepeatable constituents, and those constituents would therefore contribute nothing to the Father's and Son's kind.

However, later in his life, Scotus ends up rejecting such a theory, opting instead for the more traditional view that the Father and Son are, in fact, constituted by fatherhood and sonship relationships.³⁴ Yet even then, Scotus argues that fatherhood and sonship must be unrepeatable in the Godhead, despite the fact that they are repeatable in creatures.³⁵

Thus, whether Scotus thinks the Father and Son are constituted by haecceities on the one hand, or fatherhood and sonship relationships on the other, he insists either way that these constituents are unrepeatable in God. Hence,

³³ For instance, in *Ord.*, 1.26.un., n. 45 (Vat. 6: 15.11-12, 16.1-4), Scotus considers the claim that the Father's fatherhood must be unrepeatable, but he goes on to reject this with five arguments (nn. 46-50 (Vat. 6: 16.5-17.14)), and he cannot see a way to respond to those five arguments. As he puts it in *Ord.*, 1.26.un., n. 93 (Vat. 6: 49.9-10): 'Illa argumenta de tertia via [viz., illa argumenta dicta in nn. 46-50] videntur difficilia. ... Solvat ea qui scit' (see also Scotus's similar comments at *Lect.*, 1.26.un., n. 75 (Vat. 17: 339-340)). So at least up to the time of writing *Ord.*, 1.26.un., Scotus does not see how one could successfully argue that fatherhood is unrepeatable.

³⁴ The story of Scotus's development on this issue is somewhat complex, but see Schmaus, *Der Liber Pugnatorius*, 482-550; Wetter, *Die Trinitätslehre*, 283-342; Marilyn McCord Adams, 'The Metaphysics of the Trinity', *Franciscan Studies* 66 (2008), 112-140; Richard Cross, *Duns Scotus on God* (Aldershot, England and Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2005), 195-202; and Richard Cross, *Duns Scotus* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 65-67.

³⁵ As I pointed out in note 33 above, earlier in his career, Scotus could not see how fatherhood could be intrinsically unrepeatable. But by the time he revised the third book of his *Ordinatio*, Scotus had finally come up with some arguments to show how this is possible. (These arguments are recorded in the *textus interpolatus* in Vat. 6: 49.18-52.19. For more on this, see Cross, *Scotus on God*, 199-201; and Adams, 'The Metaphysics of the Trinity', 125-127.) The content of these arguments and whether or not they are successful does not concern us here. What matters is their conclusion: that God's fatherhood must be unrepeatable (and by extension, that God's sonship must be too).

by Scotus's reckoning, whatever these constituents are, they at least *function* as individual constituents for the Father and Son.³⁶

And like other individual constituents, they thus do not contribute to the Father's and Son's kind.³⁷ On the contrary, they only contribute to the Father's and Son's unique individuality or personhood. So even though the Father and Son include different constituents (e.g., fatherhood and sonship), that only makes them different persons, not different kinds of things. Scotus therefore rejects the subordinationist's T3, namely the claim that the Father and Son are different in kind.³⁸

Scotus next goes on to argue that univocal production must be based on quidditative constituents, not individual constituents.³⁹ A univocal product, recall, is one that is the same kind of thing as its producer. But, Scotus points out, this means that the producer and the product must have similar constituents, and obviously a producer and its product cannot have similar individual constituents, for individual constituents are always unique.⁴⁰

On the contrary, what makes a production univocal is the fact that the producer and the product have the same sorts of *quidditative* constituents.⁴¹

³⁶ Scotus, *Lect.*, 1.7.un., n. 58 (Vat. 16: 494.3-4): '[personae divinae] non assimilantur in proprietatibus relativis, quae correspondent proprietatibus individualibus in creaturis'; *ibid.*, n. 59 (Vat. 16: 494.14-15): 'proprietates personales [personarum divinarum] sint diversae, quae correspondent differentiis individualibus in creaturis'. See also *Ord.*, 1.5.2.un., n. 127 (Vat. 4: 72.16-19), cited above in note 7.

³⁷ Scotus, *Ord.*, 1.7.1, n. 59 (Vat. 4: 132.10-13): 'Ita hic, in proposito, per relationes [i.e., paternitas et filiatio] distinctas specie, vel quasi-genere ..., possunt aliqua [divinae personae] distingui personaliter tantum, in eadem specie sive in eadem natura'.

³⁸ Hence, after conceding that fatherhood and sonship are different in kind, Scotus writes, *Ord.*, 1.7.1, n. 51 (Vat. 4: 129.7-9): 'Sed cum inferens "ergo et constituta sunt alterius rationis quasi-specifice", nego consequentiam'. That is, even though fatherhood and sonship may be different in kind, it does not follow that the Father and Son are different in kind as well.

³⁹ Scotus, *Ord.*, 1.7.1, n. 49 (Vat. 4: 128.8-12): 'Cum generatio sit assimilativa quatenus eadem natura communicatur, distinctiva quatenus est geniti distincti a generante distincto, sequitur quod penes naturam gignentis et geniti sit univocatio et non penes distinctionem generantis et geniti'.

⁴⁰ Scotus, *Rep. IA*, 1.7.3, n. 76 (Wolter, 327): 'Si penes proprietatem individualement attendenda sit univocatio generationis, nulla erit univocatio sive nulla generatio erit univoca, quia omnes proprietates individuales tam in Deo quam in creaturis sunt per se diversae'; *Lect.*, 1.7.un., n. 59 (Vat. 16: 494.8-11): 'si igitur generatio esset aequivoca ratione differentiarum aut proprietatum individualium, tunc omnis generatio esset aequivoca, etiam eorum quae sunt in eadem specie, quod falsum est'.

⁴¹ Scotus, *Lect.*, 1.7.un., n. 59 (Vat. 16: 494.11-12): 'generatio igitur dicitur univoca propter convenientiam in natura communicata'.

When Socrates begets Plato, one human begets another, and this production is univocal because Socrates and Plato have the same quidditative constituents (their humanity), even though they have different individual constituents.⁴²

Likewise in divine production. Since the Father and Son share the same quidditative constituent (the divine essence), Scotus concludes that the Son's production must be univocal as well, even though the Father and Son have different 'individual' constituents.⁴³ So Scotus also rejects the subordinationist's claim of T6, namely that the Son's production is equivocal.

And with that, Scotus can reject the conclusion of the subordinationist's argument. According to the subordinationist, if the Son is an equivocal product, then the Son will be less perfect than the Father, and that amounts to subordinationism. But according to Scotus, the Son is not an equivocal product at all. On the contrary, he is a univocal product, and therefore he is equal to his Father.

3. William Ockham

Ockham disagrees with Scotus on nearly every point I discussed above. First of all, he takes issue with Scotus's denial of T1. As Ockham sees it, any difference between two things is ultimately explained by a similar difference between their constituents. Hence, we end up with different *kinds* of cakes if we use different *kinds* of flavoring (e.g., chocolate in one, toffee in the other), just as we end up with *two* cakes when we make them from *two* separate

⁴² Scotus, *Lect.*, 1.7.un., n. 58 (Vat. 16: 493.22-494.2): 'Quia quaero: a quo habet generatio quod sit univoca? Aut quia est distinctiva, et tunc omnis generatio esset univoca; aut quia est assimilativa, et tunc generatio in creaturis univoca erit propter hoc quod assimilatur in ratione naturae, licet sit distinctiva secundum principia individualia'; *Ord.*, 1.7.1, n. 48 (Vat. 4: 127.10-17): 'aut generatio dicitur aequivoca vel univoca ab aliquo termino formali generationis, aut formali proprio ipsi supposito producto. Si primo modo, cum natura ... sit eadem in producente et producto, sequitur univocatio, quia perfectissima similitudo. Si secundo modo, ergo nulla generatio est univoca, quia nullum genitum in forma sua individuali assimilatur gignenti'.

⁴³ Scotus, *Lect.*, 1.7.un., n. 60 (Vat. 16: 494.18-21): 'igitur similiter in divinis, licet Pater et Filius sint distinctae personae proprietatibus relativis, tamen propter convenientiam in natura generatio Filii a Patre erit univoca'; *ibid.*, n. 58 (Vat. 16: 494.2-5): 'Sed in divinis in natura est maxima assimilatio, licet non assimulantur in proprietatibus relativis ... igitur erit ibi generatio univoca propter convenientiam in natura'.

portions of batter.⁴⁴ For Ockham, different constituents always contribute some difference to the things they constitute.⁴⁵

Ockham recognizes, however, that some constituents are essential, while others are merely incidental to the things they constitute, and only essential constituents result in different kinds of things.⁴⁶ For example, it is essential to humans that they are rational animals, but it is only incidental whether they are male or female, black or white. Hence, men and women, black or white, are not different kinds of humans, for humans are not humans because of their gender or color.⁴⁷

Of course, we can consider something's essential and incidental constituents all together, as one aggregate whole. And in that case, says Ockham, any two such aggregates will be different in kind if their constituents are different. A bronze ring and a gold ring will be different in this sense, for even though they are both rings, they are made from different metals.⁴⁸

But this does not run against Ockham's point. After all, an aggregate is nothing more than the sum of the items that are aggregated together, so an

⁴⁴) Ockham, *Ord.*, 1.9.2 (OTh 3: 284.15-22): 'Quia sicut constituta non distinguuntur nisi per distinctionem constituentium, ita nec constituta possunt distingui tamquam alterius et alterius rationis nisi per distinctionem consimilem ipsorum constituentium. Et ideo sicut ex distinctione constituentium contingit inferre distinctionem constitutorum ita ex distinctione constituentium tali, scilicet quod sunt alterius rationis, contingit inferre consimilem distinctionem constitutorum'.

⁴⁵) Ockham, *Ord.*, 1.9.2 (OTh 3: 284.13-15): 'dico quod impossibile est aliqua constitutentia esse alterius rationis quin constituta ex illis, tamquam ex intrinsecis sibi, sint alterius et alterius rationis'; cf., *ibid.* (OTh 3: 290.1-5): 'dico quod si species, hoc est aliqua distincta specie, constituerent individua, illa individua necessario essent alterius rationis. Unde, universaliter, in creaturis impossibile est quod aliqua alterius rationis constituent aliqua individua per se in genere, nisi illa individua distinguantur specie'.

⁴⁶) Ockham, *Ord.*, 1.9.2 (OTh 3: 289.13-16): 'Et ideo, universaliter, numquam formaliter ex diversitate specifica extrinsecorum potest argui diversitas specifica illorum quibus sunt extrinseca'.

⁴⁷) Ockham, *Ord.*, 1.9.2 (OTh 3: 289.10-13, 16-18): 'Unde masculinitas et femineitas non faciunt diversitatem specificam in homine. Si tamen masculinitas et femineitas different specie et essent de essentia hominum, illi homines different specie. ... Sicut ex albedine et nigredine non potest argui quod homines illi, quorum unus est niger et alius albus, differunt specie vel quod sint alterius rationis'.

⁴⁸) Ockham, *Ord.*, 1.9.2 (OTh 3: 289.18-25): 'Tamen potest argui quod aggregata ex istis hominibus et albedine et nigredine sunt alterius rationis, sicut albedo et nigredo sunt alterius rationis. Et ideo si masculinitas et femineitas sint alterius rationis, necessario aggregata ex illis substantiis et masculinitate et femineitate erunt alterius rationis. Eodem modo dico quod quamvis circulus aeneus et aureus non sint alterius rationis, tamen illa aggregata sunt alterius rationis'.

aggregate of different items will be a different aggregate altogether. In other words, the items in an aggregate are essential to that aggregate, just as rationality is essential to a human. So when Ockham says that different kinds of constituents always result in different kinds of things, he is only talking about constituents that are *essential* to the things in question.⁴⁹

Against Scotus then, Ockham upholds the subordinationist's claim of T1, namely that different kinds of (essential) constituents contribute some difference in kind to the things they constitute. In fact, Ockham claims that if T1 were not true, we would have no way to establish when and why two things are different in kind in the first place.⁵⁰ But Scotus, recall, holds that some constituents contribute to something's kind, whereas other constituents do not. As Ockham puts it somewhat sarcastically:

Someone [like Scotus] might say that the simple fact that constituents are different in kind does not entail that the things they constitute are different in kind as well, even though constituents that are different in kind *in some special way* do entail that the things they constitute are different in kind.⁵¹

As Ockham sees it though, if we can say that certain constituents do not contribute a difference in kind to the things they constitute, then we could just as easily say that other constituents do not contribute a difference in kind either. (Or, conversely, we could just as easily say that any two things are the same in kind, even if their constituents are not.)⁵² Ockham writes:

You [viz., Scotus] say with ease that these particular constituents, which are different in kind, do not entail that the things they constitute are different in kind. But I can just as easily say that those other particular constituents—*whichever* ones you point to—which

⁴⁹ One small point: fatherhood and sonship are incidental features of creatures, but they are essential to the divine Father and Son (see the text quoted in note 8 above). Hence, Ockham would say that fatherhood and sonship do not contribute any difference in kind to *human* fathers and sons, but he will say (as we shall see) that they do contribute a difference in kind to the *divine* Father and Son.

⁵⁰ Ockham, *Ord.*, 1.9.2 (OTh 3: 284.22-25): 'Aliter enim numquam posset probari quod constituta essent alterius rationis, si non potest hoc probari per hoc quod constituenta sunt alterius rationis'.

⁵¹ Ockham, *Ord.*, 1.9.2 (OTh 3: 285.1-5): 'diceretur quod ex hoc simpliciter quod constituenta sunt alterius rationis non potest probari quod constituta sunt alterius rationis, tamen ex hoc quod ista constituenta sunt aliquo modo speciali alterius rationis potest probari quod constituta ex illis sunt alterius rationis'.

⁵² Ockham, *Ord.*, 1.9.2 (OTh 3: 285.24-286.2): 'Et ita dicam ego aequae facilius quod semper constituta erunt eiusdem rationis, tamen cum distinctione maiori et minori constituentium'.

are also different in kind, do not entail that the things they constitute are different in kind either.⁵³

Ockham thinks this is clearly absurd, for we cannot privilege some constituents over others. Unless all constituents that are different in kind contribute a difference in kind to the things they constitute, then none of them do, in which case we would have no principled way to show that two things are different in kind at all.⁵⁴

Ockham then applies all of this to the divine persons: although the Father and Son share the same divine essence, they have different unique constituents—the Father has his fatherhood, and the Son has his sonship. But since fatherhood and sonship are different in kind, the Father and Son must be as well.⁵⁵ Thus, while Scotus denies T3 (that the persons are different in kind), Ockham affirms it.

Ockham further takes issue with Scotus's claim that the Son's production is univocal. To this end, Ockham first explains what, in his view, makes a production univocal or equivocal. Now, since any given production involves a producer and a product, one might think that the producer is the starting-point or *source* of production, whereas the product is the end-point or *result* of production. For instance, when a sculptor produces a statue, one might say that the sculptor is the source, whereas the statue is the result of that production.

Accordingly, one might think that a production will be univocal when the source and the result are the same in kind, and it will be equivocal when they are different in kind. After all, productions are supposed to be univocal when the producer and the product are the same in kind, but otherwise they are equivocal (as T4 states).

But Ockham thinks there is more that can be said here. He agrees, of course, that the producer and the product must be the same in kind (and

⁵³) Ockham, *Ord.*, 1.9.2 (OTh 3: 285.13-18): 'Quia eadem facilitate qua tu [viz., Scotus] dicis quod ex hoc quod ista constituentia sunt sic alterius rationis non potest concludi quod constituta sunt alterius rationis, eadem facilitate dicam ego quod ex hoc quod ista constituentia, quibuscumque demonstratis, sunt sic alterius rationis non potest concludi quod constituta sunt alterius rationis'.

⁵⁴) Ockham, *Ord.*, 1.9.2 (OTh 3: 285.11-13, 286.2-6): 'dico quod nisi ex hoc generaliter quod constituentia sunt alterius rationis posset probari quod constituta sunt alterius rationis, numquam posset probari. ... Tum quia qua ratione potest inferri maior distinctio ex maiori distinctioe constituentium, eadem ratione ex hoc quod constituentia sunt alterius rationis potest inferri quod constituta generaliter erunt alterius rationis, vel numquam potest hoc inferri'.

⁵⁵) This is clear from the texts cited below in notes 65, and 67-68.

therefore that they must have the same kinds of constituents),⁵⁶ but as he sees it, we can be more precise about the real 'source' and 'result' of any given production.⁵⁷

On the side of the producer, Ockham thinks the real source of the production is the constituent in the producer that gives it the power to produce the product in question (e.g., the heat in a hot thing which makes it capable of heating other things). For convenience, I will call this the producer's 'power-pack'.⁵⁸ On the side of the product, Ockham thinks the 'results' of production include not just the whole product itself, but any constituent that gets produced in the product as a part of the process (e.g., the result of a sculptor's activity is not just the statue, but also the form of the statue as well).⁵⁹

Given this, Ockham maintains that a production will be univocal not only when the producer and the product are the same in kind, but also when the power-pack in the producer and the corresponding produced constituent in the product are the same in kind too. However, producers and products frequently have more than one power-pack or produced constituent, and in that case, the question becomes this: *which* power-pack in the producer is the source for *which* produced constituent in the product?

⁵⁶ Ockham, *Ord.*, 1.9.2 (OTh 3: 292.2-5): 'dico quod quando natura est eadem in generante et genito, et cuilibet essentiali in uno est aliquid simillimum in reliquo et simpliciter eiusdem rationis cum eo, est generatio simpliciter univoca'. Also, *Ord.*, 1.9.2 (OTh 3: 278.4-7): 'Sed loquendo de generatione substantiae, quae est generatio termini unius per se, sic dicitur generatio univoca quando generans et genitum non sunt alterius speciei'. Note that Ockham is only talking about the production of substances here, i.e., 'generation'. The production of accidental features works a little differently (see *Ord.*, 1.9.2 (OTh 3: 277.18-178.4)). But since the Son's production is more like a case of generation than anything else, Ockham focuses his attention on generation, and I will too. So when I say 'production', I mean the production *of a substance* (or at least something that is more like a substance than anything else), not the production of an accidental feature.

⁵⁷ Or, as Ockham puts it, *Ord.*, 1.9.2 (OTh 3: 277.6-8): 'Nunc autem est ita quod in generante creato et genito creato est duo considerare, scilicet "quod" et "quo"'.

⁵⁸ Ockham variously calls this constituent the 'power' (*potentia*), 'basis' (*ratio*), 'source' (*principium*), or 'that by which' (*quo*) a producer produces a product. But these are all synonyms for the constituent that provides the producer with its power to produce the product in question.

⁵⁹ Technically, Ockham talks about the 'formal result' of production, by which he means anything that comes to exist as the result of a production. *Ord.*, 1.5.3 (OTh 3: 70.22-23): 'dico quod terminus formalis productionis est illud quod capit esse simpliciter per illam productionem'. This includes any constituent that is produced in the product, as well as the whole product itself (though Ockham also calls the whole product the 'total result' of production, cf. *Ord.*, 1.5.3 (OTh 3: 70.23-71.4)).

This leads Ockham to distinguish between various grades of univocal production.⁶⁰ According to Ockham, the most univocal production occurs when each power-pack in the producer is the same in kind as each constituent in the product for which it is the source. This is the most univocal sort of production because each power-pack lines up in kind, so to speak, with each of its corresponding produced constituents.⁶¹

But lesser grades of univocal production can occur when at least one power-pack and at least one of its corresponding produced constituents are not the same in kind. Thus, if more than one kind of power-pack cooperates to produce one produced constituent, there will be at least one power-pack that is not the same in kind as the produced constituent.⁶² Similarly, if one power-pack results in more than one kind of produced constituent, there will be at least one produced constituent that is not the same in kind as the power-pack.⁶³

For instance, suppose that animals have more than one substantial form—(i) a ‘nutritive soul’ which provides the animal with the power to consume nutrients, grow, and most importantly, *reproduce*; and (ii) a ‘sentient soul’ which provides the animal with the power to take in and process sense-data. On this view, producing an animal would involve producing two different kinds of constituents in the product, namely a nutritive and a sentient soul.

However, the nutritive soul alone would be the power-pack for reproduction, so the nutritive soul would be the source of two different kinds of constituents in the product, namely the nutritive *and* the sentient souls. And that would mean that although the producer’s power-pack is the same in kind as one of the produced constituents in the product (the nutritive soul), it would

⁶⁰) Hence, Ockham, *Ord.*, 1.9.2 (OTh 3: 278.7-8): ‘Sed in ista generatione univoca sunt multi gradus’.

⁶¹) Ockham, *Ord.*, 1.9.2 (OTh 3: 278.9-12): ‘Si enim generans et genitum sint eiusdem speciei, et quilibet terminus formalis sit eiusdem speciei cum aliqua ratione agendi, et a nulla ratione agendi respectu sui distinguatur specie vel sit alterius rationis, tunc esset generatio perfectissime univoca’.

⁶²) Ockham, *Ord.*, 1.9.2 (OTh 3: 278.21-28): ‘Secundus gradus generationis univocae est si generans et genitum essent eiusdem speciei, et in utroque essent plures formae substantiales activae, et quaelibet illarum in generante concurreret tamquam causa partialis respectu cuiuslibet formae substantialis in ipso genito; tunc enim generans et genitum essent eiusdem rationis, et terminus quilibet formalis esset eiusdem speciei cum aliqua ratione agendi, et tamen ab aliqua esset alterius rationis, et in hoc non esset generatio perfectissime univoca’.

⁶³) Ockham, *Ord.*, 1.9.2 (OTh 3: 279.1-4): ‘Tertius gradus est si generans et genitum sint eiusdem speciei, et terminus formalis aliquis sit eiusdem rationis cum ratione agendi, et aliquis terminus formalis cum nulla ratione agendi sit eiusdem rationis’.

not be the same in kind as another of the produced constituents in the product (the sentient soul).

In this case then, the producer and the product would be the same in kind (and so have the same kinds of constituents), but nevertheless, the power-pack in the producer would not be the same in kind as at least one of the resulting produced constituents in the product. And that, says Ockham, would be a lesser sort of univocal production than a case where each power-pack and each of its corresponding produced constituents are the same in kind.⁶⁴

For Ockham then, univocal production requires at least that the producer and/or the product are the same in kind (and therefore have the same kinds of constituents). But in cases where there are many constituents in the producer and many in the product, univocal productions can be categorized into the more or less univocal.

Ockham next applies all of this to the Son's production: is it univocal, as Scotus claims? According to Ockham, it is not, strictly speaking. For every univocal production requires that the producer and the product have the same kinds of constituents, but the Father and the Son do not have the same kinds of constituents (they do not share fatherhood and sonship), so they cannot be the same in kind. Thus, the Son's production cannot be univocal.⁶⁵

I should note that Ockham also says—for reasons we need not get into—that the Son's production is not equivocal either, strictly speaking.⁶⁶ However,

⁶⁴ Ockham, *Ord.*, 1.9.2 (OTh 3: 279.4-16): 'Et ita est in generatione univoca omnium animalium, secundum unam opinionem, scilicet in generatione equi ab equo, bovis a bove, hominis ab homine, et sic de aliis. Quia, secundum aliquos, anima vegetativa differt et est alterius rationis ab anima sensitiva in istis, et ipsa sola anima vegetativa est ratio producendi et generandi, quia ipsa sola est potentia generativa, et tunc generans et genitum sunt eiusdem rationis, et aliquis terminus formalis, puta anima vegetativa in genito, est eiusdem rationis cum anima vegetativa in generante quae est ratio producendi, et aliquis terminus formalis, puta anima sensitiva, quamvis sit eiusdem rationis cum anima sensitiva generantis quae non est ibi ratio producendi, non tamen est eiusdem rationis cum anima vegetativa quae est ratio producendi'.

⁶⁵ Ockham, *Ord.*, 1.9.2 (OTh 3: 280.4-13): 'quia in generatione univoca generans et genitum sic sunt eiusdem rationis quod quodlibet essenziale in genito est simillimum alicui in generante, ita quod sit tanta similitudo et omnis modus similitudinis inter illud quod est in genito et illud quod est in generante quanta et qualis modus est inter hanc albedinem et illam, vel inter Sorstem et Platonem, vel inter hanc animam intellectivam et illam. Sed paternitas in Patre, quae est sibi essentialis, non tantum assimilatur filiationi quae est Filio essentialis quantum assimilaretur si essent duae paternitates in divinis'.

⁶⁶ Ockham, *Ord.*, 1.9.2 (OTh 3: 280.18-281.2): 'Secundo dico quod ista generatio [viz., generatio Filii] non est simpliciter aequivoca. Quia in generatione aequivoca semper est aliquid in genito quod distinguitur realiter ab omni illo quod est in generante et quod est alterius rationis ab omni illo. Sed in ista generatione nihil est in Filio producto quod distinguitur realiter ab

Ockham is not prepared to insist on this point too strongly, for he is happy to admit that the Son's production is equivocal if we assume that equivocal production simply requires that the producer and product have different kinds of constituents (and so are different in kind).⁶⁷ As he puts it:

If one were to say that a production is 'equivocal' whenever the producer and product are different in kind, then in the same way in which one concedes that some constituents in the Godhead are different in kind—as when one concedes that fatherhood and sonship are different in kind—one could also say that this production is equivocal.⁶⁸

Now, it might seem surprising to hear Ockham admitting that the Son's production can be characterized as equivocal. For given the subordinationist's claim that equivocal products are less perfect than their producers (namely, T7), would it not follow that the Son will therefore be subordinate to the Father?

According to Ockham, the answer is no. As he sees it, even if the Father and Son are different in kind, and therefore even if the Son's production is equivocal, the Son will still be just as perfect as his Father. For everything in the Godhead is perfectly identical to the divine essence, and for Ockham, this means that everything in God will be just as perfect as the divine essence too.⁶⁹

Indeed, if Cicero and Tully are the very same man, then even if we associate different concepts or names with each of them, in reality Cicero cannot be more or less perfect than Tully, for they are one and the same. Ockham thinks the same is true of the Godhead: the Son is the same as the divine essence, so he cannot be more or less perfect than the divine essence, and

omni illo quod est in Patre, quia nihil distinguitur realiter ab essentia Patris. Similiter in generatione aequivoca generans et genitum non sunt simpliciter una res; sed Pater et Filius sunt una res numero, puta una essentia numero; igitur etc.'

⁶⁷ Ockham, *Ord.*, 1.9.2 (OTh 3: 292.5-9): 'Sed sic [viz., quod producens et productum sunt eiusdem rationis, et ideo constituentia eorum sunt eiusdem rationis] non est in Deo, quia paternitas in Patre non est omni modo eiusdem rationis cum aliquo quod est essentialiter in Filio, quia non cum filiatione. Ad argumentum in oppositum dico quod [generatio Filii] non est simpliciter univoca, propter rationem dictam'.

⁶⁸ Ockham, *Ord.*, 1.9.2 (OTh 3: 281.10-14): 'Si tamen vocetur generatio "aequivoca" quandocumque generans et genitum sunt alterius rationis, illo modo quo conceditur quod paternitas et filiatio sunt alterius rationis—, potest dici quod ista generatio est aequivoca'.

⁶⁹ Ockham, *Ord.*, 1.7.1 (OTh 3: 126.17-20): 'Similiter sequeretur quod essentia esset perfectior relatione, quod est manifeste falsum, quia tunc relatio esset imperfectior essentia, quod est falsum, quia nihil est imperfectius in Deo'; *ibid.* (OTh 3: 127.7-10): 'Dico ergo quod sive paternitas sit principium elicativum generationis sive non, non est perfectior filiatione, propter identitatem realem utriusque cum eadem essentia numero'.

likewise for the Father. On Ockham's view then, there is just no way that any divine person could be less perfect than another, for everything in God is infinitely perfect.

Thus, even if we grant most of the subordinationist's argument, Ockham thinks T8 (that the Son is less perfect than the Father) does not follow. For Ockham, the Son cannot be inferior to the Father, so T8 is false.

This marks an important point of disagreement between Scotus and Ockham. Scotus agrees that everything in God is perfectly identical to the divine essence, but he also believes that fatherhood and sonship are 'formally distinct' from the divine essence.⁷⁰ We do not need to go into the details of what this distinction amounts to here, but one of the things this means for Scotus is that the divine essence has a different level of perfection than fatherhood and sonship: the divine essence is infinitely perfect, but fatherhood and sonship are not.⁷¹ Thus, Scotus clearly believes that the perfection of the

⁷⁰ For a brief definition of the formal distinction, see Scotus, *Ord.*, 1.2.2.1-4, n. 403 (Vat. 2: 356.13-357.1). For more about the formal distinction in Scotus, see (for example) Maurice Grajewski, *The Formal Distinction of Duns Scotus* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1944); Marilyn McCord Adams, 'Universals in the Early Fourteenth Century', in *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, ed. Norman Kretzmann et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 411-439; Adams, *William Ockham*, 1: 22-29; and Wolter, *Philosophical Theology*, 27-41. For the claim that the divine essence and the personal properties are formally distinct, see Scotus, *Ord.*, 1.5.2.un., n. 118 (Vat. 4: 69.15-17): 'unum simplicissimum [est constitutum] ex istis [viz., ex essentia divina et proprietate personali], quia una ratio est perfecte—immo perfectissime—eadem alteri, et tamen non formaliter eadem'; *ibid.*, n. 138 (Vat. 4: 78.11-13): 'Dico igitur breviter quod relatio [e.g., paternitas vel filiatio] et essentia [divina] ita sunt in persona [divina] . . . sed sunt perfecte idem, licet non formaliter'.

⁷¹ Scotus, *Ord.*, 1.13.un., n. 39 (Vat. 5: 85.7-9): 'probatio, quia nec relatio realis est formaliter perfectio infinita, quia tunc aliqua persona in divinis non haberet omnem perfectionem infinitam formaliter'; *Ord.*, 1.5.2.un., n. 127 (Vat. 4: 72.19-73.2): 'actus autem quiditativus [viz., personae divinae] est simpliciter perfectus, quia infinitus,—non sic autem est actus personalis de se formaliter infinitus'; *Quod.*, 5, n. 13 (Wad. 12: 128; AW, 118-119, n. 5.30): 'Omnis perfectio simpliciter est communicabilis; omne infinitum intensive est perfectio simpliciter; ergo, etc. Nulla autem proprietas personalis est communicabilis, quia est formalis ratio incommunicabiliter existendi; ergo nulla proprietas personalis est infinita intensive'. There is some debate about whether Scotus altered his theory of the formal distinction over the course of his career, and one of the issues here is whether Scotus ever countenanced distinct property-bearers within one and the same thing. On this, see Hester Gelber, 'Logic and the Trinity: A Clash of Values in Scholastic Thought, 1300-1335' (PhD dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1974), 71-102; Marilyn McCord Adams, 'Ockham on Identity and Distinction', *Franciscan Studies* 36 (1976), 5-74; and Richard Cross, 'Scotus's Parisian Teaching on Divine Simplicity', in *Duns Scotus à Paris: Actes du colloque de Paris, 2-4 septembre 2002*, ed. Olivier Boulnois et al., *Textes et Etudes du Moyen Âge*, 26 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2004), 519-562. But whether Scotus thinks there are formally distinct property-bearers within the Godhead or not, he very clearly maintains that the

divine essence does not formally 'transfer over', so to speak, to fatherhood and sonship (and, by extension, it does not formally 'transfer over' to the Father and Son).⁷²

But as we have seen, Ockham rejects this, maintaining instead that since everything in God is perfectly identical to the divine essence, everything in God must be just as perfect as the divine essence too.⁷³ Scotus, then, really does have to worry about subordination in the Godhead, but Ockham thinks subordination is just flat out impossible, no matter how different in kind the Father and Son might be.

4. Conclusion

This theological debate between Scotus and Ockham focuses our attention on an important metaphysical issue. If we look at all the constituents that

divine essence and the personal properties have different levels of perfection, and that is the crucial point for the issue I am considering here.

⁷²) Though Scotus would say that the Father and Son are infinitely perfect 'in virtue of' possessing the divine essence (see Cross, *Scotus on God*, 245-248). But the point is that the divine essence's perfection does not transfer over *formally* to the persons.

⁷³) Somewhat notoriously, Ockham does say that the divine essence is 'formally distinct' from fatherhood and sonship, even though he rejects Scotus's formal distinction elsewhere. This has led some to think, or at least imply, that although Ockham very much dislikes the formal distinction, he reluctantly accepts it in one case: the Trinity (see, e.g., Philotheus Boehner, *Collected Articles on Ockham*, 2nd edition, ed. Eligius Buytaert (St. Bonaventure, New York: The Franciscan Institute, 1992), 365ff). But in my opinion, this is not accurate, for Ockham clearly says that he uses the phrase 'formal distinction' in a different way than Scotus, namely as a mere label for cases where the scriptures or church doctrine require us to deny the transitivity of identity. Ockham, *Ord.*, 1.2.1 (OTh 2: 19.3-18): 'Unde universaliter dico quod nunquam de aliquibus verificatur distingui formaliter nisi propter distinctionem realem, quando scilicet de uno illorum vere dicitur quod est aliqua res et de reliquo vere dicitur quod non est illa res, sicut relatio et essentia [in divinis] distinguuntur formaliter, puta essentia et paternitas, quia videlicet essentia est filiatio et paternitas non est filiatio. ... Immo distingui formaliter non est aliud, sicut ego teneo distinctionem formalem, et hoc est quid nominis ipsius, scilicet quod unum illorum est aliqua res absoluta vel relativa et alterum non est illa res. ... Et quando est hoc possibile invenire, tunc est ponenda distinctio formalis, quia nihil aliud voco distingui formaliter; et quando non est possibile, tunc non est ponenda', and (OTh 2: 17.18-18.1): 'ideo non debet poni [formalis distinctio] nisi ubi evidenter sequitur ex creditis traditis in Scriptura Sacra vel determinatione Ecclesiae, propter cuius auctoritatem debet omnis ratio captivari'. See also *Ord.*, 1.2.6 (OTh 2: 175.1-9), 1.2.11 (OTh 2: 371.5-10), and *Quodlibeta Septem*, 1.3 (OTh 9: 20.1-3). For more on this, see Adams, 'Ockham on Identity and Distinction', 59-74, and *William Ockham*, 2: 1000-1003.

make up any given thing, which (if any) of them contribute to that thing's kind? That is, which of a thing's constituents are kind-contributors, and how does that play into the way that things are sorted into kinds?

First of all, we can rule out any incidental constituents as kind-contributors. For instance, the particular gender or color of a human does not make that person any more or less of a human, for being a particular gender or color is incidental to being human. But with incidental constituents ruled out, that just leaves a thing's essential constituents. So which (if any) of them contribute to that thing's kind?

As we have seen, Scotus distinguishes between two different kinds of essential constituents: quidditative and individual constituents. Of those, Scotus maintains that quidditative constituents contribute to a thing's kind, but individual constituents do not. Thus, for Scotus, two things will be the same in kind only if they have the same kinds of quidditative constituents.

Ockham, by contrast, rejects this. As he sees it, we cannot privilege some constituents over others, for otherwise we would have no way to show that two things are different in kind in the first place. Unless all of a thing's essential constituents contribute to its kind, then none of them do. For Ockham then, two things will be the same in kind only if they are constituted by exactly similar sets of (essential) constituents.

This means, however, that Ockham will only be able to say that two things are the same in kind if they do not have any unrepeatable (essential) constituents. After all, if two things each had a unique essential constituent, then no matter what else they had in common, they would not have their unique constituents in common, and by Ockham's reasoning, that would make them different in kind.

So Ockham's criticism of Scotus turns on the assumption that members of the same kind do not have any unique haecceities. And of course, that is just what Ockham believes, for as is well known, Ockham holds that every constituent is individual in and of itself, so he has no need for such things as 'haecceities'.⁷⁴

But Scotus would obviously reject this assumption, for as he sees it, members of the same kind do have such unrepeatable constituents. And given that, Scotus would have every right to insist that no two members of the

⁷⁴ Ockham, *Ord.*, 1.2.6 (OTh 2: 197.14-18): 'Et ita quaelibet res extra animam se ipsa erit haec; nec est quaerenda aliqua causa individuationis nisi forte causae extrinsecae et intrinsecae, quando individuum est compositum, sed magis esset quaerenda causa quomodo possibile est aliquid esse commune et universale'.

same kind could ever have exactly similar sets of constituents. They will have their quidditative constituents in common, but they will always differ with respect to their unique individual constituents.

Scotus and Ockham are thus separated on this issue by their distinctive views about what sorts of constituents go into individuals. Scotus believes in haecceities, whereas Ockham believes that every constituent is individual, and that pushes each of these authors in different directions. Nevertheless, these trinitarian discussions are fruitful in illustrating that for Scotus and Ockham, there is a close connection between the constitution of individuals and kind-membership.⁷⁵

⁷⁵) I want to thank Marilyn McCord Adams, Lodi Nauta, and three anonymous reviewers for a number of very helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. All errors, of course, are my own.